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ABSTRACT 
On 30 November 2000, the Accounting Standards Board issued Financial 
Reporting Standard 17 ('Retirement Benefits', FRS 17) to supersede Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice (`Accounting for Pension Costs', SSAP 24). It 
removed managerial discretion over the main actuarial assumptions used to 
estimate employers' pension obligations, and required the recognition of pension 
assets and liabilities on a consistent `fair value' basis. However, FRS 17 was 
only fully effective for reporting periods ending on or after 30 June 2005. 
This thesis examines empirically how the prolonged period associated with the 
debate, promotion and implementation of FRS 17 interacted with various 
managerial pension choices. Evidence of these interactions can help discriminate 
among competing theoretical perspectives concerning employers' long-term 
defined benefit pension obligations. This thesis draws upon these competing 
theoretical frameworks to develop and test hypotheses concerning the impact of 
pension accounting regulatory change on UK firms' discretion over pension 
actuarial assumptions, termination and asset allocation during the period 1998- 
2002. 
The empirical results support three major hypotheses. Firstly, the magnitude of 
expected rate of return on pension assets assumption used for financial reporting 
purposes is driven primarily by the UK firms' balance sheet leverage. Secondly, 
firms' defined pension benefits termination decision is inter-related with their 
pension financial reporting choices. Thirdly, the allocation of pension assets has 
been managed in a way to reduce firms' cash contribution risks that stem from 
measuring both pension assets and liabilities on a `fair value' basis. These 
findings imply managerial discretionary behaviour related to these choices is 
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consistent with the perspective that employer firms and their sponsored pension 
funds are an integrated economic entity, as is asserted by the new UK pension 
accounting rule (FRS 17). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
Over the past few decades, an ever-larger proportion of workers in many 
OECD countries appear prepared to accept long-term deferred compensation in 
the form of the employer-sponsored defined benefit pensions (Bodie, 1990). 
However, rising demographic pressure, economic and social dislocations 
associated with greater volatility in both labour and capital markets in recent 
years have put strains on these pension arrangements. Indeed one of the greatest 
challenges facing the UK economy now and increasingly in the decades ahead is 
to provide retirement income security in an environment characterized by a rising 
ratio of retired to working age population. 
The accounting rules that govern the measurement and reporting of 
employers' pension obligations and costs are a very important part of the 
regulatory structure that has been developed to govern the accountability of the 
pension industry and related participants. To meet the challenge for the greater 
accountability of corporate pension sponsorship and to enhance internationally 
comparable pension GAAPs, the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
decided to replace former GAAP (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24, 
`Accounting for Pension Costs', hereinafter `SSAP 24', issued in 1988) with 
Financial Reporting Standard No. 17, `Retirement Benefits' (hereinafter `FRS 
17') in 2000. 
SSAP 24 separated accounting and funding objectives of employers' 
pension sponsorship. It merely required firms sponsoring defined benefit pension 
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plans to disclose actuarial assumptions underlying the ratio of conservatively- 
determined pension assets to liabilities in the notes to the financial statements. 
SSAP 24 also allowed considerable managerial discretion over valuation 
frequency (a minimum of once every three years), and the measurement of 
pension assets as well as the main actuarial assumptions used to estimate 
employers' pension costs and liabilities. There was also very limited disclosure 
of those main actuarial valuation assumptions used for financial reporting 
purposes. 
New UK GAAP (FRS 17) takes a radically different approach by 
focusing primarily on the balance sheet impact of firms' pension exposures, 
measured using `fair value' principles. However, UK companies adopting FRS 
17 quickly found that their balance sheets became more volatile due to the need 
to report changes in the market values of pension fund assets, which in many 
cases were heavily invested in equities. This situation was exacerbated by rapidly 
declining stock prices, to the point where many of the FTSE 100 companies 
reported their large pension deficits! These net deficits have forced many UK 
sponsoring firms to make immediate cash contributions, terminate their defined 
benefit pension plans or close their defined benefit provisions to new employees. 
Due to sustained industry pressure, in July 2002 the ASB indefinitely 
delayed fully implementing FRS 17. Consequently, UK firms are required to 
continue reporting pension assets and liabilities under both old UK GAAP 
(SSAP 24 - actuarial based valuation) and new UK GAAP (FRS 17 - market 
based valuation). The ASB deliberations require, as of the 2001 reporting year, 
UK sponsors have to disclose annually the difference between the value of assets 
1 The Financial Times of July 28,2003 claimed that efforts by UK companies to fill a £160 
billion `pension black hole' as revealed by FRS 17 would even `hold back UK economic growth'. 
2 
and liabilities of their sponsored pension funds, measured using a standardized 
`fair value' basis, alongside with the SSAP 24 disclosures in the footnote to their 
financial statements. 
1.2. MOTIVATION 
Accounting for the costs of pensions in the accounts of employer 
companies is a complex estimation process that involves material amounts, long 
duration, and future investment, mortality and inflation risk uncertainties that are 
subject to sophisticated actuarial inputs. Thereby the term of pension accounting 
has so far evolved to define a set of accounting problems that affect a range of 
measurement and reporting issues associated with contractual pension 
commitments made by employers to their employees (Klumpes, 2001, p. 30). 
Most of the early US-based empirical research on pension accounting has 
focused on explaining how the capital market prices the unfunded pension 
liabilities (e. g. Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Dhaliwal, 1986), and what 
constitutes the appropriate pension liability measure (e. g. Landsman, 1986). 
However, changes in legislative requirements, economic condition and the size 
of pension exposures in relation to market capitalization of sponsoring firms 
have placed increasing pressure for pension accounting regulation to safeguard 
the financial accountability of employer sponsors. In response to pressure for 
changes, the accounting profession's concern has shifted to issues as to whether 
the `fair value' approach is appropriate in measurement and reporting of pension 
assets as well as employers' pension costs and liabilities. 
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In the UK the promulgation of FRS 17 culminated a broader debate 
within the UK actuarial profession as to whether pension fund valuation should 
remain grounded in traditional `discounted cash flow' valuation approach or 
should be made more consistent with the `market-based' valuation approach 
advocated by modern financial economics theory (Klumpes and Li, 2004). 
Traditionalists argued for a continuation of the cost-based methodology (i. e. 
cash-flow relationship of assets to liabilities based on long-term funding 
assumptions) then espoused under existing SSAP 24 (e. g. Day and McKelvey, 
1963; Greenwood and Keogh, 1997). Opponents are in favour of valuation 
assumptions consistent with the principles of financial economics (e. g. Smith, 
1996; Exley et al., 1997) as advocated in FRS 17. 
The differences between SSAP 24 and FRS 17 draw attention to the 
potential for differences in long-term actuarial versus short-term corporate 
financial perspectives for employers' pension reporting and corporate pension 
management decision. Further empirical research is needed to add to existing 
knowledge in the area of pension accounting through discriminating among 
alternative theoretical perspectives, which in turn bears direct applicability to 
pension accounting practices. 
If fully implemented, FRS 17 requires the mandated recognition of 
pension plan assets and liabilities on sponsors' balance sheets. Adoption of FRS 
17 also increases the volatility of the income statement and the balance sheet. US 
pension GAAP (Statement of Financial Reporting Standards No. 87, `Accounting 
for Pension Costs') avoids such financial statement volatilities by permitting 
fluctuations of net pension assets and liabilities values to remain unrecognized in 
the financial statements. Unlike SFAS 87, FRS 17 requires pension actuarial 
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gains and losses to be immediately written off and permits balance sheet 
recognition of excess pension surpluses. Consequently, FRS 17 explicitly 
recognizes the existence of the employers' implicit option to terminate their 
defined benefit pension obligations. 
The change of pension accounting rules from SSAP 24 to FRS 17 also 
reflects the international accounting standard setter's move towards a 
comprehensive `fair value' based accounting model in general. The International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is currently deliberating whether IAS 19 
(International Accounting Standard No. 19, revised 1998, `Employee Benefits') 
should be made more consistent with FRS 17. Consequently, the prolonged delay 
in implementing FRS 17-style pension accounting in the UK affords an 
opportunity to conduct an empirical investigation that examines managerial 
discretionary behaviour related to various aspects of corporate pension 
management decision over an extended adoption period of new UK pension 
accounting rules. 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The overall aim of the thesis is to examine empirically how the prolonged 
period associated with the debate, promotion and implementation of FRS 17 
interacted with various managerial pension choices. Evidence of these 
interactions can help discriminating among competing theoretical perspectives 
concerning employers' long-term defined benefit pension obligations. Main 
research objectives of the thesis are divided into three areas. 
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1.3.1. Pension Actuarial Assumption Choices 
Changes in actuarial valuation assumptions have effects on reported 
pension costs, cash flows and contracting costs of sponsoring firms with 
significant pension exposure. The traditional actuarial approach in pension 
accounting under SSAP 24 permitted employer sponsors with discretion to 
measure both pension assets and liabilities using expected rate of return on equity 
investment (ERR). In the late 1980s, there was concern that UK companies were 
using such discretion allowed by SSAP 24 to manipulate pension costs, in order 
to smooth corporate earnings (Whittington and McGeachin, 2003, p. 89). 
FRS 17 radically reduced the flexibility formerly available to UK firms 
sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to manipulate the level of ERR 
assumptions. The first objective of this thesis is to investigate whether UK 
managers have used their discretion under SSAP 24 to determine the reported 
ERR assumption opportunistically, and whether UK firms have responded to the 
new pension accounting rule through their discretionary choices of the ERR 
assumptions for reporting purposes. 
The empirical analysis identifies and examines some possible 
opportunistic and/or economic determinants associated with managerial 
discretion over the magnitude of reported key pension valuation assumptions 
during a period that covers both pre- and post- pension accounting rule change in 
the UK. It seeks to answer the question of whether pension reporting 
requirements prescribed by new pension accounting standard (FRS 17) have 
enhanced the comparability of pension costs among firms as they are intended. 
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1.3.2. Pension Termination Decision 
An important issue in pension accounting is whether employer sponsored 
pension schemes are to be effectively treated as financial subsidiaries of the 
sponsoring firm or as distinct separate entities. To discriminate among differing 
perspectives, prior research focuses on employers' propensity to terminate 
defined benefit pension plans with excess pension assets. However, the 
accounting implications of managing under-funded defined benefit pension plans 
has not attracted much attention from prior researchers. The second objective of 
this thesis is to examine whether economic decision concerning termination of 
under-funded defined benefit pension plans is primarily driven by corporate 
financial characteristics of the employer firm, or by fundamental characteristics 
of their sponsored pension funds. 
The empirical analysis develops and tests alternative integration, 
separation and risk management explanations of sponsoring firms' propensity to 
terminate under-funded defined benefit pension plans, and its inter-relationship 
with their discretionary ERR updating behaviour. It seeks to answer the question 
of whether the recognition of pension deficit as debt on sponsoring firms' 
balance sheet as required under FRS 17 has influenced their decision to terminate 
sponsored defined benefit pension plans. 
1.3.3. Pension Asset Allocation Decision 
The adoption of `fair value' approach in pension accounting, consistent 
with the corporate finance perspective, implies a short-term volatility mismatch 
between pension assets and liabilities. Prior empirical research on corporate 
pension asset allocation decision has yielded rather mixed results (e. g. Friedman, 
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1983; Bodie et al., 1987; Peterson, 1996; Frank, 2002) in discriminating among 
alternative theoretical perspectives. In the late 1990s, a new body of theoretical 
literature concerning pension asset allocation develops asset/liability models of 
portfolio management taking into account not only asset returns but also changes 
in pension liabilities and their covariance with asset returns (e. g. Sharpe, 1990; 
Blake, 2003). The third objective of this thesis is to provide further empirical 
knowledge into sponsoring firms' pension asset allocation decision over a period 
of regulatory uncertainty about the development of pension accounting and 
funding rules. 
The empirical analysis identifies and examines possible determinants 
associated with the firms' choices over alternative asset categories (e. g. equity 
versus bonds). It seeks to answer the question of whether volatilities implied by 
FRS 17 on employer sponsors' financial statements affect corporate pension 
asset allocation decision. 
1.4. CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis provides unique insights into the nature and impact of 
changing UK pension accounting policy regulation towards a `fair value' 
approach. It contributes to existing knowledge of employers' pension cost 
accounting through empirical investigation into the effects of pension accounting 
rule change and its inter-relationship with various managerial pension choices 
over an extended period associated with the debate, promotion and 
implementation of FRS 17. 
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This thesis also extends the literature which attempts to discriminate 
among competing theoretical perspectives concerning employers' long-term 
pension obligations. It develops and tests hypotheses explaining UK firms' 
discretion over pension actuarial assumptions, termination and asset allocation 
during an extended period associated with the debate, promotion and 
implementation of FRS 17 (1998-2002). Finally, this thesis identifies and 
recognizes some unresolved issues in prior empirical studies, such as the 
endogeneity between managerial pension actuarial assumption choices, pension 
funding and investment decision, and makes attempts to control for them in 
empirical design and testing. 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes 
the development of UK legislative framework on private pension provisions, and 
the international differences in current practice of employers' pension cost 
accounting. Chapter 3 provides a critical review of major theoretical perspectives 
on corporate pension sponsorship and explores their implications for interpreting 
the findings of prior pension-related empirical research. 
Chapters 4 to 6 comprise the empirical part of the thesis. Chapter 4 
presents an empirical study on the determinants of the expected rate of return on 
pension assets assumption as disclosed by UK sponsors. Chapter 5 examines the 
corporate decision to terminate their defined benefit pension plans and its 
potential linkage with the corporate pension financial reporting choices. Chapter 
6 presents a related empirical study that focuses on pension asset allocation 
decision, and its inter-relationship with corporate pension funding and pension 
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reporting choices. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of this thesis, 
outlines its potential limitations and suggests the scope of further research. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries in the world to 
develop formal private pension arrangements (beginning in the 18th Century) 
and was also one of the first to begin the process of systematically reducing 
unfunded state provisions (beginning in the 1980s) in favour of funded private 
provisions (Blake, 2001, p. 3). The majority of private pensions in the UK are 
employer sponsored pensions, often known as occupational pension schemes. 2 
As the work force industrialized and life expectancies extended, the UK 
government has encouraged the growth of privately-funded retirement savings in 
order to achieve a reduction in the cost of public old-age pensions and improve 
the adequacy of retirement income. As a result, the late 1980s witnessed a rapid 
growth in the membership of occupational pension schemes. Currently there are 
over 25 million members in the UK participating in over 90,000 occupational 
pension schemes. 3 
There are two basic types of occupational pension schemes in the UK, 
defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) scheme. Historically the 
most common have been defined benefit (DB) pension schemes. The principal 
features that distinguish these two types of schemes are how members' benefits 
are measured and the relative risks borne by scheme members and sponsoring 
employers. Details for the differences between DB and DC schemes are 
2 Occupational pension schemes are schemes arranged by and contributed to by the employer. 
3 Available from data collected by the Pension Schemes Registry, which was set up by the UK 
government under the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (replaced by the Pension 
Regulator on April, 2005) for tracing purposes and collecting a levy from pension schemes. See 
http: //thepensionregulator. gov. uk/opraArchive/pensionSchemesUK/opraArichive_pensionSchem 
esUK. pdf. 
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summarized in Appendix A. In particular, employers face differential incentives 
and risks dependent upon whether their sponsored schemes are DB or DC in 
nature. For example, the employer sponsoring a DB scheme bears the risk that an 
individual will live longer in retirement or the investment return on his/her 
pension contributions will be lower than anticipated at the time when retirement 
benefits were determined. 
Accounting for defined contribution pension plans is simple because they 
are always by definition fully funded. By contrast, defined benefit pension plans 
are not always fully funded and potential mismatch of pension assets and 
liabilities cause incentive problems to arise. This thesis focuses on defined 
benefit pension schemes provided by UK firms because employers' pension 
accounting rules are primarily designed to regulate and safeguard accountability 
by employers sponsoring defined benefit pension schemes. 
This Chapter briefly describes the relevant UK legislative framework 
covering occupational pension arrangements and compares it with the US 
legislation. 4 It then briefly discusses the associated professional accounting rules 
governing the reporting of employers' pension cost information in major 
accounting jurisdictions (i. e. UK, USA and international GAAP). The purpose of 
this Chapter is to provide an overview of the major institutional arrangements 
governing the accountability of sponsored pensions, which in turn have 
important implications on the development of employers' pension cost 
accounting. 
4 Regulation of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) schemes differs significantly 
and this section focuses on legislation regulating defined benefit pension schemes as relevant to 
the thesis. 
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The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 
provides a brief description of UK legislation on occupational pensions with a 
focus on pension funding regulation. Section 2.3 compares the relevant UK 
pension institutional features with those in the USA. Section 2.4 examines the 
current accounting practices for employers' pension costs (UK, USA and 
International GAAP). It provides a comparative analysis between the UK (SSAP 
24 and FRS 17), the USA (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, 
`Employers' Accounting for Pensions') and international pension accounting 
standard (International Accounting Standard No. 19, revised 1998, `Employee 
Benefits'). The proposed international convergence of pension accounting 
standards is also discussed. Section 2.5 concludes this Chapter. 
2.2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UK LEGISLATION ON 
PRIVATE PENSIONS 
Privately funded pensions (both occupational and personal) have been a 
success in the UK in terms of their coverage of the labour force on a voluntary 
basis (attaining 75 percent), asset size (amounting to 80 percent of GDP) and 
investment performance (Davis, 2001, p. 9). The success and growth of the 
employer pension sponsorship have also made private pension funds one of the 
most important institutional investors in the UK economy. This section briefly 
overviews the UK government's pension reform legislation since the 1980s and 
describes the main features of legislation governing occupational pension 
schemes. 
5 The legal and regulatory arrangements which apply to employer sponsored pensions are subject 
to continual change. The relevant legislation and regulation discussed and analysed in this 
Chapter are extant as of December, 2002. 
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2.2.1. Pre-1995 
Concerns about the state's ability to pay for the state pension 
commitments coupled with demographic trends of an ageing population, resulted 
in a change of public policy in the 1980s, with an emphasis on the private sector 
provision of pensions (World Bank, 1994). During the 1980s, the UK 
government conducted a major study of the relationship between social security 
and pension funds in light of projected demographic changes. It proposed 
pension reform legislation to further encourage privately funded pensions (both 
occupational and personal), so as to reduce the burden of unfunded social 
security pensions. 
The Social Security Act 1980 replaced the indexation of the basic 
pensions from earnings growth to the change in the retail price index. Further, 
the Social Security Act 1986 reduced the pension benefits of the State Earnings- 
Related Pension Scheme ('SERPS'), and encouraged individual employees to opt 
out of SERPS6 into a funded private pension system. A smaller, but growing 
number of individuals have been covered by individual private pension 
arrangements, typically known as personal pensions or stakeholder pensions 
since its introduction in April 1988 (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992). 
In December 1991, there was a notorious public scandal about Robert 
Maxwell's looting of the Mirror Group pension funds. Over 18,000 Maxwell 
pensioners lost their pension entitlement because of his fraudulent theft of over 
£160 million pension assets during 1990-1991. In light of the increased public 
awareness about the lack of legislative framework governing those responsible 
6 SERPS has been replaced by the State Second Pension (S2P) since 2003. 
7 See Whitehouse (1998) and Blake (2001) for an overview of the UK pension system. 
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for managing pension funds, the Pension Law Review Committee (Goode 
Committee) was established by the Government to review whether the existing 
pension laws could be improved. Subsequently, the Goode Report, published in 
1993, proposed to strengthen the legislative backing of regulations governing 
funded pensions and to protect pension members' rights. 
2.2.2. The 1995 Pension Act 
It was not until the late 1990s that the UK government policy of funded 
pensions had undergone significant changes. Pension reform legislation became 
top of the UK government agenda after a number of significant cases of apparent 
abuses of the employer pension sponsorship (e. g. Maxwell scandal). These 
scandals raised alarm about the adequacy of the existing regulatory framework. 
Proposals on tightening the regulation of occupational pensions by the Goode 
Report were subsequently codified in the new Pension Act 1995. Designed to 
ensure the security of pension plan beneficiaries and protect their rights, the 
Pension Act 1995 established minimum standards for trustee fiduciary duties and 
pension fund reporting. In fact, the main features of the current UK regulatory 
framework on private pension provisions were established by the Pension Act 
1995 (the 1995 Act). 
2.2.2.1 Supervision 
The 1995 Act established a new Occupational Pensions Regulatory 
Authority (OPRA)8 to enforce compliance with the new pension legislation. The 
overriding objectives of OPRA are to: (i) protect the rights of pension 
8 The Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) has been replaced by the Pensions 
Regulator effective from April, 2005. 
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participants; (ii) ensure that assets invested in occupational pension schemes 
remain safe. 
In particular, OPRA has extensive powers in regulating the activities of 
employers and trustees in relation to the pension scheme. The 1995 Act requires 
every pension scheme to appoint an auditor and an actuary. It lays down in 
Section 48(1) the responsibilities of scheme auditors and scheme actuaries to 
report to OPRA if they have `reasonable causes' to believe that there has been a 
breach of duty relevant to the scheme's administration by the employer, trustees, 
administrator or a professional adviser. 
2.2.2.2 Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) 
To ensure the adequacy of funding to schemes, the Goode Report (1993) 
recommended a minimum solvency standard for pension funds. The 1995 Act, 
under section 56(1), introduced the statutory Minimum Funding Requirement 
(MFR). The statutory `Minimum Funding Requirement' (MFR) specifies a 
minimum funding basis for a defined benefit pension scheme and an associated 
schedule of necessary contributions, effective in April 1997. 
Obligation to meet the statutory MFR requirement was dealt with in 
section 59 and section 60, which state that schemes must ensure that `the value of 
the assets of the schemes are not less than the amount of the liabilities of the 
scheme'. The detailed workings of compliance to statutory MFR requirement 
were set out in the Occupational Pension Schemes (Minimum Funding 
Requirement and Actuarial Valuations) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/1536) and 
Guidance Note 27 (GN 27) from the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries. 
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Compliance with the statutory MFR requirement was based on an annual 
valuation by the scheme appointed actuary using market values for scheme assets 
and prescribed assumptions for scheme liabilities under GN 27. A `serious under- 
provision' arises under the 1995 Act section 60(1) in the case where the 
scheme's assets are less than 90 percent of its liabilities. The sponsoring 
employers with funds falling below 90 percent of the MFR are required to 
increase their cash contributions so as to eliminate the deficit within one year. A 
five year period was set for those falling in the region of 90 to 100 percent of the 
required MFR. 9 
However, the MFR met with stringent criticism in the pension industry 
and the actuarial profession. The criticism was centred on its failure to take 
account of specific circumstances of individual schemes and to encourage an 
appropriate long-term investment strategy for meeting employer-specific pension 
commitments. The UK business press has cited minimum funding rules as one of 
regulatory burdens which discouraged employers' long-term pension investment 
decision. In 2001, the UK government issued the Myners Review of Institutional 
Investments to address the growing criticism against MFR rules and its potential 
negative impact on pension investments. The Myners Review (2001) proposed to 
abolish the MFR and replace it with scheme-specific funding requirements. '° 
9 This was amended by the Occupational Pension Schemes (Minimum Funding Requirement and 
Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/380). 
10 In 2002 the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) issued a Green Paper "Simplicity, 
security and choice: working and saving for retirement". To ensure extra protection for scheme 
members' retirement benefits, the pensions Green Paper (DWP, 2002) proposed to introduce 
some form of insurance or a centralized `clearing house' arrangement when the employer 
becomes insolvent with under-funded defined benefit pension schemes. The pensions Green 
Paper (DWP, 2002) went further to propose a new pension regulator (Pension Protection Fund) 
whose objectives and resources focused on protecting the benefits of scheme members. The issue 
of the Green Paper 2002 began a new phase in UK pension legislation reform. 
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Pension funding legislation has been subject to continuous disputes 
because of the theoretical controversy over the ownership of any pension 
surpluses or deficits. " UK legislation has so far permitted the share of pension 
surplus by employer sponsors through reducing or suspending contributions (i. e. 
contribution holidays). The Myners Review recommended a reduction of the tax 
penalty for recovery of surpluses and greater clarity in the ownership of surpluses 
by the sponsoring firm (Davis, 2001). Since the Myners Review report was 
published in 2001, considerable public attention was paid to the closure of 
defined benefit pension plans by UK sponsoring firms. In many cases, a defined 
contribution scheme was offered to new employees instead. This shift, together 
with an ageing population and maturing workforces, has put heightened strain on 
the privately funded pension system in the UK. 12 
2.2.2.3 Information Disclosure (SORPs) 
The 1995 Act, under section 41(1), requires trustees to provide annual 
audited pension fund financial report to scheme members. Information disclosed 
in pension fund financial reports is subject to the `Statement of Recommended 
Practice' (SORPs). The Accounting Standards Committee issued SORP 1 
`Pension Scheme Accounts' in 1986. As stated in the Explanatory Foreword to 
SORPs issued by the ASC in May 1986, SORPs are developed in the public 
interest and set out current best accounting practice. 13 
11 The excess of pension assets to pension liabilities leads to pension surpluses and the reverse 
results in pension deficits. 
12 On 11th February 2004, the UK government enacted the 2004 Pensions Act (the 2004 Act). 
The 2004 Act implemented the Green Paper proposals for pension reform published in December 
2002 and subsequent public announcements made in 2003 about increasing protection for 
members' benefits. In relation to occupational pension schemes, the Act proposed the 
replacement of the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) with a new "statutory funding 
objective. " 
13 The primary aims in issuing SORPs are to narrow the areas of difference and variety in the 
accounting treatment of the matters with which they deal and to enhance the usefulness of 
published accounting information. 
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However, the Goode Committee's report recommended a review of 
SORP 1 on the grounds that `the value of the annual report to members and other 
users could be improved if a review of its form and contents were undertaken. ' In 
1996 the ASB recognized Pension Research Accountants Group (PRAG) as the 
appropriate organisation to issue SORPs. A revision of SORP 1 was 
subsequently undertaken by PRAG with a view to updating the guidance 
incorporating developments in legislation and improving the usefulness of the 
pension fund annual report to scheme members. In July 1996 a revised Statement 
of Recommended Practice, `Financial Reports of Pension Schemes', ('revised 
SORP') was issued by the Pension Research Accountants Group (PRAG). The 
pension fund annual financial report was subject to the revised SORP from years 
ending on or after 6 April 1997. The legal enforceability of SORPs was 
sanctioned by the 1995 Act. 
2.3. COMPARISON WITH THE US LEGISLATION 
The recent UK pension legislative developments outlined above mirror 
those affecting the US thirty years earlier. Both the UK and USA share common 
economic and social pressures for pension legislation reform. The US 
government legislation regulating private pensions was developed in the USA in 
1974. Table 2.1 summarizes various aspects of the relevant institutional features 
governing occupational pensions in both countries, each of which are briefly 
discussed in more detail below. 
19 
TABLE 2.1 
Comparative Institutional Features Underpinning Employer Sponsored 
Pension Plans in the UK and USA 
Employer-sponsored UK 
pension 
USA 
Supervisory legislation Pension Act 1995 
Pension Funding Minimum Funding 
Regulation Requirement, 1997; 
section 56 
Regulations to mandate Pension Act 1995; 
annual pension fund section 41 
financial reporting 
ERISA 1974 
Minimum Funding 
Standards, 1974; section 
302(f) 
ERISA 1974, section 103 
Employers' Pension SSAP 24 (1988) SFAS 87 (1985) 
Accounting Standard FRS 17 (2000) 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA 1974) 
constitutes a far-reaching and controversial attempt to reform legislation of the 
private pension system (Stone, 1982). The first national uniform legislation for 
US private sector pension funds was instigated by the ERISA 1974. It established 
minimum standards for vesting, funding, investment and information disclosure 
for pension funds, and stimulated the subsequent development of employers' 
pension cost accounting standard by the FASB during the late 1980s (Stone, 
1982). 14 
In terms of its nature and far-reaching impact on private pensions, ERISA 
1974 is similar to the Pension Act 1995 in the UK. One feature worth noting in 
14 Stone (1982) points out that the Discussion Memorandum, Employers' Accounting for 
Pensions and Other Postemployment Benefits (FASB, 1981), for example, begins with an 
overview that cites several reasons why the FASB has undertaken this project. Included in the 
section on `Reason for the Project' is a reference to the `significant changes in laws and 
regulations, including the introduction of the Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA)'. 
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the UK is that the funded pensions are founded upon trust laws. Traditionally 
protection against insolvent employer is afforded through trust funds. The 
interests of beneficiaries are set out in the trust deeds. Trustees have a fiduciary 
duty under the Trustees' Act 2001 to preserve the trust capital and to apply the 
capital and its income according the trust deeds (Blake, 2003). The Pension Act 
1995 permits trustees' greater power in safeguarding the schemes' investments 
and solvency. 15 
The minimum funding standards set by the ERISA 1974 are more 
stringent than the equivalent UK Minimum Funding Requirements (MFR). 
Under ERISA 1974 section 302(f), a lien is imposed upon US employer sponsors 
that fail to meet minimum funding standards. The retirement benefits have to be 
paid up to the guaranteed levels, even if the sponsors' plan contains insufficient 
funds. Furthermore, ERISA 1974 established the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), which guaranteed the payment of defined benefit pension 
benefits in case of insolvency of employer sponsors. 16 Employer sponsors in the 
US could exchange their pension liabilities to PBGC plus 30 percent of firms' 
assets if they are unable to meet their promises to workers. The PBGC plan 
termination insurance program has substantially influenced the financial nature 
of US firms' unfunded pension obligations (Stone, 1982). A similar programme 
has not yet been implemented in the UK. 17 
15 With respect to other aspects of private pension systems in the UK, for example in terms of 
benefit design, UK total accrued benefit pensions are required to provide customer price 
inflation-linked increases both in deferment (i. e. between leaving service and retirement) and in 
retirement payment (Davis, 2001). In contrast, ERISA 1974 only mandates sponsoring firms to 
maintain the level of benefits accruing at which the fund can meet all its current obligations 
which is not indexed to earnings up to retirement. 
16 See ERISA 1974 section 4002(a). 
17 In March 2005, UK government established a new pension regulator (Pension Protection 
Fund), similar in nature with PBGC in the US, which guarantees defined benefit pension 
obligations. 
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ERISA 1974, under Section 103, requires annual financial reports to be 
submitted by all pension employer sponsors to the Department of Labour, which 
include summary financial statements of assets and liabilities. The 5500 Form is 
filed annually with the Internal Revenue Service within 210 days after the end of 
the plan year. It includes financial information about the plan and must be 
provided to plan participants upon request. '8 The financial reporting of pension 
funds is also subject to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 36 
(SFAS 36, Disclosure of Pension Information). However, unlike the equivalent 
UK standard SORP 1 (revised), US pension funds need only report pension 
assets available to settle accrued pension benefit obligations. 
Professionally developed accounting standards (GAAP) provide an 
important source of regulated information about employer pension sponsorship. 
This is because employer sponsors are also subject to Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) as promulgated by professional accounting 
standards setting bodies. Related pension information is provided in firms' 
financial statements prepared by US employer sponsors under requirements of 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 ('Employers' 
Accounting for Pensions', SFAS 87), and Statement No. 132, ('Employers' 
Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits', SFAS 132). 
The following section provides an overview of current pension 
accounting practices (UK, USA and international GAAP). 19 It focuses on the 
international differences in measurement and valuation issues associated with 
employers' pension cost accounting and concludes with a brief introduction of 
18 Employers with fewer than 100 employees must file using Form 5500-GR. 
19 A chronology of the development of UK and international pension accounting standards since 
1980s can be found in Appendix B. 
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the proposed international convergence of employers' pension accounting 
standards. 
2.4. EMPLOYERS' PENSION COSTS ACCOUNTING 
Professionally-developed pension accounting rules in both the US and 
UK are intertwined with pension regulations to enhance the accountability of 
employer sponsors. Most recently, the employers' pension cost accounting rules 
are of growing economic significance given the fact that pension assets and 
liabilities are now important components of firms' overall financial structure and 
strategy. This can be demonstrated from the pension footnote disclosure by 
British Telecommunications Group (hereinafter BT Group) at its accounting year 
end of 2002 upon adopting FRS 17. 
BT group had an actuarial present value of plan benefits obligation of £29 
billion at the end of 2002. With pension assets of about £27 billion at market 
value, the company had "unfunded" pension liabilities of £2 billion. The market 
value of pension assets of this public listed company amounted to about 60 
percent of its total corporate assets and 128 percent of its shareholders' funds. 
Furthermore, the pension liabilities of BT at the end of 2002 amounted to about 
182 percent of its outstanding long-term corporate liabilities. The BT group's 
pension exposure illustrates how the presence of large, unfunded pension 
liabilities can have potential effects upon the financial structure and corporate 
management of UK sponsoring firms. 
At the time when FRS 17 was in effect, FTSE 100 companies employed 
3.5 million pensionable workers in the UK, and incurred total annual pension 
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costs of over £3 billion in 2001, comprising 5 percent of their pre-tax profits 
(Lane, Clarke and Peacock, 2001). Pension assets for these companies at 2001 
amounted to about £250 billion's worth with a combined pension deficit of about 
£25 billion. Changes in the economic conditions, the nature of pension schemes 
themselves, and corresponding legislative reform all have caused the pressures in 
changes of employers' pension accounting standards. The accounting profession 
began to recognize the importance of developing pension accounting standards 
that are consistent, comprehensive, and based on clear principles to enable 
financial reports to reflect the underlying economic reality of employers' pension 
sponsorship (Tweedie, 2003, p. 719). 
2.4.1. International Differences in Current Practice 
Employers' pension cost accounting rules (SSAP 24) differed 
significantly from those in the US and internationally. The issue of FRS 17 in 
2000 has resulted in greater harmonisation of the UK pension accounting with 
both SFAS 87 and IAS 19 (revised 1998). However, significant differences in 
current practice still remain between UK, US and International GAAP. This 
section briefly reviews the international differences in the current practice of 
accounting for employers' pension costs. Table 2.2 compares the key differences 
of SSAP 24, FRS 17, SFAS 87 and IAS 19, which are discussed in more detail 
below. 20 
As noted in Chapter 1, the adoption of `market-based' approach of FRS 
17 is intended to be consistent with the broader conceptual framework of UK 
ASB that financial statements should reflect at `fair value' of the assets and 
20 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was formed in April 2001 as the 
successor body to the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was 
initiated as a private organisation back in 1973. 
24 
liabilities arising from an employer's retirement benefit obligations and any 
related funding (ASB, 2000, para. 6). 21 Both SFAS 87 and IAS 19 have 
previously adopted a measurement and valuation methodology to a large extent 
very similar to FRS 17. However, unlike FRS 17, SFAS 87 and IAS 19 allow the 
valuation of pension assets to be determined at market values that are subject to 
actuarial smoothing. 
The valuation of pension liabilities is intrinsically more difficult than that 
of assets, because typically no market value is readily available. It is common 
practice in pension accounting to measure the pension liabilities by projecting 
forward the expected cash flows and discounting them at appropriate rate (i. e. 
discount rate). The discount rate is the accounting counterpart of the valuation 
rate of interest used by actuarial profession for pension funding purposes. SSAP 
24 requires the discount rate to be an actuarially-determined rate reflecting the 
expected return on equity investment (Davies et al., 1994). 
By contrast, under FRS 17 a good quality (AA rated) corporate bond rate 
of return is required as the discount rate, consistent with the `market-based' 
valuation methodology. SFAS 87 and IAS 19 set out similar requirements for the 
assumed discount rate by reference to `rates of return on high-quality fixed- 
income investments currently available and expected to be available during the 
period to maturity of the pension benefits' (SFAS 87, para. 44). 
21 Chapter 3 develops a conceptual review of the UK pension accounting rule change from SSAP 
24 in the context of theoretical perspectives concerning employers' long-term pension 
obligations. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Comparison of Pension Accounting Standards 
SSAP 24, FRS 17, SFAS 87 and LAS 19 
SSAP 24 FRS 17 SFAS87 IAS 19 
Asset 
Valuation 
Actuarial 
smoothed 
value 
Market value Market value 
-allows 
Market value 
-allows 
average average 
smoothing smoothing 
Discount Actuary's AA Fixed income Fixed income 
Rate best estimate corporate securities yield securities yield 
Assumption over the bond yield 
long-term 
equity return 
Expected Long-term Long-term Long-term Long-term 
Return on expected expected expected expected return 
Pension return for all return for return for all for all assets 
Assets assets each asset assets 
Assumption class 
Amortization 
of Actuarial 
Gains and 
Losses 
Spread over 
future 
working 
lifetime in 
profit and 
losses (P&L) 
Immediate 
recognition 
in STRGL 
Spread over 
future working 
lifetime in 
profit and 
losses (P&L) 
Spread over 
future working 
lifetime in 
profit and 
losses (P&L) 
Components 
of P&L 
Consolidated 
figure based 
on actuarial 
judgement 
Regular 
service cost 
Regular 
service cost 
Regular 
service cost 
+interest cost +interest cost 
-expected 
return on 
assets 
+ benefit 
improvement 
-expected 
return on 
+interest cost 
-expected 
return on assets 
assets 
+amortizations 
of actuarial 
gains/losses 
and benefit 
+amortizations 
of actuarial 
gains/losses 
and benefit 
improvement 
improvement 
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The key component of periodic pension costs, `regular cost', which is the 
operating cost of providing for pensions to employees in the absence of any 
complications arising from actuarial gains and losses, is not required to be 
disclosed under SSAP 24. By contrast, under provisions of FRS 17, SFAS 87 and 
IAS 19, the operating costs of providing retirement benefits to employees and 
related finance costs are disclosed, and charged to the profit and loss account, by 
using a uniform methodology which prescribes a set of standardized components. 
These standardized components are considered to affect the changes in 
the net value of the pension funds during the reporting period. Specifically, 
`regular service cost' is the actuarial present value of pension benefits allocated 
under the formula for employee services provided during the year. Since actual 
payments of benefits are delayed until retirement, each year's pension cost 
includes an `interest cost' component, which measures the increase in the present 
value of the projected benefit obligation due to the passage of time. The 
difference between the `expected return on plan assets' less the unwinding of 
`interest cost' on the obligations is shown as finance income (see Table 2.2). 
Included in the determination of pension costs are the gains and losses 
primarily resulting from differences between the actuarial valuation assumptions 
used to project pension costs and the actual experience. FRS 17 requires 
immediate recognition of such actuarial gains and losses in a Statement of 
Recognized Gains and Losses (STRGL). 22 This approach in FRS 17 constitutes a 
significant departure from both SFAS 87 and IAS 19. The IAS 19 states that (i) 
actuarial gains and losses up to 10 percent of the greater of the gross value of the 
scheme assets and liabilities should not be recognised; (ii) the proportion of 
22 Under UK GAAP, STRGL supplements the profit and loss account by reporting some of the 
recognized gains and losses. 
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actuarial gains and losses in excess of the 10 percent `corridor' can be spread 
forward over the remaining service lives of the employees. The `corridor 
method' in IAS 19 is very similar to that in SFAS 87. As a result, both SFAS 87 
and IAS 19 effectively permit the smoothing of volatilities in annual pension 
costs recognized in employers' profit and loss account. 
2.4.2. International Convergence of Pension Accounting Standards 
Recently the International Accounting Standards Board announced to 
undertake improvement projects to achieve international convergence23 in 
pension accounting where practice is at present diverse and unsatisfactory. Of 
significance from a UK perspective is the fact that accounting standards 
(International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) developed by the IASB were 
endorsed by EU regulation back in 2001, and the UK government soon followed 
up by issuing a consultation paper proposing that IASB standards replace UK 
accounting standards. According to current plans, all EU listed companies must 
prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IAS and IFRS 
standards from 2005 onwards. 
FRS 17 and IAS 19 differ significantly in the use of the `corridor method' 
to smooth volatilities arising from recognition of actuarial gains and losses in 
employers' profit and loss account. In 2000 the IASB issued limited revisions to 
revised IAS 19, `Employee Benefits'. The minimum amendments made to IAS 
19 allow companies that do not use the `smoothing' mechanism to report 
actuarial gains and losses in the Statement of Changes in Equity. The current 
proposal for a longer-term project includes consideration of convergence with the 
23According to Whittington (2005, p. 133), `convergence' means reducing international 
differences in accounting standards by selecting the best practice currently available, or if none is 
available, by developing new standards in partnership with national standard setters. 
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UK's FRS 17 with respect to the reporting of actuarial gains and losses in the 
income statement, thus eliminating the smoothing achieved by the `corridor' and 
`amortisation' method of current IAS 19 (Whittington, 2005, p. 133). 24 These 
developments suggest that international pension GAAP is moving towards the 
FRS 17-style accounting rules. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
Over a decade from the mid-1990s onwards, the UK government began to 
change pension legislation governing privately funded pensions. The analysis in 
this Chapter suggests that pension accounting regulatory changes following 
government pension policy reform in both UK and USA are in fact by-products 
of the legislation demanding greater accountability for pension funds, which 
reflect political concern over the adequacy and security of privately funded 
pensions. 
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The dependence on employer sponsored pensions to provide secured 
retirement benefits for workers and the importance of pension funds as 
institutional investors have necessitated changing public pension policies. The 
review of institutional settings suggest that institutional features can affect the 
scope of pension accounting standards, and in turn stimulate the changes in 
24Since the period analysed in this thesis, the IASB issued an amendment to lAS 19 in December, 
2004. The IASB has decided to allow the option of recognising actuarial gains and losses in full 
in the period in which they occur, in a statement of recognised income and expense. This 
approach is similar to the UK standard FRS 17. 
It is reasonable to expect that the minimum funding requirement (MFR) as legislative-imposed 
solvency restrictions is also likely to have an impact on UK corporate pension management 
decisions. However, this thesis does not characterize it as a primary driver underlying managerial 
discretionary behaviour under investigation for two reasons. Firstly, MFR requirements primarily 
affect financial reports of pension funds, whereas FRS 17 affect pension accounting by employer 
sponsors. Secondly, as early as in 2001, government proposals to replace MFR were published, 
and MFR was eventually replaced in 2002. As a result, it is unlikely that MFR rather FRS 17 is 
driving managerial behaviour for the period (1998-2002) studied in this thesis. 
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accounting regulation of employers' pension cost. The next Chapter of this thesis 
provides a conceptual overview of changes in UK pension accounting regulation 
and reviews the related empirical accounting research. The remaining Chapters 
develop and test hypotheses based on this framework for the inter-relationship of 
changing government pension policy regulation, financial reporting and 
management of pensions by corporate sponsors in the UK. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The academic literature so far has illuminated several important topics in 
pension accounting research, which advanced our understanding of the nature of 
this important long-term compensation arrangement. The development of 
theoretical perspectives on employers' pension commitments in turn brought to 
light the importance of existing and proposed accounting regulation for defined 
benefit pension plans. This Chapter explores the linkages between alternative 
theoretical perspectives on employers' long-term pension commitments and the 
promulgation of new pension accounting rules in the UK. The purpose of this 
Chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for the remaining empirical part of 
the thesis, and evaluate relevant empirical studies into pension accounting. 
Figure 3.1, which updates the one originally presented in Klumpes (2001, 
p. 32), illustrates the linkages between the development of theoretical 
perspectives on the pension contractual agreement, promulgation of new pension 
accounting rules, related hypothesis generation and testing, and the implications 
for future research. The rest of this Chapter is divided into sections according to 
the framework presented in Figure 3.1. Section 3.2 of this Chapter briefly 
summarizes the development of alternative theoretical perspectives on the nature 
and scope of pension commitments. Section 3.3 discusses how these theoretical 
concepts have been incorporated into the evolution of UK pension accounting 
rules. Section 3.4 reviews relevant empirical research which bears on alternative 
hypotheses that are implied by these theoretical perspectives. Section 3.5 
critically evaluates their findings and motivates empirical studies in this thesis. 
31 
FIGURE 3.1 Linkages between the Development of Pension Theoretical 
Perspectives, Pension Accounting Regulation, Reform Legislation, and 
Empirical Research 
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3.2. THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS 
In this section, major theoretical perspectives that offer distinct insights 
into the corporate pension sponsorship are reviewed. Each of the perspectives has 
motivated prior empirical researchers to develop and test competing explanations 
for corporate pension-related accounting choices and pension management 
decision. Stone (1982) examines three alternative theoretical frameworks from 
which various aspects of modem defined benefit pension arrangements can be 
analyzed and their implications for pension accounting, e. g., (i) pension as 
deferred wages (gratuity theory and deferred wage theory); (ii) pension as 
contingent claims (options pricing theory); and (iii) incentive effects of plan 
sponsorship (agency theory). 
Klumpes (2001) delineates four theoretical perspectives that can be taken 
to understand the nature of pensions, e. g., (i) labour economics; (ii) corporate 
finance; (iii) insurance; and (iv) inter-generational equity. These perspectives 
need not be viewed as mutually exclusive theories of what constitutes the 
pension contract, but rather reflect distinct disciplinary insights on various 
dimensions of observable corporate pension decision that are affected by this 
phenomenon (Klumpes, 2001, p. 31). Since each of the above theoretical 
perspectives was reviewed in detail by Klumpes (2001), this section briefly 
overviews the three alternative theoretical antecedents that are relevant to this 
thesis in particular, e. g., (i) labour economics perspective; (ii) corporate finance 
perspective; (iii) insurance perspective. 26 
26 Inter-generational perspective is not pertinent to this thesis as it is only relevant to public sector 
pension schemes, while the focus of this thesis is private pension provisions. Inter-generational 
equity perspective suggests that inter-generational equity is a key dimension of pension 
arrangements between concerned parties. This concept is especially applicable in pension funding 
environments where the employer does not pre-fund the pension obligation and is effectively 
unable to do so because of fiscal stress (e. g. the public sector) or where pension commitments 
payable under the pension plan are frequently amended over time (Klumpes, 2001, p. 39). 
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Early economic theory perceived pension contracts as a form of 
discretionary gratuity paid for loyal and faithful service (Stone, 1984). The 
subsequently developed labour economics perspective depicts pension benefits as 
a form of `deferred compensation'. Pension plans are viewed as labour market 
institutions designed to achieve efficiency in the long-term relationship between 
the employer and employee (Gustman et al., 1994). Such life-time contractual 
models of labour market assume that workers provide a time path of labour 
services to exchange in the form of long-term total compensation. In this context, 
there need be little or no relationship between this year's labour effort and this 
year's compensation. The central argument of the labour economics perspective 
is that the employer tacitly promises that the right to terminate the pension 
scheme will not be exercised. The plan's assets in excess of its accrued liabilities 
(i. e. pension fund surpluses) therefore belong to employees. 
By contrast, the corporate finance literature views pension fund assets 
and liabilities as an integral part of the employer sponsor's own assets and 
liabilities (e. g. Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981). This integrated perspective requires 
managing the sponsoring firm's extended balance sheet, including both 
conventional assets and liabilities and its pension assets and liabilities, in the best 
interests of its shareholders. In contrast to the labour economics perspective, it 
assumes that companies can easily terminate their pension promises. Thus 
employer sponsors face incentives to alter the magnitude and even the existence 
of pension fund surpluses by exercising discretion over pension-related 
accounting choices (e. g. actuarial assumptions), pension funding (e. g. voluntary 
termination) and/or investment strategy (e. g. equities versus bonds). 
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The insurance perspective takes an alternative view (different from both 
labour economics and corporate finance perspectives) by examining the 
insurance elements inherent in both defined benefit and defined contribution 
funded pension schemes. Bodie (1990) views defined benefit pensions as 
retirement income insurance providing employees protection against longevity 
risk (the risk that they will outlive their assets); replacement rate risk (the risk 
that benefits will be too low to maintain their standard of living after retirement); 
risk from potential social security benefit cuts; investment risk (the risk that 
returns will be reduced due to poor investment performance); and the risk of 
having their benefits eroded by inflation. As a result, pensions offered under a 
defined benefit pension plan are better viewed as participating annuities that 
offer a guaranteed minimum nominal benefit, determined by the pension plan's 
benefit formula (Bodie, 1990). The important implication from the insurance 
perspective is that the corporate pension obligations can be viewed, at least 
partially, as a complex implicit contingent claim by the employees on the 
pension plan sponsor (Klumpes, 2001, p. 37). 
3.3. CHANGES IN UK PENSION COST ACCOUNTING 
Understanding the differences in the nature and scope of pension 
commitments that are implied by each of these perspectives provides a 
conceptual basis to critically evaluate the existing UK pension accounting 
regulation. The evolution of employers' pension accounting rules from SSAP 24 
to FRS 17 reflects broader debates within professional accounting and actuarial 
literature concerning: (i) cost-based versus market based measurement of pension 
assets and liabilities; (ii) discretionary versus standardised pension actuarial 
discount assumptions; (iii) pension asset/liability disclosure versus recognition. 
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These controversies over aspects of pension accounting raise fundamental 
questions about the validity of differing underlying theoretical perspectives about 
the nature of pension liabilities. The evolution of competing pension theoretical 
perspectives in turn have implications on promulgating relevant accounting 
procedures that decide how various components constituting an employer's 
pension commitments are to be measured and disclosed. The purpose of this 
section is therefore to review the changes in UK pension accounting rules in the 
context of competing theoretical perspectives concerning employers' long-term 
pension liabilities. 
3.3.1. SSAP 24 
Prior to the 1980s, pension accounting in the UK was based on the cash 
contributions payable by employer sponsors to the schemes during each 
accounting period, when little was known about the economic relationship 
between alternative types of the labour markets and employers' pension costs. 27 
Academic pension accounting research in the early 1980s explores the potential 
link between pension accounting problems and alternative models of the labour 
market ('spot contract' and `implicit lifetime contract') from which a firm 
operates (e. g. Pesando and Clarke, 1983). Appendix C contains a brief review of 
their findings in terms of alternative measures of reported pension liabilities: (i) 
the projected benefit obligation (PBO); (ii) the accrued benefit obligation (ABO). 
27 This cash flow accounting principle focuses only on whether a sponsoring firm is making 
sufficient cash contribution annually to match periodic benefit payments. However, it fails to take 
account of the effect that contribution levels may vary over longer periods of time in accordance 
with long-term actuarial valuation assumptions concerning future mortality, investment or 
longevity. Moreover, no accounting recognition was given to the annual pension cost arising 
during the years when the pension benefits were being accumulated. 
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These accounting measures of pension liabilities (PBO versus ABO) are 
dependent on the nature of labour market. According to Pesando and Clarke 
(1983, p. 745), the projected benefit obligation (PBO) with salary projection is 
the most consistent with the `implicit lifetime contract' model. The Pesando- 
Clarke analysis thus provides important insights into the pension accounting 
debate during the 1980s as to what constitutes the appropriate measures of an 
employer sponsor's pension obligation. 
Advances in labour economics literature, which view employer sponsored 
pensions as a form of deferred compensation, have important implications for 
understanding the subsequent development of employers' pension accounting 
rules. Pension accounting has evolved from recording periodic pension cash 
contributions to recognizing the need to accrue a liability for the funding of prior 
service costs. In 1988 the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24 (SSAP 
24), `Accounting for Pension Costs', issued by the predecessor body to the ASB, 
the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC), introduced the fundamental 
principle of accruals to UK pension accounting. Compared to the previous cash 
flow approach, SSAP 24 represents a significant improvement. 
Consistent with the labour economics view that employers' pension 
obligations are implicit long-term commitments, SSAP 24 set out the accounting 
objective of `requiring the employer to recognise the cost of providing pensions 
on a systematic and rational basis over the period during which the employer 
benefits from the employees' services' (SSAP 24, para. 16). Under SSAP 24, the 
`regular cost' of sponsoring a pension scheme is a level percentage of the 
pensionable payroll (Davies et al., 1994). The `regular cost' and valuation of 
scheme assets and liabilities were determined by actuarial estimation. Variations 
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from the regular cost arising from scheme deficiencies or surpluses, measured for 
reporting purposes, are deferred and gradually recognized over the remaining 
service life of employees (Davies et al., 1994). This approach smoothes the 
effects of surpluses and deficiencies and ensures that there are no volatilities in 
employer sponsors' profit and loss account. 
Just over two years after SSAP 24 was published, there were indications 
that employers' pension accounting should be reconsidered by the Accounting 
Standard Board (ASB), because `the balance sheet dimension is inadequately 
addressed in SSAP 24' (Paterson, 1990, p. 27). For example, a sponsoring firm 
taking a `contribution holiday' as a result of a pension scheme surplus can 
sometimes show a pension liability on its balance sheet under SSAP 24. As a 
result, the effect of SSAP 24 approach on an employer's balance sheet is not 
consistent with the underlying economic reality of employers' pension 
sponsorship. 
3.3.2. FRS 17 
Over the period 1995 to 1999, the ASB issued two Discussion Papers, 
one Exposure Draft and eventually the Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS 17) 
in November, 2000. The accounting principles embodied in FRS 17 were 
founded solely on the ground of financial economics and explicitly endorsed the 
corporate finance view that employer firms and their sponsored pension funds 
are an integrative economic entity. 
38 
3.3.2.1 Debate (1995-1997) 
The issue of pension scheme surpluses and solvency during the early 
1990s, as noted in Chapter 2, prompted the reform of UK pension legislation. 
However, the subsequent introduction of the Minimum Funding Requirement 
(MFR) has been controversial, involving much heated debate both inside and 
outside the actuarial profession (Greenwood and Keogh, 1997). 
During the mid-1990s, the UK actuarial profession debated on the most 
`true and fair' approach to valuing corporate sponsoring firms' pension assets 
and liabilities (e. g. Dyson and Exley, 1995; Exley et al., 1997; Greenwood and 
Koegh, 1997; Gordon, 1999; Head et al., 2001). Since the early 1970s, the 
discounted cash flow method (DCF) was the most common practice in the UK 
for the valuation of both assets and liabilities by consulting actuaries in a pension 
fund valuation. According to Greenwood and Keogh (1997, p. 499), the 
traditional DCF method pursues the theme of the consistency of the valuation of 
both assets and liabilities as suggested by Day and McKelvey (1963). The 
assessed value of assets represents the discounted present value of the expected 
income and capital proceeds from the scheme's assets. The value of liabilities is 
discounted at a rate which is the expected long-term return on the equity-based 
portfolio of assets that are perceived as a match for the pension liabilities (Head 
et al., 2001, p. 104). 
Traditionalists argued for a continuation of the cost-based valuation 
methodology (i. e. DCF method) then espoused under existing UK GAAP (SSAP 
24). SSAP 24 permits employers' pension obligations measured by using long- 
term actuarial assumptions that project the present value of cash flows associated 
with both pension assets and liabilities. Arguments in support of the traditional 
method are: (i) it smoothes the fluctuations that are inherent in market prices 
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over time since sponsors' pension obligation are long-term commitments; (ii) it 
places a value on asset cash flows and liability cash flows on a consistent basis 
(e. g. Greenwood and Keogh, 1997; Gordon, 1999). 
Proponents of market based approach argued that valuation of pension 
assets and liabilities should be consistent with the principles of financial 
economics, i. e. based on `fair value' principles28 as required for other types of 
corporate financial instrument accounting (e. g. employees' stock option). 
Consistent with market-based approach, pension assets should be measured at 
their `fair value' and pension liabilities should be discounted using market yield 
on index-linked government bonds (e. g. Smith, 1996; Exley et al., 1997). 
The professional actuarial debate coupled with the increasing criticism of 
SSAP 24 prompted the Accounting Standards Board to review SSAP 24 with the 
publication of its 1995 Discussion Paper. The ASB acknowledged that in SSAP 
24 `there are too many options available to the preparers of accounts, leading to 
inconsistency in accounting practice and allowing employers a great deal of 
flexibility to adjust results on a short-term basis' (ASB, 1995). The 1995 
Discussion Paper then considered two fundamentally different approaches to the 
measurement of pension surplus or deficiencies: actuarial basis of measurement 
and market basis of measurement. Two alternatives proposed by the 1995 
Discussion Paper reflected the debate within the accounting profession as to the 
appropriate approach to the problem (Napier and Casson, 1997). 
28 Alternative definitions of the accounting term `fair value' can be found in different accounting 
jurisdictions (Horton and Macve, 2000). The FASB defines `fair value' in relation to financial 
instruments as `the price at which an asset or a liability could be exchanged in a current 
transaction between knowledgeable unrelated willing parties' (FASB, 2004). By comparison, the 
IASB defines `fair value' as `the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability 
settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction' (IASB, 2004). 
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The ASB recognizes that `the distinction between these two approaches is 
most evident in the selection of measurement assumptions used to estimate the 
pension cost, i. e. the basis of measurement' (ASB, 1995, para. 13). The SSAP 24 
approach (i. e. actuarial basis measurement approach) in accounting for the cost 
of providing pension benefits is based on the emerging long-term expected 
outcome (ASB, 1995, para. 14). By contrast, the market basis measurement 
approach endorsed by FRS 17 values pension assets by taking the `fair value' of 
the scheme's assets and liabilities. 
Nevertheless, the 1995 Discussion Paper concluded that `the pension cost 
should be determined by using long-term estimates as the basis of actuarial 
assumptions. ' Further emphasis was given in supporting the view that `using 
compatible long-term assumptions to measure the surplus or deficiency results in 
better estimates of pension obligations than the market values, whilst having the 
characteristics of being objective and precise at a point in time'(ASB, 1995, para. 
2.8.2). The discount rate assumption thus would be `the rate of return on equity- 
based portfolio of scheme assets' (ASB, 1995, para. 7.2.5). 
The stance then adopted by the ASB in favour of actuarial basis of 
measurement constitutes a significant disagreement to US and international 
accounting standard setters. In 1996 the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) issued an Exposure Draft 54 (ED 54) on employee benefits. 
ED 54 proposed that employers value pension plan assets at market values. 29 
Pension liabilities would be determined in line with actuarial assumptions. The 
most significant one is `the rate used to discount post-employment benefit 
29 Market values refer to either at actual fair values or market values subject to actuarial 
adjustments by discounting the expected future cash flows from the assets by a risk-adjusted 
interest rate (IASC, 1996, para. 96). 
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obligations (both funded and unfunded), which should be determined by 
reference to market yields at the balance sheet date on high quality fixed-rate 
corporate bonds' (IASC, 1996, para. 75). 
The disagreement among accounting standard setters in different 
jurisdictions over the appropriate discount rate assumption mirrors the debate 
within UK actuarial profession as to the move towards market-based actuarial 
valuation methodology. This broader debate among UK actuarial and accounting 
professions reflects that shifting emphasis on the corporate finance view on 
employers' pension obligations has important implications on the subsequent UK 
pension accounting rule development. 
3.3.2.2 Promotion (1998-1999) 
During the late 1990s, the market-based valuation method has gradually 
gained its ground within UK actuarial profession (Head et al., 2001). In 1998 the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) issued the revised 
International Accounting Standard No. 19, `Employee Benefits', which 
implemented most of its proposals published in the Exposure Draft 54 (IASC, 
1998). It was against this background that the ASB issued a further 1998 
Discussion Paper on aspects of accounting for pension costs under the pressure to 
harmonize with international accounting standards. 
The ASB concludes that the actuarial approach of discounting the cash 
flows of liability using a discount rate based on the rate of return on the assets in 
the scheme needs to be refined (ASB, 1998, para. 1.23). However, the 
appropriate rate for current employees was expected to be `a rate that allows the 
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implicit recognition of change in the economy through the incorporation of some 
element of expected equity return' (ASB, 1998, para. 1.24). 
In November 1999, the Accounting Standards Board published a 
Financial Reporting Exposure Draft 20 (FRED 20) that proposed a new 
accounting standard on the treatment of pensions and other retirement benefits in 
the employer's accounts. FRED 20 proposed that the discount rate applied to the 
scheme liabilities to be the current rate of return on AA rate corporate bonds of 
equivalent terms and currency to the liability. The ASB states that market-based 
valuation approach is consistent with pension accounting practice internationally 
(i. e. SFAS 87, IAS 19). It is also in line with the increasing use of market values 
by the actuarial profession in the UK (ASB, 1999). In dealing with the volatilities 
inherent in the use of market values, the ASB claims that its proposed alternative 
approach has two advantages over the international practice: (i) the balance sheet 
shows the current deficits or recoverable surplus in the scheme; and (ii) the total 
profit and loss charge is more stable than it would be if the market value 
fluctuations were spread forward. 30 
3.3.2.3 Implementation (2000- ) 
Financial Reporting Standard 17 ('Retirement Benefits', FRS 17) was 
issued in November 2000, which implemented most of proposals in FRED 20. 
The Accounting Standard Board's (ASB) major objectives in effecting these 
changes as stated in the standard are to ensure that the `fair value' approach is 
used in measuring pension assets and liabilities and to achieve the transparency 
and comparability in accounting for pension costs (FRS 17, para 1). Unlike 
30 This is achieved through immediately recognizing the effects of the fluctuations in market 
values in the second performance statement, the statement of total recognized gains and losses 
(STRGL). 
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SFAS 87 and revised IAS 19, FRS 17 went further to require the net pension 
surplus or deficit recognition31 in the balance sheet (FRS 17, para. 37). 
Apart from their implications on appropriate discounting assumptions, 
competing theoretical perspectives on employers' pension obligations also 
influence when and how pension surpluses and deficiencies should be recognised 
in the employers' accounts. The labour economic perspective implies that 
property rights of pension surpluses belong to employees. Trust monies should 
only be used for the beneficiaries. Any pension surpluses should not be returned 
to the employer sponsor. Consistent with the long-term labour economic 
perspective, the net pension surplus, defined as the excess of market value of 
plan assets over the projected benefit obligation (PBO), would not be shown on 
the employer's balance sheet. However, if net pension deficits arise (i. e. the PBO 
is greater than the market value of plan assets), it should be recognized on 
employer's balance sheet as the firm's liabilities. SSAP 24 does not address this 
issue in relation to appropriate accounting treatment of pension asset and liability 
on employer sponsor's financial statements. 
By contrast, the corporate finance perspective implies that the net worth 
of the pension fund should be fully consolidated into the employer's balance 
sheet. Consistent with the integration perspective, the net pension surplus or 
deficit, defined as difference between the market value of plan assets and the 
accrued benefit obligation (ABO), should be recognized on the employer 
sponsor's balance sheet. With respect to the debate over the necessity of pension 
asset and liability recognition, FRS 17 approach is to require sponsoring firms 
recognize the net pension surplus or deficiency on their balance sheets. SFAS 87 
31 FRS 17 defines the net pension surplus or deficit as the excess or shortfall of the value of the 
assets in the scheme over or below the present value of the scheme liabilities. 
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only requires the balance sheet recognition of net difference between the market 
value of plan assets and accrued benefit obligation (ABO). It thereby represents a 
compromise between the corporate finance and labour economics perspective, as 
espoused by FRS 17 and SSAP 24, respectively (Klumpes, 2001, p. 43). 
3.4. EMPIRICAL PENSION ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
The previous section sheds theoretical insights into understanding the UK 
pension accounting rule development that has gone through phases of debate, 
promotion and implementation. In this section, prior empirical studies are 
reviewed to form a proper framework for the present studies in this thesis. 
According to Figure 3.1, three major areas of empirical research are being 
reviewed, namely (i) pension-related accounting choices; (ii) corporate pension 
termination decision; (iii) corporate pension asset allocation decision. The review 
of literature in this Chapter aims to highlight the linkage between empirical 
studies in each of the above areas and alternative theoretical perspectives that 
they implicitly or explicitly draw upon. 
3.4.1. Pension-related Accounting Choices 
An extensive body of early US-based empirical studies examine the 
market valuation of the pension liabilities (either measured as the PBO or ABO) 
by employing valuation models that assume pension liabilities are `owned' by 
shareholders (e. g. Feldstein and Morck, 1983; Daley, 1984; Landsman, 1986; 
Dhaliwal, 1986). These studies generally find that unfunded pension obligations 
are considered to be value relevant by capital market. However, pension 
liabilities included in the financial statements are estimated values based on a 
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number of assumptions including mortality, employee turnover, disability rates, 
salary rates, retirement rates and investment performance. None of these studies 
attempt to control for the considerable scope available for managerial discretion 
over the actuarial valuation assumptions at which pension liabilities are 
calculated. Thus it is very difficult to draw any implications of their results for 
discriminating among alternative hypotheses concerning pension-related 
accounting choices. 
The labour economics perspective implies that the rates used to discount 
pension assets and liabilities should be consistent with a long-term pension 
funding objective, i. e. are set independent of managerial short-term reporting 
objectives. By contrast, the corporate finance perspective implies that the 
discount rate chosen by a firm is systematically related to its financial condition 
and/or other managerial financial reporting incentives. A few US-based empirical 
studies have investigated managerial discretion over actuarial assumptions. Their 
findings are generally consistent with the corporate finance perspective (e. g. 
Bodie et al., 1987; Asthana, 1999; Godwin, et al., 1996; Amir and Gordon, 
1996). 
Godwin et al. (1996) provide evidence that managers increase discount 
rate in response to earnings decline, tightening debt covenants and dividend 
constraints. Their research design involves the transformation of effect on 
earnings by the changes in discount rate into an ordered measure as the 
dependent variable. Therefore they have not clarified the managerial motives 
underlying pension discount rate per se. In a more comprehensive study on 
firms' actuarial choices (i. e. actuarial assumptions and cost methods), Asthana 
(1999) finds that managerial propensity to select a `liberal' actuarial rate (e. g. a 
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high discount rate) is associated with sponsoring firms' profitability, cash flows 
and debt capacity. 
Amir and Gordon (1996) examine the discount rate in measuring the post 
retirement benefit other than pensions. They find that firms select the discount 
rate and health care cost trend rate to manage the accumulated post-retirement 
benefit obligation reported under SFAS 106 (FASB, 1990). Furthermore, they 
show that firms with relatively high leverage select more `liberal' discount rates 
to minimize the probability of violating debt covenants. These findings in the US 
suggest some evidence of managerial opportunism being related to pension 
discount rate choices. 
Another important actuarial assumption required for estimating periodic 
pension costs under US SFAS 87 is the expected rate of return assumption 
(hereinafter `ERR'). Only two empirical studies have explicitly examined 
managerial discretion over the ERR assumptions. Blankley and Swanson (1995) 
investigate whether companies manage earnings by manipulating various pension 
estimates. Specifically, they examine the reliability of the expected rate of return 
on pension assets for a sample of firms randomly selected from the 1990 
Compact Disclosure database. Their results suggest no managerial manipulation 
of the ERR. They find that changes in the expected rate of return on plan assets 
(ERR) are infrequent and sponsoring firms have the tendency to adjust the 
assumption towards the actual rate of return on plan assets realized over the 
period 1990-1994. 
By contrast, Amir and Benartzi (1998) present evidence consistent with 
corporate finance perspective in relation to managerial choices over the ERR 
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assumptions. They examine the correlation between the ERR and the 
composition of the pension investment portfolio, measured as the percent 
invested in equity (%Equity). Their evidence suggests that the ERR is only 
weakly related with the asset composition. Furthermore, only %Equity (not ERR) 
is correlated with future returns on pension assets. Amir and Benartzi (1998) 
therefore conclude that the FASB should consider the enforcement rather than 
elimination of disclosure of pension asset composition in financial statements 
prepared under SFAS 87. 
Another strand of literature examines the managerial choice to switch 
actuarial cost methods. These methods belong to two broad categories: cost 
allocation method and benefit allocation method. Switching from cost allocation 
method to benefit allocation method could reduce the estimated amount of 
pension liabilities and annual pension costs. Consistent with corporate finance 
perspective, researchers documented evidence that managerial choices over 
actuarial cost methods are associated with financial statement considerations and 
reduction in pension funding (Ghicas, 1990; VanDerhei and Joanette, 1988). 
Klumpes and Whittington (2003) examine the incentives affecting UK 
firms' decision to voluntarily switch to market-based actuarial pension valuation 
methods during the period prior to the release of FRS 17 (1996-1998). Compared 
to firms that continued to triennially update their pension funding position in 
accordance with SSAP 24, switching firms more frequently adjusted their 
footnote disclosure of pension funding ratios each year by showing updated 
market valuation assumptions of pension assets, and changed their pension 
liability discounting assumptions, similar to the manner that was subsequently 
required by FRS 17. Their findings suggest that UK firms' propensity to switch 
48 
actuarial valuation method is associated with the characteristics of their 
sponsored pension plan, other than firms' short-term funding needs or earnings 
characteristics. 
3.4.2. Corporate Pension Termination Decision 
The ownership over excess pension assets has been an extremely 
contentious issue. The labour economics perspective holds that the assets of the 
pension plan are distinct from the assets of the sponsoring firm, while the 
corporate finance perspective suggests that shareholders of the firm own the 
surpluses anyway as the pension assets are an integral part on the firms' 
augmented balance sheets. In practice, pension legislations in both UK and USA 
permit pension surplus reversion to sponsoring firms, though some restrictions 
on the amounts can be reverted do apply. 
Through termination of defined benefit pension plans, the surpluses may 
be recaptured by the employers. During the late 1980s, a large body of US-based 
empirical research has developed to explain why firms terminate pension funds 
with excess assets. Drawn upon explicitly labour economics and/or corporate 
finance perspective, these studies generate various (financing, financial distress, 
tax incentives, take-over, breach of implicit contract) hypotheses to explain 
firms' decision to terminate their over-funded pension plans (e. g. Stone, 1987; 
Hamdallah and Ruland, 1986; Mittelstaedt, 1989; Thomas, 1989). In general, 
empirical evidence documented from the above studies seems to be providing 
stronger support to corporate finance perspective. 
Hamdallah and Ruland (1986) compare a sample of firms terminating 
overfunded plans with a sample of firms continuing overfunded plans. They find 
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that smaller firms with higher financial leverage exhibit a greater tendency to 
terminate overfunded pension plans. Stone (1987) hypothesizes that excess 
pension assets are financial slack and terminations liquidate the accumulated 
financial slack to gaining access to less costly financing. Her findings suggest 
that firms which had low market valuation of cash flow and generated small 
proportion of its resources internally exhibit greater propensity to terminations. 
Mittelstaedt (1989) and Thomas (1989) both examine several competing 
theories in explaining managerial decision to revert excess assets from 
overfunded pension plans. Mittelstaedt (1989) postulates that firms can reduce 
overfunding slowly by reducing required cash contributions to pension plans via 
changes in actuarial assumptions or methods. He examines whether managers' 
decision to terminate and/or make slow withdrawal of excess assets via changing 
actuarial assumptions are motivated by financial weakening, tax considerations, 
or susceptibility to takeover. His results indicate that firms with severe financial 
weakening terminate pension plans. Firms with less severe financial weakening 
change their actuarial assumptions to reduce required cash contributions to 
pension plans. 
Thomas (1989) draws upon competing theories in developing hypotheses 
on overfunded pension plan terminations. He postulates first that excess plan 
assets may represent financial slack (Stone, 1987; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Second, terminations may represent expropriation of wealth from employees 
resulting from the violation of implicit lifetime contracts to pay benefits that are 
vested later in an employee's services. Third, terminations may also be driven by 
accounting or tax effect for firms undergoing financial weakening, and may 
represent attempts to transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders. 
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In order to discriminate empirically among these alternative theoretical 
explanations, Thomas (1989) compares a sample of firms which terminated their 
pension plans obtained from PBGC against two other reference groups: a sample 
of firms making slow withdrawals characterized by changes in actuarial 
assumptions, and a sample of firms making no withdrawals (a control group). 
After partitioning between those firms which terminate after control changes and 
those terminating without control changes, Thomas (1989) conducts a time-series 
examination of cash flows for three years prior to the plan terminations. His 
results suggest that firms terminating pension plans without control changes 
suffered large and persistent declines in cash flows for several years before 
terminating their pension plans. This evidence is further supported by estimating 
a multinomial probit model with the dependent variable representing each 
category (i. e. termination, slow withdrawal, and no withdrawal). The coefficient 
on the cash flow variable was negative and highly significant, indicating that as 
cash flows decrease, the probability of termination increases. 
Thomas (1989) concludes that empirical evidence suggests that over- 
funded plan terminations is most consistent with 'financial slack' hypothesis. As 
firms become more and more constrained for cash, they consider terminating the 
pension plan. Such terminations appear to be costly relative to other sources, 
such as dividend cuts, investments cuts, or changes in actuarial assumptions. 
Both Mittelstaedt (1989) and Thomas (1989) also find that firms draw on other 
sources of financial slack before drawing on over-funded pension plans, 
implying that plan terminations and contractions are more costly sources of 
capital. Only financially weak firms (i. e. firms that had exhausted other sources 
of capital) draw on over-funded pension plans. 
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This strand of research discussed so far only focuses on pension plan 
terminations with asset reversion. Haw et al. (1991) examine the financial 
characteristics (earnings, debt covenants, management incentive compensation, 
risk and financial structure) of firms that settle overfunded pensions without asset 
reversions. Settlements without asset reversions do not represent a source of 
financing opportunity as implied by 'financial slack' hypothesis. However, firms 
can include a portion of the deferred pension gain in net income in the year of the 
settlement. Therefore,, settlements without asset reversions provide an 
opportunity to substantially boost net income. Haw et al. (1991) find evidence 
that firms experiencing an earnings decline or have restrictive debt covenants are 
more likely to settle overfunded pension plans, which indicate that settlement 
transactions are motivated by financial statement concerns. 
Another relevant study by Amir and Ziv (1997) examines the 
renegotiation, curtailment and/or termination of non-pension benefits (mainly 
health care and life insurance). In Decemeber 1990, the FASB issued SFAS 106, 
which required companies to recognize non-pension obligations on the balance 
sheet. Since pre-funding of non-pension benefits was largely unrecognized for 
tax purposes, these obligations were mostly unfunded. Amir and Ziv (1997) find 
evidence that firms seek to keep long-term debts off the balance sheet through a 
variety of non-pension benefits related transactions (e. g. terminations) because 
contractual obligations are specified in terms of leverage ratio under the SFAS 
106. 
3.4.3. Corporate Pension Asset Allocation Decision 
The extant theoretical insight on allocation of pension assets implies 
extreme all-bonds or all-equities strategy (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981; Treynor, 
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1977; Sharpe, 1976; Harrison and Sharpe, 1983). The implicit assumption is that 
management acts exclusively in the best interests of shareholders with regard to 
managing the pension assets and funding its pension plan. Black (1980) and 
Tepper (1981) argue that the unique feature of pension funds lies in their role as 
a tax shelter. Firms can effectively earn a pre-tax rate of return on any assets held 
in the pension fund and pass these returns through to shareholders. To benefit 
from the tax arbitrage, all firms should follow all-bond investment strategy. 
An alternative 'pension put' hypothesis (Sharpe, 1976; Treynor, 1977) 
argues that firms effectively own a put option to give the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) the plan assets plus 30 percent of the underlying 
firm's value should firms be unable to meet the beneficiaries' claims. As with 
any put option, the value of this put increases with the risk of the underlying 
asset. To maximize the value of put option to default, firms therefore should 
follow an all equities portfolio. However, simple and well-known empirical 
evidence does not support either of these extreme optimal asset allocation 
solutions. 
Bicksler and Chen (1985) explain the prevalence of interior solutions in 
practice by taking into account of the market imperfections and the combined 
effects of the tax arbitrage and PBGC insurance factors. Although the pension 
scheme is insured, the employer may experience pension termination costs (e. g. 
large legal expense, poor labour relations, problems obtaining tax exempt status 
for a subsequent pension scheme, etc). These costs make defaulting on pension 
commitments costly to employers. There is also a possibility that in some years 
the sponsoring company may not have any taxable income to offset the interest it 
has to pay on the bonds issued. While such tax credits can be carried backwards 
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and forwards, this may result in a reduction in the present value of the tax 
reduction. Therefore, the marginal benefits from tax arbitrage decrease as 
pension funds switch most of their money into bonds. Bicksler and Chen (1985) 
argue that these market imperfections are responsible for the mixtures of bonds 
and equities that prevail in practice. 
To date, very little empirical research has investigated economic 
determinants of the firms' pension asset allocation decision. Friedman (1983) 
conducts a very extensive empirical study with a large sample to address the 
question of whether corporate pension plans can be viewed as an integral part of 
the overall corporate financing decision. The empirical evidence from the 
pension asset allocation part of his research suggests that less profitable 
companies with higher leverage and higher earnings variability tended to hold 
less in equities. 
Friedman (1983) finds no significant correlation between the funding 
level of pension plans and the asset allocation between equities and bonds. His 
results on asset allocation seem to suggest that firms manage their pension fund 
asset allocations to counterbalance the risks across firms that are stemming from 
product markets or financial structure. By contrast, Bodie et al. (1987) find that 
the proportion of assets allocated to equities is negatively related to the level of 
funding and positively related to the size of the company. In other words, under- 
funded plans tend to hold more equities and less fixed income securities. The 
negative correlation between funding and the proportion of assets allocated to 
equities provides some support to the 'pension put' hypothesis. Their findings on 
asset allocations taken together suggest that firms do not manage their sponsored 
pension funds as if they are entirely separate entities from the sponsor as implied 
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by alternative labour economics perspective (Friedman, 1983; Bodie et al., 
1987). 
Nevertheless, US-based empirical research during the 1990s provides no 
evidence supporting a tax arbitrage based pension investment strategy. Motivated 
by the inconsistency among theoretical and empirical studies, Frank (2002) re- 
examines the extent to which taxes affect a firm's decision to allocate its defined 
benefit plan's assets between equity and bonds within a simultaneous system of 
equations, which attempts to capture the joint corporate capital structure and 
pension asset allocation decision in such arbitrage strategy. Contrary to prior 
empirical research, Frank (2002) finds evidence consistent with firms trading off 
tax benefits and non-tax factors as described by Black (1980). 
Motivated by the passage of pension accounting standard SFAS 87, Amir 
and Benartzi (1999) investigate the possibility of a relation between firms' 
pension accounting and investment choices during a post pension accounting 
regulatory change period (1988-1994) in the US. They contend that SFAS 87 
provides managers the opportunity to choose between recognition and disclosure. 
In particular, they focus on the question of whether the recognition of additional 
minimum pension liability in accordance with SFAS 87 affects asset allocation 
decision. Indeed they find evidence that companies closing to a recognition 
threshold will make an economic decision of allocating more plan assets into 
fixed income investments. Uncovering existence of such relationship implies that 
SFAS 87 has potential economic consequences for firms, consistent with the 
corporate finance perspective. 
55 
A new body of theoretical research concerning pension asset allocation 
emerged in the late 1990s. These studies developed asset/liability or surplus 
return models of portfolio diversification taking into account not only asset 
returns and variances but also changes in pension liabilities and their covariance 
wit asset returns. It is suggested that managers are concerned with maximizing 
the risk-adjusted pension surplus value of pensions (Sharpe, 1990; Leibowitz et 
al., 1994; Blake, 2003). Peskin (1997) suggests that companies can reduce 
pension costs and risks of sponsoring their pension promises by following such 
an asset/liability framework. 
In summary, prior empirical research on corporate pension asset 
allocation has yielded rather mixed results. Inconsistency thus remains 
empirically on the extent pension funding affects asset allocation decision, and 
other economic factors from theoretical research that appear to be important in 
explaining firms' pension asset allocation decision. Further empirical studies 
incorporating theoretical insights from modem pension investment theory in a 
UK institutional environment can help to shed further insights into corporate 
pension asset allocation decision. 
3.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Tepper (1982) predicts that the trends in pension accounting regulation 
will be strengthening the link between employer pension sponsorship and 
corporate finance perspective. Two decades later his prediction certainly has 
been well supported by the passage of the new pension accounting standard FRS 
17 in the UK. However, empirical pension accounting studies to date have not 
yet explained some important observed features with respect to employers' 
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pension commitments. Prior research has,, to certain extent, failed to discriminate 
among theoretical perspectives to explain and predict corporate sponsors' 
pension actuarial assumption choices, termination, asset allocation decision. For 
instance, the corporate finance perspective predicts that pension funds should 
pursue extreme funding policies: either maximum funding or investment entirely 
in taxable bonds, or minimal funding and investment entirely in stocks. However, 
existing empirical evidence does not support this prediction (e. g. Friedman, 
1983; Bodie et al., 1987). 
Moreover, a simplifying assumption adopted in much empirical pension 
accounting research is either firm's pension accounting, funding or investment 
choices can be taken as exogenous, thus modelled in a single equation system. 
However, employer sponsors' pension actuarial assumption choices, funding and 
investment decision can be jointly determined, and ignoring this simultaneity in 
single equation models may bias estimates of more complex relationships. 
Further empirical pension accounting research requires alternative econometric 
specifications and more sophisticated research design to model such managerial 
discretionary behaviour endogenously. 
Also note that virtually almost all of the published empirical studies over 
the past two decades are premised on the effects of US-based SFAS 87 pension 
accounting standard. To date very little research has studied managerial pension 
choices outside the US. 
32 Although international pension accounting 
harmonization is in the foreseeable future, significant differences in pension 
32 Scott (1994) examines voluntary disclosures by Canadian firms, where institutional pension 
disclosure rules are weaker than SFAS 87 and vary in scope across the provinces. Klumpes 
(2000) examines competing proprietary cost (corporate finance perspective) and political cost 
(labour economics perspective) hypotheses concerning Australian and UK pension fund 
managers' motives underlying their voluntary disclosure decisions during 1991-1995. 
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accounting across OECD countries still remain. It is therefore important that 
future pension accounting research incorporates more accurate recognition of the 
institutional features into the research design. 
Most importantly, the pension accounting debate has shifted from its 
earlier focus on what constitutes appropriate pension liability measure (e. g. 
corporate finance perspective implied ABO versus labour economics implied 
PBO) to what constitutes the appropriate approach in measuring both pension 
assets and liabilities. The traditional 'cost-based' actuarial valuation approach is 
seriously challenged and alternative 'market-based' valuation methodology was 
introduced both in theory and practice. Exley et al. (1997) assert that the 
adoption of 'market-based' approach appears now to be essential in many of the 
most critical areas in the field of defined benefit pension provision. Yet no 
empirical studies so far have investigated the impact of 'fair value' approach in 
pension accounting on corporate pension management decision. 
This Chapter has reviewed the prior research literature in pension 
accounting pertinent to the thesis. It highlights the implications of various 
theoretical perspectives for defining the nature and scope of employers' pension 
commitments and evaluates their impacts on both accounting standard setting 
activities and hypotheses testing developed by accounting researchers. The 
remainder of this thesis then draws from the theoretical framework developed in 
this Chapter to generate and test hypotheses concerning the impact of pension 
accounting regulatory change on (i) managers' pension actuarial assumption 
choices; (ii) pension termination decision; and (iii) asset allocation decision by 
UK firms during the period 1998-2002. 
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4. DETERMINANTS OF EXPECTED RATE OF 
RETURN ASSUMPTION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Pension accounting has evolved to incorporate complex actuarial 
procedures into standards setting (Fogarty and Grant, 1995). Despite the 
variations in pension accounting and reporting practices across OECD countries, 
determination of reported periodic pension cost and long-term pension 
obligations all heavily rely upon the actuarial input under Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) for employers' pension cost accounting. 
Most recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US 
has undertaken an investigation into the potential corporate manipulation of the 
expected rate of return on pension assets assumption (hereinafter 'ERR'), a key 
actuarial assumption underlying firms' reported pension costs by major US 
corporations (The Economist, 2004). The US business press claims that 
managers have been exploiting their discretion over the ERR to inflate corporate 
earnings (e. g., USA Today, 2002; Fortune, 2002). For instance, General Motors 
sponsors a large defined benefit pension plan. Its earnings in 2003 would have 
dropped by over 25 percent, simply by a1 percent reduction in its ERR 
assumption (Sarah, 2004). 
Much of these public concerns relate to the apparently persistent high 
ERR assumptions reported by many firms, despite the economic reality of 
depressed equity markets. Similarly, there are concerns raised in the UK given 
the continuing wide cross-sectional variations in the ERR and other key actuarial 
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assumptions reported in employer sponsors' annual reports (Lane, Clarke and 
Peacock, 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002; Whittington and McGeachin, 
2003). 
Accounting standards for pension costs are meant to represent the 
economic reality of pension provisions and help all interested parties to 
understand the implications for a company that runs a pension scheme (Tweedie, 
2003). Deficient accounting can be caused by unreliable actuarial estimates and 
can have the effect of limiting users' understanding of economic substance of 
employer pension sponsorship (Fogarty and Grant, 1995). Further research is 
needed to examine the determinants of ERR assumptions by UK firms for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the ERR has been a significant actuarial input in the 
total estimated pension costs, especially during the time when most of pension 
funds are maturing. 33 Secondly, there are considerable cross-sectional variations 
between actuarial assumptions disclosed by UK sponsoring firms under SSAP 
24. Thirdly, the adoption of the UK pension accounting standard (FRS 17) has 
heightened public attention towards the link between the related costs of 
employer pension sponsorship and other core components of corporate earnings. 
This Chapter identifies and examines possible determinants associated 
with managerial discretion over the magnitude of reported ERR assumptions in a 
UK setting during a period from 1998-2002. Under former UK GAAP (SSAP 
24), managers could exercise discretion opportunistically in selecting reported 
ERR assumptions for the estimated periodic pension cost amounts to manage the 
33 The definition of the ERR assumption differs significantly between the US and UK reporting 
environment. The US GAAP (SFAS 87) requires the ERR to be based on the managerial best 
estimates of both historical returns and rate of returns available for reinvestment, whereas the 
discount rate should refer to the high-quality bond yields (Blankley and Swanson, 1995). Former 
UK GAAP (SSAP 24) leaves the determination of the ERR to managerial discretion. Most often 
in the UK the ERR assumption is also used as the discount rate in estimating pension liabilities. 
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balance sheet and/or the income statement. Consequently, two specific research 
questions are addressed: (i) do UK managers use their discretion under SSAP 24 
to determine the ERR opportunistically? (ii) Have UK managers responded to the 
new pension accounting ru e through their discretionary choices of the ERR 
assumption for reporting purposes? 
The period 1998-2002 is of relevance to this study for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it is a time frame covering both the pre- and FRS 17 transitional 
adoption period in the UK. Prior UK-based research finds evidence that 
managerial propensity to switch towards a market based actuarial valuation 
method is associated with reported corporate earnings during the pre-FRS 17 
period (Klumpes and Whittington, 2003). Secondly, the UK corporate sponsors 
were subject to disclosure requirements under two sets of pension accounting 
rules (i. e. SSAP 24 and FRS 17), which provides an experimental setting that 
was not readily available for previous researchers investigating the similar issues. 
This Chapter extends existing US-based research on managerial 
discretion over the expected rate of return assumption in two ways. Firstly, it 
tests competing opportunistic and economic explanations on managerial 
discretion over the expected rate of return assumptions within an institutional 
setting outside the US. Secondly, it is conducted during a period of the UK 
pension accounting regulatory change. The empirical investigation can help to 
shed further insights into the professional debate over the appropriateness of 
changes from a cost-based towards a market-based actuarial valuation approach 
(as endorsed under FRS 17) to pension cost accounting. 
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The empirical results confirm predictions that those UK firms sponsoring 
pension plans with tightening debt covenants select ERR opportunistically during 
the study period (1998-2002). In addition, the UK pension accounting regulatory 
shift from SSAP 24 to FRS 17 appears to have increased managerial opportunism 
in relation to the choice of the reported ERR. The evidence suggests that 
managerial propensity to manage leverage ratio appears to be stronger in the FRS 
17 transitional adoption period (2001-2002). However, there is little evidence 
suggesting that management select the ERR opportunistically in order to smooth 
earnings during the study period (1998-2002). 
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
provides the institutional background required for this study. Section 4.3 
develops the hypotheses. Section 4.4 overviews the research design. Section 4.5 
describes the sampling procedure, data and descriptive statistics. Section 4.6 
reports the results of empirical analysis, while section 4.7 concludes this Chapter. 
4.2. BACKGROUND 
Chapter 3 suggests that the evolution of UK pension accounting rules 
reflects an on-going debate among accounting standard setters over the 
appropriate discount rate to measure employers' pension liabilities. Employers' 
pension costs and pension liabilities disclosed in the financial statements are all 
estimated values that are subject to a number of actuarial assumptions related to 
life and work life expectancy of the labour force (Davies et al., 1994). Indeed the 
actuarial estimation process is very complex and the selection of assumptions is 
open to debate. 
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The accounting profession has recognized that the discount rate 
assumption is of particular importance in estimating employers' pension costs 
and liabilities. According to Winkelvoss (1993), pension liabilities and expenses 
are extremely sensitive to several key actuarial assumptions (e. g. discount rate, 
expected rate on plan assets, projected salary growth rate). For example, aI 
percent increase in the discount rate used in the calculation attributes a 20 
percent decrease in pension benefit obligation 
Under SSAP 24, pension liabilities are determined on a discount rate that 
is based on the actuary's estimate of the long term rate of return on equity 
investments. UK firms have the discretion to discount pension liabilities at the 
same rate as the expected return on pension plan assets. 34 In the 1980s and early 
1990s, the return on equity investments exceeded what was required for fully 
funding pension obligations, enabling many UK firms taking 'contribution 
holidays' (i. e. employers' required cash contributions to sponsored pension funds 
are temporarily suspended). By applying various actuarial smoothing choices as 
permitted under SSAP 24, many UK sponsoring firms with substantial actuarial 
pension surpluses have the option to report a net amortized credit to their 
operating income. 35 
Extensive survey evidence suggests that there has been continuing large 
cross-sectional variations in the main actuarial assumptions on sponsoring firms' 
pension footnotes (Lane, Clarke and Peacock, 2001). Because of the considerable 
34More specifically, the financial reporting approach under SSAP 24 blurs the operating and 
financing components of regular pension costs. Different from SFAS 87 (FASB, 1985), 
compliance with SSAP 24 means both regular service costs and the difference between interest 
cost and the expected rate of return on pension assets are charged against operating income. 
35 For a UK sponsoring firm whose regular cost of pensions exceeds the amortised credit, there 
will be a net pension charge to the income statement. The opposite is true for firms over-funded 
pension plans. There will be a net credit to the income statement, with the effect of an increase in 
earnings. The exact impact upon corporate net earnings depends on the scale of the amortised 
credit. 
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discretion permitted by SSAP 24 over the exercise of actuarial assumptions and 
their disclosures, the UK financial press has frequently alleged that reported 
pension costs may have been potentially managed by sponsoring UK firms. 
Current UK GAAP (FRS 17) amended the requirements of SSAP 24 by 
mandating disclosure of specific set of main actuarial assumptions by reference 
to prescriptive requirements. In particular, FRS 17 prescribes the discount rate 
used to measure pension obligations by reference to AA rated corporate bond 
yield (FRS 17, para. 14). The corporate finance perspective implies that 
employers' pension obligation is in effect a form of corporate debt. Therefore the 
assumed discount rate should be an entity-specific discount rate that is based on 
the credit risk of the particular sponsor, reflecting the assumption that sponsoring 
firms can easily terminate their pension promises. 
Compliance with the FRS 17 discount rate assumption has effectively 
increased employers' reported cost of funding pension liabilities, thus increasing 
the propensity of certain firms to alter their actuarial funding assumptions as 
disclosed under SSAP 24 for earnings management purposes (Financial Times, 
February 14,2002). Relative to the cost-based valuation assumptions used to 
discount both assets and future benefit payments currently allowed under SSAP 
24, the FRS 17 pension reporting requirements also increase volatilities in the 
size of the reported funding ratio. This will reduce the level of pension surplus 
that can be spread over long-term horizon under SSAP 24, and increase the 
pension costs that sponsoring firms charge annually against their earnings. 
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43. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
This section develops hypotheses concerning managerial incentives to 
exercise discretion over the magnitude of ERR reported by UK sponsoring firms. 
In particular, two important opportunistic strategies focusing on either leverage 
or earnings smoothing are examined (e. g. Miller and Skinner, 1998). 
4.3.1. Contracting Hypothesis 
Empirical evidence suggests that managers of financially distressed firms 
face incentives to avoid violating the restrictions imposed by accounting-based 
debt covenants (e. g. Smith and Warner, 1979; Leftwich, 1980). These contractual 
agreements restrict management's choice of investing and financing decisions 
that transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders and ultimately result in 
firm value reduction. A large volume of accounting choice literature finds 
evidence that increasing leverage levels are associated with managers' 
opportunistic accounting choices (e. g., Dhaliwal, 1980; Press and Weintrop, 
1990; Duke and Hunt, 1990). 
Prior US-based research provides some evidence on managerial strategic 
attempts to manipulate actuarial assumptions in order to manage contents of 
financial statements. Feldstein and Morck (1983) find that firms select pension 
discount rate to reduce the level of total debt relative to total assets. Francis 
(1987) finds evidence that highly levered firms display a higher propensity to 
lobby against the FASB's Preliminary Views on pension accounting, which was 
issued prior to the release of SFAS 87. 
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Prior empirical research has established that leverage ratios serve as 
reasonable proxies for the proximity to loan restrictions: book value of debt 
under GAAP is frequently restricted in public agreements and companies with 
higher leverage ratios are closer to technical default on their debt covenant 
restrictions (e. g. Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990). The choice to 
report a higher ERR, ceteris paribus, can influence the leverage ratios by 
lowering estimated pension expenses, and thus increase the denominator in 
traditional leverage ratios (e. g. debt-equity ratios). The leverage ratio (LEV) is 
calculated as total short-term plus long-term debt, scaled by shareholders' equity 
adjusted for pension expenses. It is hypothesized that leverage will be positively 
related to the magnitude of reported ERR. The higher a sponsoring firm's 
leverage ratio (i. e. the lower debt covenant slack), the more likely the firm's 
manager is to select a higher ERR. 
Hypothesis 43: Ceteris Paribus, the level of reported ERR is positively 
related to sponsoring firms' leverage ratio. 
43.2. Smoothing Hypothesis 
An alternative opportunistic explanation for why firm managers might 
seek to manipulate their ERR assumption is to smooth corporate earnings. 36 
Managerial incentives to smooth corporate earnings have long been established 
in both business press and academic literature (e. g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
36 Degeorge et al. (1999) examine whether managers manage to hit 'targets', where these targets 
include: (i) zero (to avoid reporting losses); (ii) last-year earnings, or (iii) analysts forecasts of 
earnings. This Chapter focuses only on earnings smoothing hypothesis because the smoothing 
mechanism, as a legacy in employers' pension cost accounting, is explicitly reserved in order to 
dampen the volatility of corporate earnings (e. g. in SSAP 24, SFAS 87 and IAS 19). 
Furthermore, the wide latitude in managerial choices of actuarial rate estimates (e. g. ERR) being 
one of the powerful smoothing tools by managements has been under increasing scrutiny by 
business press and accounting academics. 
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The earnings management literature provides empirical evidence that persistent 
earnings are valued highly by investors and managers use their accounting 
discretion to reduce fluctuations in reported earnings in pursuit of smoothing 
earnings series (e. g. Dye, 1988; Givoly and Ronen, 1981; Nfiller and Skinner, 
1998). The business press claims that managerial flexibility in determining 
actuarial rate estimates (e. g. ERR) is being used to smooth earnings. 37 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that using high ERR assumptions can significantly reduce UK 
firms' reported pension costs. For instance, a1 percent increase in the expected 
rate of return assumption (ERR) on its own can reduce pension costs by typically 
20-30 percent for UK firms (Lane, Clarke and Peacock, 2002). 
These claims are embedded within the widespread belief that investors 
have been misled in recent years by current US pension accounting rule SFAS 
87. In 2002, Standard & Poor's (S&P) introduced the S&P 'core earnings' 
concept in which pension expense together with the executive stock option 
expense is eliminated from the reported corporate earnings in calculating the 
S&P 'core earnings'. Gold (2000) suggests that SFAS 87 which overstates and 
smoothes earnings produced upwardly biased valuation. Indeed Coronado and 
Sharpe (2003) find supportive evidence that US capital market participants are 
unable to discriminate between core and non-core (pensions') sources of 
earnings. 
However, earlier US research that examines cross-sectional variations in 
the ERR has yielded mixed evidence related to managerial opportunism (see 
Blankley and Swanson, 1995; Amir and Benartzi, 1998). In fact, there is very 
limited evidence documented on the managerial earnings smoothing incentive 
37 For example, see Lane, Clarke and Peacock Annual Pension Accounting Survey (2001,2002), 
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers Annual Survey of Actuarial Assumptions Survey (2002). 
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underlying the reported ERR assumptions. Klumpes and Whittington (2003) find 
evidence that UK corporate managers' propensity to switch toward a market 
based actuarial valuation methodology (AVM) is sensitive to reported corporate 
earnings during the pre-FRS 17 period. The empirical analysis in this Chapter 
focuses on whether UK managers exercise discretion to smooth earnings by 
exercising discretion over the level of their reported ERR assumptions during 
both pre-FRS 17 and FRS 17 periods. 
SSAP 24 required sponsoring firms to recognize a single regular pension 
cost figure (similar to the concept of operating component of pension costs under 
FRS 17, SFAS 87 and IAS 19) charged against sponsoring firms' operating 
earnings. Therefore, it is predicted that if management wishes to smooth bottom 
line earnings in a year when operating earnings decrease (increase), then they 
could choose a relatively higher (lower) ERR to achieve the smoothing target. 
Following Miller and Skinner (1998) and Gordon and Joos (2004), the change in 
operating income deflated by beginning total assets adjusted for pension 
expenses is used as the proxy to test the earning smoothing hypothesis. It is 
hypothesized that the proxy for earnings smoothing (AROA) is negatively related 
to the level of the reported ERR. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Ceteris Paribus, the reported ERR level is negatively 
related to changes in reported operating earnings. 
Control Variables 
Notwithstanding opportunistic incentives for exercising discretion over 
the ERR assumption, there may be a number of non-opportunistic or economic 
determinants affecting the sponsoring firms' choice over the reported ERR level. 
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Since any observed cross-sectional variation in UK firms' choice of ERR 
assumptions may also be explained by real operational characteristics between 
firms and/or their sponsored pension plans, the empirical tests need to account 
for these factors. 
One direct economic determinant associated with managerial discretion 
of ERR assumption is the sponsored pension plan's asset allocation strategy, 
defined as the percentage of pension assets that are equity investments 
(%EQUITY). If firms use their best estimate of the ERR assumptions, then cross- 
sectional differences in the ERR should reflect the cross-sectional differences in 
the riskiness of the underlying investment portfolio of pension assets (Amir and 
Benartzi, 1998). A positive relation between the ERR and %EQUITY is expected 
because equity investments are expected to earn a higher premium than less risky 
asset categories. 
SFAS 87 requires the ERR assumptions be the firms' best estimates as to 
its long-run, average rate of earnings on pension investments (SFAS 87, para. 
45). Blankley and Swanson (1995) argue that firms should consider both 
historical returns and rate of return expected to be available for reinvestment 
based on SFAS 87 requirement. By contrast, SSAP 24 does not make any 
specific guidelines on the reference benchmark of the ERR assumptions for UK 
sponsoring firms. The contemporaneous actual rate of return (ARR) is used to 
control for firm-specific pension investment performance. A negative relation 
between the ERR and ARR is expected because some mean reversion in ARR 
may arise over time, as compared with the ERR, an actuarial rate of return 
estimate based on long-term market conditions which is likely to remain constant 
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over time. Moreover, firms with relatively stronger contemporaneous pension 
investment performance is unlikely to adjust their reported ERR assumptions. 
Sponsored pension plans' specific characteristics may explain the cross- 
sectional variations in the reported ERR levels. A primary factor to be considered 
is the pension plan's demographic characteristic in terms of the maturity of the 
workforce participating in the pension plan (PRET). The argument is that 
variations in pension plan demographic characteristics potentially reflect cross- 
sectional differences in key actuarial assumptions (e. g. the ERR) in the 
estimation process. Pension plans with higher proportion of retired workers are 
likely to demand fixed periodic contributions from the sponsoring firm, hence 
reflecting a phase of maturity and even decline. By contrast, firms with younger 
pension funds have implicitly higher growth opportunities and thereby are able to 
make more powerful investment decision. It is expected that firms sponsoring 
relatively more mature pension plans will report relatively lower ERR 
assumptions, i. e. a negative relation between the ERR and PRET. 
Pension fund size is included as a general control variable, which is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market value of total pension fund assets 
38 (LNSIZE). Pension fund size is associated with a number of factors, such as 
expected political visibility and risk, which may themselves be associated in 
unpredictable ways with accounting choices (e. g. Ball and Foster, 1982). Firms 
sponsoring relatively larger pension funds are more likely to make relatively 
higher ERR assumptions as firms with larger pension funds can make more 
powerful investment decision and have relatively larger pension assets as 
38 Pension fund size (SIZE) is considered as a reasonable proxy for firm size because large firms 
normally sponsor relatively large pension plans. To mitigate multicollinearity problem, this study 
doesn't include firm size as a control. 
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'cushion' against poor investment performance. However, it is possible that 
LNSIZE can also be negatively associated with the reported ERR if firms with 
larger pension funds which earn relatively higher investment return 
opportunistically select lower ERR assumptions to avoid political costs. 
Therefore, there are no specific predictions made concerning the direction of its 
relation with the reported ERR. 
433. Pension Accounting Rule Change and Opportunistic Determinants 
During the extended adoption period of FRS 17, the flexibility over 
actuarial assumptions available to UK management under former UK GAAP 
(SSAP 24) was largely eliminated due to the more stringent assumptions required 
under FRS 17. Moreover, under transitional reporting requirements, disclosures 
under the new pension accounting rule (FRS 17) are available concurrently with 
disclosures in compliance with SSAP 24. Consequently, investors can assess the 
reasonableness of key actuarial assumptions by using the equivalent FRS 17 
disclosures as a reference benchmark. If UK pension accounting regulatory 
change has acted as intended, then it is hypothesized that opportunistic incentives 
underlying the reported ERR level would be weaker during the FRS 17 
transitional period relative to the pre-FRS 17 period. 
4.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.4.1. Estimation Methodology 
Chapter 3 suggests that most of prior research on managerial discretion 
over actuarial assumptions has investigated either the discount rate or expected 
rate of return assumption separately in a single equation framework (e. g. Godwin 
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et al., 1996; Amir and Benartzi, 1998). However, most often UK firms are 
provided with discretion to use a portfolio of actuarial assumptions under SSAP 
24 for financial reporting purposes. Aside from the expected rate of return 
assumptions (ERR), the assumed salary growth rate (SGR) also plays an 
influential role in calculating pension cost and long-term pension liabilities in the 
UK setting. For instance, a pension plan paying retirees a given fraction of pay 
could show a smaller pension cost charge, if a lower rate of future salary increase 
is assumed (Lane, Clarke and Peacock, 2002). 
It is therefore possible that the ERR and SGR may be determined in a 
joint process by managers, so as to achieve effectively their desired effects on 
balance sheet and/or income statement. Asthana (1999, p. 54) argues that firms' 
choice of the discount rate and projected salary growth rate are jointly distributed 
because adjustments to one actuarial variable may be offset by adjustments to 
another. 39 For example, managers who have chosen a relatively high expected 
rate of return assumption may consider the use of a low salary growth rate to 
further reduce reported pension CoStS. 
40 
To allow for the possibility that the ERR and SGR are jointly determined, 
Asthana (1999) employs a system of simultaneous equations with the actuarial 
choices as endogenous variables for the empirical analysis in his study. However, 
in this study the complete set of actuarial assumption choices available to UK 
managers is not directly observable by researchers. Only key actuarial rate 
assumptions, such as the expected rate of return, expected salary growth rate are 
39 According to Asthana (1999, p. 47), actuaries contend that the interest rate assumption are 
determined from the joint process of selecting other actuarial estimates. 
40 Assuming the choice of a low ERR assumption is based on the maturing age profile of the 
sponsored pension fund. 
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disclosed under SSAP 24 . 
41 Therefore, this study is characterized by the 
limitation that opportunistic incentives may not be captured in any single 
actuarial assumption choice. 
The simultaneous equations approach employed by Asthana (1999) does 
not control for any omitted variables from the specified system of equations 
model that affect managers' portfolio choices of actuarial assumptions. 
Consequently, it would lead to the correlated error terms across individual 
equations. By contrast, seemingly unrelated regressions method (SUR) provides 
efficient coefficient and standard error estimates of the multiple equations system 
with the presence of contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations 
(Greene, 2000, p. 615). 
In determining the appropriate empirical framework for this study, a 
Breusch-Pagan test using the Lagrange multiplier test statistics is made to test the 
null hypothesis that there is no contemporaneous correlation between errors 
across equations. 42 The Breusch-Pagan test of independence on following system 
of equations (specified in section 4.4.2) indicates that the null hypothesis is 
rejected at less than 0.1 percent level (LM test statistics=41.11, p<0.001). This 
result suggests that error term of OLS estimates is subject to significant 
contemporaneous correlation across equations. Therefore SUR method is applied 
to the empirical analysis in this study. 
41 SSAP 24 does not enforce the disclosures of the major actuarial assumptions that play a critical 
role in determining the annual pension cost charge in respect of defined benefit pension schemes 
(Davies et al., 1994). Many UK firms have opted to disclose only the spread between their key 
actuarial estimates. In some extreme cases, major actuarial assumptions are not even disclosed. 
42 If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then ordinary least square (OLS) equation by equation is 
fully efficient. 
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4.4.2. Empirical Model 
The primary empirical analysis evaluates whether proxies for managerial 
opportunistic behaviour are associated with the magnitude of reported ERR, after 
controlling for a range of explanatory factors posited by prior literature. The 
following system of equations using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is 
estimated: 
ERRit -= ao + altLEVit + a2tAROA,, + a3t%EQUITYit + a4t4RR, t 
a5tp'ZET, t + a6tLNSIZEt + a7tsGRit +, 6, t 
(4.1) 
SGRit ao + altLEVit + a2tAROA, t + a3tPRET,, + a4tLNSIZEit + a5, ERRi, 
+ C2t 
(4.2) 
where ERR is the level of expected rate of return assumption as disclosed in the 
pension footnote for each firm-year observations under SSAP 24. SGR is the 
level of reported expected salary growth rate for each firm-year observations 
under SSAP 24; and LEV and AROA denote to opportunistic determinants of 
reported ERR level. The null hypothesis is that if management consider only 
their sponsored pension fund characteristics and pension asset investment 
portfolio to determine the long-term expected rate of return on pension assets, 
then none of the opportunistic proxies will be significant in the empirical model. 
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach controls for the 
choice of one assumption to influence the choice of the other, therefore produces 
more efficient coefficient estimates in the presence of correlated error terms. A 
positive relation between the ERR and SGR is predicted since the expected rate 
of return and assumed salary growth rate should move together to some extent 
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because they should incorporate managerial expectations of the same economic 
and/or operational environment. 
In addition, to control for the possibility of omitted time-specific 
macroeconomic e cts, year dummy variables are incorporated into the model. It 
is argued that firms in the same industry might employ similar actuarial rate 
assumptions (Ghicas, 1990). Therefore, industry dummy variables representing 
all industry sectors across the sample are included into the model to control for 
the industry effect on cross-sectional variations in actuarial assumptions. 
4.43. Pension Accounting Rule Change and Opportunistic Determinants 
Further tests are undertaken to establish whether there are any changes in 
the coefficient estimates of the proxies for opportunistic incentives in the 
specified SUR regression function between the pre-FRS 17 and FRS 17 
transitional period. An indicator variable (CHANGE) is constructed, which is 
coded 1 for FRS 17 period (2001-2002) and 0 for pre-FRS 17 period (1998- 
2000). The test is performed through the interaction of the opportunistic proxy 
variables LEV and AROA with indicator variable CHANGE. The following 
augmented systems of equations with the CHANGE dummy indicator and 
interaction terms LEV*CHG and AROA*CHG are estimated using SUR 
regression: 
EPJý-, = ao + alLEV,, + a2, AROA., + a3, %EQUITYi, + a4, ARk. + a5, PRETi, 
+ a6, LIVSIZE,, + a7, SGk + a8, CHANGE + agLEV * CHG, + aloAROA * CHG +, 61, 
(4.3) 
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SGRit = ao + altLEVit + a2tAROA, + a3tPRETt +a 4tLNSIZEit + a5t ERRit 
+ a6, CHAATGEit + a7tLEV * CHGit + a8t AROA * CHG+ 62t 
(4.4) 
4.5. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.5.1. Sample and Data 
43 The main sample period consists of accounting years 1998-2002 . This 
sample period was chosen because Exposure Draft 20 (FRED 20) was issued in 
1999 and FRS 17 was subsequently issued in year 2000. Mandatory phased-in 
transitional disclosure in compliance with FRS 17 commenced in year 2001. 
Hence, this period witnessed major changes in the pension regulatory 
environment in the UK, which had significant implications on UK corporate 
pension reporting and funding decision. 
The sample data used in this study were obtained from three resources. 
First, the expected rate of return on pension assets (ERR) and assumed salary 
growth rate (SGR) were primarily hand-collected from pension footnote 
disclosure from UK sponsoring firms' annual reports. Second, the detailed 
pension plan data were hand collected from the professional Publication 'Pension 
Funds and Their Advisers' (PFTA), which contains an alphabetical list of 2500 
UK pension funds sponsored by UK companies and organizations with 500 
employees or more. The PFTA book provides information on pension fund size, 
annual contribution, pension asset allocation, fund expenditure and participants 
43 UK firms are required to disclose their pension asset composition in footnote disclosure on 
their annual reports under FRS 17 in 2002, the third transitional implementation year after FRS 
17 was issued. 
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in defined benefit and/or defined contribution plans by their employer sponsors. 
Third, the relevant accounting data of corresponding plan sponsors were 
collected from UK-domiciled DATASTREAM database. 
The initial sampling procedure identified companies as those being 
constituents of the FrSE 350 index during the study period from year 1998 to 
year 2002.44The FFSE 350 index was chosen as the focus of the study because 
FRED 20 and FRS 17 are likely to have major impacts on large firms whose 
pension exposure matters for the overall financial condition of the firm. It was 
not feasible to include every publicly traded company sponsoring defined benefit 
plans because most of data of this study required hand-collection from the above 
identified resources. 
FrSE 350 index companies that meet the following criteria during the 
period 1998-2002 are then included into the initial sample: (i) included in 
'Pension Fund and Their Advisers' publication for the study period (1998-2002); 
(ii) sponsor at least one defined benefit pension plan or defined benefit pension 
plan in nature; (iii) public listed companies. Financial firms were excluded from 
the sample because the characteristics of financial firms differ greatly from non- 
financial firms. As indicated in Table 4.1, an initial sample of 521 firm-year 
observations was obtained following the above sampling criteria. 
The lack of availability of key actuarial rates disclosed under SSAP 24 
reduced the initial sample down to 422 firm-year observations. After deleting 
observations not covered by Datastream (26), with missing variables (74) and 
"Companies comprising the FrSE 350 index during the study period 1998-2002 can be obtained 
from the monthly publication European FFSE monthly review. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Selection Criterion 
LFFSE350 companies 
included in Pension Fund and 
Their Advisors Book 
2. Sponsoring defined benefit 
pensions 
3. Non-financial institutions 
4. Key actuarial rates available 
5. Covered by Datastream 
6. After Deleting Missing 
Variables 
7. After Eliminating Outliers 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ALL 
179 178 147 154 148 806 
168 165 131 139 136 739 
121 122 90 94 94 521 
82 84 84 86 86 422 
77 79 79 81 80 396 
60 65 66 67 64 322 
54 57 59 57 54 281 
The 281 firm-year observations in the sample are associated with 63 firms belonging to 15 
industries. Industry sectors represented are: Beverage & Tobacco (3), Building & Construction 
(9), Business & Support Services (7), Chemicals (3), Retail (8), Electronics & Engineering (3), 
Food Manufacturing (4), Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals (7), Industrial & Manufacturing (6), 
Leisure & Entertainment (3), Publishing & Media (3), Real Estate (1), Telecommunications (2), 
Transport (3), Utilities (4). 
outliers (41), the final sample comprises 281 firm-year observations from fiscal 
years 1998 through 2002 as shown in Table 4.1.45 
4.5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the sample distribution of ERR in each of 
the five years (1998-2002). The ERR assumption varies significantly across UK 
firms. The distribution of ERR ranges from a low of 5.00 percent to a high of 
10.00 percent over the five year period. The mean reported ERR by sample 
sponsoring firms during the study period is 7.55 percent (ranging from 8.32 
percent in 1998 to 6.58 percent in 2002. Over half sponsoring firms use an ERR 
that is in the range of 8.00 to 10.00 percent in 1998. But in 2002, half of 
45 The outliers were identified by plotting dependent variable against each independent variable 
(Besley et al., 1980). 
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sponsoring firms have used an ERR that falls into the range of 5-6 percent, a 
decrease of approximately 3.5 percent. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 provides the distribution of SGR reported by the 
sample firms in each of the five years (1998-2002). The mean SGR decreased 
steadily with a size of approximately 0.5 percent each year over the study period 
(1998-2002). Cross-sectional variations of the SGR assumptions are also 
significant across the sample firms, ranging from a high of 8.00 percent to a low 
of 3.00 percent. Majority of UK firms have used an SGR that is in the range of 
6.00 to 8.00 percent in 1998; but an overwhelming 60 percent of firms have 
chosen an SGR below 4.00 percent in 2002. The persistent decrease in the SGR 
as revealed in panel B, Table 4.2 is certainly not a favourable trend from current 
and future employees' perspective. 
Table 4.3 presents the percentage of firms changing ERR and SGR 
respectively and the mean rate change by each of the five years (1998-2002). 
A-proximately 20-25 percent of sample firms have changed their actuarial rate 
assumptions. With regard to both ERR and SGR, a greater percentage of firms in 
the sample made changes in 2002 than in the earlier years, although smaller in 
their magnitude. For instance, the percentage of firms changing the ERR 
assumptions holds relatively steady from 1998 to 2001, in the 20 percent range, 
before increasing to 25.66 percent in 2002. However, the magnitude of change 
has decreased from approximately 0.5 percent to 0.2 percent. 
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TABLE 4.2 
Distribution of Key SSAP 24 Actuarial Assumptions 
Panel A: 
Expected Rate of Return on Pension Assets (ERR) 
(Percent of Firms in Specified ERR Range) 
Range of ERR 
1998 
(n=54) 
1999 
(n=57) 
2000 
(n=59) 
2001 
(n=57) 
2002 
(n=54) 
ALL 
(n=281) 
5.00-5.99% 0.00 4.17 20.83 29.17 45.83 5.14 
6.00-6.99% 3.08 10.77 23.08 31.54 31.54 27.84 
7.00-7.99% 11.65 18.45 19.42 24.27 22.33 22.06 
8.00-8.99% 29.10 26.12 14.93 5.97 3.73 28.69 
9.00-10.00% 28.95 13.16 5.26 0.00 0.00 16.27 
Mean 8.32 7.83 7.22 6.75 6.58 7.55 
Std. Error 0.76 0.94 0.98 0.77 0.69 1.12 
Median 8.50 8.00 7.00 6.70 6.60 7.64 
Panel B: 
Expected Salary Growth Rate (SGR) 
(Percent of Firms in Specified SGR Range) 
Range of SGR 
1998 
(n=54) 
1999 
(n=57) 
2000 
(n=59) 
2001 
(n=57) 
2002 
(n=54) 
ALL 
(n=281) 
3.00-3.99% 0.00 3.03 9.09 27.27 60.61 7.08 
4.00-4.99% 5.23 11.76 20.92 30.72 30.72 32.83 
5.00-5.99% 17.17 24.24 25.25 19.19 9.09 21.24 
6.00-6.99% 28.35 23.62 13.39 4.72 3.15 27.25 
7.00-7.99% 29.63 11.11 3.70 0.00 0.00 11.59 
Mean 6.05 5.55 5.07 4.59 4.33 5.33 
Std. Error 0.79 0.89 0.82 0.64 0.65 1.07 
Median 6.00 5.50 5.00 4.50 4.28 5.43 
The percentage of firms that has changed their expected salary growth 
rate (SGR) assumptions stays around 20 percent of the sample during 1998-2001. 
But this increased to 24.68 percent in 2002. The size of the decrease ranges from 
approximately 0.50 percent to 0.27 percent in 2002. The matched pair west 
result suggests that mean rate changes for both ERR and SGR by year 2002 is 
statistically different than previous years. 
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4.6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.6.1. Univariate Analysis 
The sample is partitioned into two sub-samples, one that chose the ERR 
above the sample median (high-ERR), and the other chose the ERR below the 
sample median (low-ERR). Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics on all the 
explanatory variables for the pooled sample and between high-ERR and low- 
ERR sub-samples . 
46 T-tests are performed for differences in means and 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests are performed for differences in medians among two 
sub-groups. 
Beginning with the contracting cost hypothesis H4.1, the univariate test 
results indicate that the sub-group of firms that chose higher ERR above the 
median (n=131) have significantly higher leverage ratios than sub-group of firms 
that chose lower ERR below the median (n=150). In terms of economic 
determinants, the high-ERR sub-sample has statistically significant higher 
percentage of equity investments in asset composition (%EQUITY). In addition, 
high-ERR sub-sample firms sponsor smaller pension plans than low-ERR sub- 
sample. This evidence suggests that firms with larger pension funds appear to 
report lower ERR assumptions to avoid political visibility costs. Taken together 
the univariate test results are consistent with hypothesis H4.1. But no evidence is 
found to be supportive of the earnings smoothing hypothesis H4.2. 
46 The rationale behind partitioning sample into high rate group and low rate group is that a firm 
might not choose the reported ERR and SGR independently in each individual year and the 
managers may select the level of the ERR based on history. Therefore, dividing the sample by the 
size of reported ERR may help detecting the bias of coefficient estimates if a serial correlation 
between the ERR exists. 
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Since the multicollinearity inflates the standard errors in multivariate 
regression analysis, Table 4.5 reports Pearson product-moment and Spearman 
correlations for the pooled sample and between high-ERR and low-ERR sub- 
samples. LEV and AROA are correlated with PRET and LNSIZE respectively for 
the high-ERR sub-sample. But this correlation is not observed for the low-ERR 
sub-sample. VIF test results (not reported) indicate that collinearity should not 
impair the coefficient estimates in the empirical model. 
4.6.2. Multivariate Analysis 
4.6.2.1 Regression Tests of Opportunistic Determinants 
To test hypotheses on managerial opportunism related to ERR (H4.1 and 
H4.2), the system of equations as specified in section 4.4.2 is estimated. Panel A, 
Table 4.6 contains results from estimating the ERR equation (4.1) using SUR 
regression on the pooled sample and on each of the five years during the study 
period 1998-2002. Consistent with hypothesis H4.1, the coefficient on leverage 
proxy (LEV) in the Eq. (4.1) for the contracting incentive factor is of the 
predicted sign and highly significant at less than 0.001 level (with White t- 
statistics of 4.69 in the pooled sample, suggesting highly levered firms 
systematically report higher ERR. Furthermore, its coefficient is reliably 
significantly positive at 0.05 percent level in each five individual year (1998- 
2002). Further the coefficients on earnings smoothing proxy (AROA) are not 
significant at conventional statistical levels of significance in the pooled sample 
and each year, but are of negative signs as expected. 
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In contrast to the opportunistic variables, none of the coefficients on 
economic determinants (ARR, PRET and %EQUITY) are found to be 
statistically significant at conventional level. The coefficients of ARR (proxy for 
the pension fund investment performance) and PRET (proxy for the maturity of 
pension plan) are only of the predicted negative sign. The empirical proxy for the 
pension investment strategy (%EQUITY) fails to explain the cross-sectional 
variations in reported ERR with an insignificant coefficient and unexpected 
negative sign in the pooled regression. In particular, the signs on coefficient of 
%EQUITY have changed between positive and negative in separate cross- 
sectional regression each year. In years 1998 and 2002, the coefficients of 
%EQUITY have positive signs as expected, suggesting firms with higher 
percentage of equity investments report higher ERR. However, the coefficients 
of %EQUITY have negative signs during 1999-2001, suggesting that a higher 
percentage of equity in asset composition is associated with the lower reported 
ERR during that period. 
Panel B. Table 4.6 presents results from estimating the SGR equation 
(4.2) using SUR regression on the pooled sample and on each of the five years 
during the study period 1998-2002. This evidence suggests that highly levered 
firms also systematically report lower SGR (see panel B, Table 4.6). The 
coefficient of the expected salary growth rate (SGR), is of predicted positive sign 
and highly significant (at 0.0001 level) for each individual year regression, and 
for the pooled regression. Lastly, coefficients on the year dummy variables are 
statistically significant (not reported), indicating unobserved specific year factors 
also play an important role in explaining the level of reported ERR. 
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4.6.2.2 Changes in Opportunistic Determinants Between the pre-FRS 17 and 
FRS 17 Period 
Table 4.7 reports findings on the further test on whether opportunistic 
determinants in relation to the reported ERR have changed over the pre-FRS 17 
and FRS 17 transitional periods. As discussed in section 4.4.3, the system of 
equations is augmented with indicator intercept terms (CHANGE) and 
interactive variables (AROA*CHG, LEV*CHG). The coefficient on the 
contracting cost incentive proxy (LEV) is significant at 0.01 level (0.124, White 
t-statistics of 3.52). In addition, the coefficient on the interaction variable 
(LEV*CHG) is significantly positive (0.258, White t-statistics of 2.84), 
suggesting that the sample firms exhibit stronger propensity to adjust the level of 
reported ERR opportunistically during the FRS 17 transitional period. There is 
weak evidence on the ERR being used to smooth earnings during the pre-FRS 17 
period. The coefficient on earnings smoothing proxy (AROA) is significant at 5 
percent level (-2.287 with a White t-statistics of -2.06). In addition, the 
coefficient on the interaction variable (AROA*CHG) is not statistically 
significant (2.417, White t-statistic 1.28). 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the contracting cost incentives 
underlying managers' choice over the reported ERR appear to be stronger in FRS 
17 transitional period than in pre-FRS 17 period. This result is inconsistent with 
the prediction in section 4.3. One possible explanation can be that FRS 17 
requires that net pension surpluses and deficits to be recognized at UK 
sponsoring firms' balance sheets. Investors and creditors are likely to perceive 
any unfunded pension liabilities as being equivalent to debt, when they are 
provided with the FRS 17 pension disclosure information. Consequently, the 
leverage indicator becomes a more important opportunistic incentive underlying 
managerial ERR choices during the FRS 17 period. 
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TABLE 4.7 
Regression Tests of Changes in Opportunistic Determinants between 
the pre-FRS 17 and FRS 17 Period 
Variable Pred ERR Pred. SGR 
Sign Equation (4.3) Sign Equation (4.4) 
LEV + 0.124*** -0.116*** 
(3.52) (3.57) 
AROA -2.287** + 2.132** 
(2.06) (2.07) 
OloEQUIIY + -0.004 
(0.44) 
ARR -0.006 
(0.70) 
PRET -0.084 0.077 
(0.45) (0.45) 
LNSIZE -0.004 + -0.002 
(0.15) (0.05) 
SGR + 1.064*** + 
(37.18) 
CHANGE -0.095 + 0.046 
(-1.06) (0.55) 
LEV*CHG ? 0.258*** -0.237*** 
(2.84) (2.81) 
, 4ROA*CHG ? 2.417 ? -2.165 
(1.28) (1.24) 
ERR 0.914*** 
(37.18) 
Pseudo. R2 0.7964 0.8020 
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4.63. Sensitivity Tests 
Sensitivity tests are conducted to examine the robustness of the main 
results relating to managerial propensity to manage leverage ratio via the use of 
reported ERR assumptions. The validity of the multivariate analysis relies on the 
identification and measurement of the opportunistic and operational determinants 
of the reported ERR assumption. The absences of support for the earnings 
smoothing hypothesis potentially follows from the choice of a weak proxy for 
earnings smoothing in the regression analysis. To check this possibility, the first 
sensitivity test is performed by substituting earnings smoothing proxy (AROA) 
with an earnings management variable, SMU? ROFr, which takes the value of 1, if 
a firms' change in earnings is between 0 and 0.01 percent of market value, and 0 
otherwise. Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), it is assumed that 
SMIPROFIF identifies potential earnings management situations. If so, a positive 
coefficient on SUIPROFT would suggest that managers boost earnings by an 
increase in the reported ERR assumptions. Un-tabulated results however show 
the coefficient on SMPROFr is not significant. 
Following Mittelstaedt et al. (1995), the second sensitivity test construct 
industiy-adjusted independent variableS47 and use these variables to re-estimate 
Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.2) using SUR regression method. The use of industry- 
adjusted independent variables serves as an alternative control for the industry 
effects on cross-sectional variations of the reported ERR assumptions. Results 
from using industry-adjusted independent variables yield qualitatively consistent 
results as tabulated in Table 4.7. 
47 Industry adjusted variables are defined as (the non-industry-adjusted variable less the industry 
median for the variable) / the industry inter-quartile range for the variable. 
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4.7. SUMNLARY AND CONCLUSION 
The shift from SSAP 24 to FRS 17 radically reduced the flexibility 
formerly available to UK firms sponsoring defined benefit pension funds to 
manipulate the level of ERR assumptions underlying pension reporting. This 
Chapter sheds light on this issue by examining whether UK managers use the 
flexibility provided to manipulate magnitude of the expected rate of return on 
pension assets assumptions (ERR) opportunistically during the study period 
1998-2002, a time frame covering both pre- and post- pension accounting 
regulatory change in the UK. 
Consistent with the contracting cost hypothesis H4.1, corporate managers 
appear to have exercised discretion to the reported ERR under former UK GAAP 
(SSAP 24) opportunistically to manage leverage ratio during the study period 
(1998-2002). Moreover, evidence is found that managerial incentives to manage 
leverage ratio appear to be stronger over the FRS 17 transitional period. The 
empirical analysis in this Chapter provides insight to the effects of pension 
accounting regulatory shifts on managerial opportunism related to the actuarial 
assumption choices during an extended period of accounting regulatory 
uncertainty. Contrary to hypothesis H4.2, there is little evidence in support of 
UK management using the reported ERR to smooth earnings. 
This study also controls for the endogeneity of UK firms' discretion over 
the ERR assumptions with other key pension actuarial rates, such as the expected 
salary growth rate (SGR). Contrary to prior US-based study (Asthana, 1999), this 
study finds no evidence supporting that managers align their key actuarial rate 
assumptions (ERR and SGR) to manage the content of financial statements. 
Furthermore, it is also plausible to assume that sponsoring firms' pension 
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accounting policy may interact with their other key pension management 
decision undertaken by employer sponsors, such as pension funding policy, plan 
terminations and asset allocation policy. For instance, firms can shift more 
pension assets allocated to bonds in order to avoid the potential financial 
statement volatility inherent with full adoption of FRS 17. These empirical issues 
are examined further in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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5. PENSION REPORTING CHOICES AND DEFINED 
BENEFIT PENSION TERMINATIONS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 implies that reported 
pension actuarial assumptions can be exploited by UK sponsoring firms as 
opportunistic reporting tools to manage the balance sheet leverage. However, the 
accounting implications of managing under-funded defined benefit pension plans 
has not attracted much attention from prior researchers. Some prior US-based 
studies sought to explain managerial discretion over pension-related accounting 
choices, such as apparent cross-sectional variations in actuarial discount rate 
assumptions in terms of managerial opportunism (e. g. Ghicas, 1990; Godwin et 
al., 1996). Other studies identified a linkage between managerial propensity to 
terminate over-funded pension plans and transfers of wealth between shareholders 
and employee participants of those plans (e. g. Thomas, 1989; Mittelstaedt, 1989; 
Stone, 1987; Hamdallah and Ruland, 1986). 
Until recently, pension accounting traditionally separated pension funding 
and accounting by allowing a variety of income smoothing devices (e. g. SSAP 
24), and most pension plans appeared to be over-funded. Indeed, there were no 
studies available in literature seeking to explore the potential linkage between 
managerial discretion over pension actuarial rate assumptions and pension plan 
termination decision, since the sponsoring firm was assumed to own the pension 
fund surplus anyway (e. g. Daley, 1984; Landsman, 1986). 
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Recent pension accounting changes in the UK setting provide an 
opportunity to distinguish among competing theoretical explanations for firms' 
pension termination decision, and how these may be inter-related to their pension 
accounting policy for a number of reasons. Firstly, the extreme volatility in equity 
values, increased longevity, tax changes and reduced inflation resulted in many 
UK firms sponsoring severely under-funded pension plans. Secondly, new pension 
accounting rule (FRS 17) prohibits the former practice of spreading pension costs 
and instead requires pension net surpluses or deficits (based on fair market 
valuation of assets and estimation of pension liabilities using a standard corporate 
bond rate) to be recognised on the balance sheet. Thirdly, new pension legislation 
(the 1995 Act) has imposed minimum funding rules (MFR) that requires 
employers to fully fund severely under-funded pension plans on the basis of 
market-based valuation and funding calculations. 
Consequently, many UK firms with defined benefit pension plans, which 
had previously been able to take 'contribution holidays' enabling the erosion of 
the excess pension surpluses, were suddenly required to make significant cash 
contributions to make up the funding shortfall as revealed under FRS 17. 
Moreover, the potential linkage between pension funding and accounting policy 
through the need to consolidate unfunded pension obligations with other long- 
term corporate debt raises the possibility that short-termist management of 
corporate financial policy might conflict with long-term funding to defined benefit 
retirement plans. 
This Chapter empirically tests alternative explanations of the inter- 
relationship between UK firms' pension termination decision, and their corporate 
financial and pension accounting policy within a volatile economic and regulatory 
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environment . 
48 Prior US-based literature has advanced competing explanations for 
pension funding and corporate financial decisions: under an integration 
hypothesis, these decisions are jointly determined, while a competing separation 
hypothesis suggests that they are not. Aside from the above competing 
explanations from prior US-based literature, an alternative risk management 
hypothesis is considered for the potential inter-relationship between firms' 
pension termination decision and their pension-related accounting policy. This 
hypothesis is made empirically testable by UK firms' voluntary adoption of 
'market-based' actuarial valuation approach, which was subsequently endorsed by 
the new pension accounting rule (FRS 17). 
Specifically, those firms voluntarily adopting the 'market-based' valuation 
method regularly update reported ERR assumptions in their pension footnote 
disclosures. By contrast, firms following the traditional 'cost-based' actuarial 
valuation approach report 'sticky' ERR assumptions in their footnote disclosures. 
It is predicted that such ERR-updating firms are less likely to terminate their 
defined benefit pension plans than firms using 'sticky' ERR assumptions. 
The results from an industry matched-pair sample of 80 firms in the period 
1998-2002 are consistent with the above hypothesis. A statistically significant 
association is observed between firms' termination decision and their discretion to 
regularly adjust reported ERR assumptions. This evidence suggests that economic 
decisions made on long-term employment relationships are indeed not 
independent of the financial reporting environment. In addition, as the integration 
hypothesis predicts, it is found that the need to reduce increased contracting costs 
48 The term 'termination decision' in this thesis refers to firms' decision to close their sponsored 
defined benefit pension schemes to new employees and/or the closure of sponsored defined benefit 
schemes to both old and new employees. 
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is associated with pension terminations. Therefore the results from this Chapter 
provide some support for the view that FRS 17 provides motivation for firms to 
instigate the termination of UK defined benefit pension plans. 
The remaining part of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 
provides the institutional background. Section 5.3 develops hypotheses that 
differentiate empirical relationships implied by competing explanations on plan 
terminations. Section 5.4 describes the methodology, sampling procedure and data 
used in this study. Section 5.5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5.6 
provides a summary and concludes this Chapter. 
5.2. BACKGROUND 
This section explains the institutional background required to understand 
competing incentives faced by UK firms to terminate their under-funded defined 
benefit pension plans. Prior to the issuance of FRS 17, there was a relatively 
benign environment in the UK for corporate sponsored pension plans. Similar to 
the US environment, during the mid-1980s many pension funds enjoyed surpluses 
which in turn led to asset reversions. 
In the UK, any reversion of surpluses to UK sponsoring firms is restricted 
by the Finance Act 1986 (Schedule 13, part 2), which required the reduction of the 
surplus of assets over liabilities to not more than 5 percent (Blake, 2000). 
However employers could still have access to surpluses by reducing benefits, and 
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by reducing or suspending contributions (a contribution 'holiday') for up to five 
years . 
49Any 
surplus returned to the employer is taxed at a higher rate. 
The number of employers taking refunds from schemes has in practice 
been relatively low. Over the period 1987-1988 to 2000-2001,293 schemes took 
refunds, at a value of L1.2 billion. By contrast, a more common practice in the UK 
has been for employers to suspend or temporarily reduce their contributions. Over 
the same period, 2,881 schemes reported a reduction or suspension of employers' 
contributions with a value of L18.57 billion. Only L1.13 billion of surplus was 
used to reduce employee contributions or give employees a contribution holiday. 50 
UK firnis now have significant pension deficits because, with hindsight, 
they held a relatively large proportion of equity investments during the 1990s, 
despite the increasingly mature pension funds. This asset allocation strategy 
appeared to have enabled many firms to reduce their pension cash contributions 
and thereby increase reported profits during the long equity bull market of the 
1990s. However negative returns from equity investments and severe pension 
deficits as made transparent by FRS 17 disclosures revealed that many pension 
funds went into severe deficit. 
The new UK pension GAAP, when fully implemented, prescribes the 
method by which pension liabilities and assets are to be valued for reporting 
purposes. Under FRS 17, actuaries are required to measure the value of a pension 
fund's pension promises using a set of prescribed assumptions, and adjust those 
values to make them consistent with current conditions in investment markets. 
49 The assumption that pension fund surpluses belong to the employer has recently been restricted 
in the UK by the provisions of the Pensions Act 1995, which imposes statutory limitations on the 
ability of employers to revert pension surpluses. 
50 Inland Revenue statistics, available from http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/stats/pensions/p_t08_1. htm#4. 
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The surplus or deficit must be valued annually, using market prices for its 
investments and the AA corporate bond rate to discount its pension obligations. 
The net figure is then to be recorded in the employer's balance sheet as an asset or 
liability. 
The survey evidence suggests that FrSE 100 firms in 2001 disclosed an 
overall surplus of L5 billion under FRS 17. However it is estimated that if these 
companies had all reported in mid-July 2002, they would have disclosed a 
combined deficit of L25 billion, mostly due to the fall in equity markets (Lane, 
Clarke and Peacock, 2002). According to the survey by the Government Actuary's 
Department (GAD), in 1995 around 4.7 million private sector employees were 
offered defined benefit pension schemes (GAD, 2000). However, this figure has 
fallen to 3.8 million by 2000, with nearly one quarter of defined benefit schemes 
frozen or winding up (GAD, 2003). The UK financial press has been replete with 
allegations that under-funded pension deficits revealed by the new accounting 
rules has 'caused' many UK firms to terminate their pension arrangements in 
order to avoid a credit rating downgrade (e. g. The Sunday Telegraph, February 2, 
2003). 
Consequently under such a radically changing pension reporting 
environment, at least some UK firms face incentives to jointly consider their 
pension accounting policy, such as manipulating the ERR assumptions under 
SSAP 24, with other pension-related decision, such as switching to a 'market- 
based' actuarial valuation approach, in order to mitigate the adverse impact of 
reporting large unfunded pension liabilities on their balance sheets. 
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53. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Two competing hypotheses are advanced in prior literature to explain why 
firms might terminate their over-funded pension plans (Alderson and Chen, 1986; 
Moore and Pruitt, 1990). The integration hypothesis implies that termination 
merely constitutes a liquidation of the financial slack, which was stored as a form 
of excess pension assets when firms experience financial difficulty. The separation 
hypothesis implies that a termination constitutes a breach of implicit contracts and 
results in a windfall gain (loss) to the sponsoring corporation. 
In light of the UK setting, a risk management hypothesis is developed by 
postulating an interaction between firms' accounting discretion over the ERR 
assumption and their propensity to pension terminations. Table 5.1 provides a 
brief overview of each hypothesis and their predictions concerning the pension 
termination decision. 
TABLE 5.1 
Predictions of competing hypotheses 
Integration 
hypothesis 
Termination 
decision 
Determined 
primarily by 
financial 
characteristics of 
corporate sponsor 
in termination year 
Separation 
hypothesis 
Determined 
primarily by 
pension plan 
characteristics in 
years prior to 
termination 
Risk management 
hypothesis 
Determined by the 
interaction of 
pension funding 
policy and 
corporate finance 
policy 
Inter-relationship Termination is No systematic Termination is between 
conditional upon relation between conditional upon discretion over firms' corporate discretion over firms' discretion ERR assumption finance policy ERR assumption over ERR 
and termination and termination assumption decision 
105 
5.3.1. Integration Hypothesis 
The integration hypothesis states that the assets of the pension fund are 
inseparable from the assets of the firm which sponsors a defined benefit plan. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the corporate finance perspective, which implies that 
the firm effectively owns the pension plan. According to this integrated balance 
sheet approach, the firm's pension benefit obligations are money-fixed liabilities 
of shareholders. FRS 17 appears to adopt the integration hypothesis by requiring 
UK firms to recognise any pension plan surplus or deficit on their balance sheet. 
Prior US literature explains pension terminations as being induced by 
existence of excess pension assets as a form of financial slack (e. g. Stone, 1987). 
However, this explanation is not applicable to the current economic environment 
faced by UK sponsoring firms. By contrast, most UK corporate sponsors are likely 
to report pension deficits under FRS 17 or from their latest triennial actuarial 
valuation, given the deflated capital market and their large equity exposure. Were 
FRS 17 fully adopted, unfunded pension liability would be required to be 
recognized as balance sheet debts. Although FRS 17 has no first order cash flow 
effects, the above statements imply that the adoption of FRS 17 has indirect cash 
flow effects. One implied cost is the increased contracting cost associated with 
moving a firm closer to debt-covenant restrictions due to the FRS 17 reporting 
approach. As a result, relative to former UK pension GAAP (SSAP 24), 
terminating pension plans in the current UK pension accounting environment has 
the effect of reducing sponsors' reported pension costs and future pension 
accruals, thus reduce firms' proximity to technical violation of accounting-based 
debt covenants. 
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During pre-FRS 17 period, a typical UK firm's leverage ratio can be 
simply determined by its non-pension long-term debt as reported in its balance 
sheet, since the pension funding was actuarially determined and accounting is 
effectively separated from funding. Much of the prior research uses the traditional 
leverage ratio as a proxy for the existence and tightness of accounting-based debt 
covenants (i. e. higher debt ratios are associated with covenant tightness). 
However, adopting FRS 17 implies that UK firms face incentives to reduce their 
unrecognized unfunded pension obligations on their balance sheets together with 
other non-pension debts. Therefore an empirical proxy 'pension leverage' ratio 
(PENLEV) was constructed to take into account the tightness of the accounting- 
based covenants prior to adoption of FRS 17 and the magnitude of the FRS 17 
effect on covenant tightness. PENLEV is calculated as the total long-term debts 
adjusted for pension liabilities (as disclosed under FRS 17) over total tangible 
assets. UK firms with higher pension adjusted leverage face stronger incentives to 
terminate their sponsored pension plans. 
Hypothesis 5.1: Ceteris paribus, firms that terminate their defined benefit 
pension plans have higher pension adjusted leverage than other firms prior to 
terminations. 
53.2. Risk Management Hypothesis 
FRS 17 also requires adopting firms to measure reported pension assets 
and liabilities using 'fair value' principles on a yearly basis. The adoption of 'fair 
value' pension accounting increases the volatility risks of the sponsoring firms' 
pension exposure since the market value of pension assets is now driven by short- 
term fluctuations in investment returns. Adoption of FRS 17 implies that employer 
firms are required to reflect changes in the market values of pension assets as they 
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occur rather than smoothing out the fluctuations over many years as was permitted 
under SSAP 24. UK firms thus face incentives to mitigate the risks of reporting 
volatile pension surpluses or deficits that stem from measuring both pension assets 
and liabilities on a 'fair value' basis. This motivation is referred to as risk 
management. 
One potential financial reporting tool available for mitigating such pension 
risks is the firms' accounting flexibility over reported ERR assumptions under 
SSAP 24. Firms that regularly update their ERR assumptions are likely to be more 
'confident' that can tolerate relatively greater volatility risks implied by adopting 
'fair value' pension accounting. This argument is corroborated by prior evidence 
which suggests firms switching to the 'market-based' valuation approach are those 
sponsoring larger, better-funded schemes during period 1994-1997 (Klumpes and 
Whittington, 2003). It is therefore postulated that firms regularly updating their 
ERR assumptions would exhibit less propensity to terminate their pension plans. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Ceteris paribus, firms that voluntarily updated their ERR 
assumptions exhibit less propensity to terminate their defined benefit pension 
plans than other firms prior to terminations. 
533. Separation Hypothesis 
The separation hypothesis holds that the assets of the pension plan are 
distinct from the assets of the sponsoring firm. This hypothesis assumes that 
workers have partly funded their own pensions through acceptance of lower 
current remuneration in exchange for future pension benefits (Cooper and 
Thomas, 2002). By assumption, the firm cannot use the assets placed in a pension 
fund for other corporate financing purposes. Contrary to the predictions implied 
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by integration hypothesis H5.1 and risk management hypothesis H5.2, the 
separation perspective predicts that firms" pension termination decision are not 
associated with either their proximity to violation of debt covenant constraints or 
by reference to managerial discretion over the reported ERR assumptions. 
Consequently, this study treats the separation hypothesis as merely a null against 
the hypothesis H5.1 and H5.2. 
5.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.4.1. Sample and Data 
It is plausible to assume that industry-related variables have effects on 
firms' discretion upon their actuarial assumptions and pension termination 
behaviour. For example, firms from the same industry may be offering 
comparable pension benefits to remain competitive in the labour market. 
Moreover, firms from the same industry might typically employ work forces with 
similar maturity and assume similar mortality and turnover assumptions. In 
discriminating between the alternative hypotheses developed in the previous 
section, it is necessary to control for the effects of systematic intra-industry 
differences upon corporate financing, pension funding and termination behaviour. 
The approach to match experimental and control group on variables that are 
believed to influence dependent variable, has proved to be useful to mitigating the 
above concern in the experimental design. 
Harrison (1977) matched on industry, systematic risk, and fiscal year-end 
in his study of discretionary versus non-discretionary accounting changes. Ghicas 
(1990) used industry-matched pair design to control for some industry- related 
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variables affecting pension liabilities in his investigation on the determinants of 
actuarial cost method changes for pension accounting and funding. Prior 
accounting research suggests that the use of control samples is particularly 
effective for assessing the sensitivity of corporate reactions to accounting events 
(Abdel-Khalik and McKeown, 1978; Brown, 1980; Harrison et al., 1983). 
Therefore samples of industry-matched ERR updating and non-updating firms are 
employed in order to discriminate among competing hypotheses and assess the 
posited inter-relationship between firms' pension accounting choices and their 
termination decision. 
Criteria were established to obtain two groups of industry-matched pair 
firms. First, a systematically different approach in determining ERR assumption 
had to exist between the two groups. In this case, firms chose to update their ERR 
assumptions regularly, a methodology subsequently endorsed by new UK GAAP 
(FRS 17), can easily be distinguished from those relying on traditional or 'sticky' 
ERR assumptions that were permitted by old UK GAAP (SSAP 24). Second, 
pension exposure had to be a significant factor in a firm's financial position. In 
this case, pension liabilities needed to be in excess of 5 percent of the total market 
value of the firm as at balance sheet date. The first requirement is important 
because the hypotheses assume that firms updating their reported ERR 
assumptions regularly can be easily distinguished from firms using 'sticky' ERR 
assumptions. The latter criterion is required because pension exposure must be a 
material component of the firms' value. 
Accordingly, the control sample was matched in the following industries: 
telecommunications, financial services, electrical manufacturing, steel, utilities, 
extraction, consumer goods, food manufacturing, travel and entertainment. All 
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firms included in the sample must (i) have complete, relevant fmancial, 
accounting and actuarial data available on UK domiciled Datastream over the 
entire study period 1998-2002; (ii) sponsor pension funds for which complete and 
relevant data is available over the corresponding period (hand-collected by the 
authors); (iii) are in continuous existence during the study period; and (iv) had 
issued equity capital that was actively traded in UK capital markets during 1998- 
2002; and (v) have been in continuous existence for at least 10 years. 
Restricting the sample to the above criteria and limited availability of 
detailed UK pension fund data reduce the sample size down to the total of match- 
paired 80 firms, covering the above industry classifications. The study period 
(1998-2002) was chosen because it represents the period during which firms can 
voluntarily switch toward a 'market-based' actuarial valuation method (Le. 
updating their ERR assumptions), as later endorsed by new pension GAAP (FRS 
17). All pension plan terminations occurred during the extended adoption period 
(i. e. when FRS 17 was in transitional implementation in 2001-2002). 
5.4.2. Research Methodology 
Most of prior termination studies have examined either firms' decision to 
terminate over-funded plans (e. g. Thomas, 1989; Mittelstaedt, 1989) or 
managerial discretion over actuarial assumptions (such as the discount rate) and/or 
actuarial cost method (e. g. Godwin et al., 1996; Ghicas, 1990) as two distinctive 
decision and modelled them as discrete outcomes in a single equation framework. 
To extend prior literature, this study examines firms' decision to terminate their 
defined benefit pension plans, and its potential linkages with their pension 
reporting choices. Recall evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that UK managers adjust 
the level of their reported ERR assumptions due to the financial statement concern 
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over the balance sheet leverage. It is plausible to assume that the incidences of 
pension plan terminations are not independent of corporate pension reporting 
discretion over the actuarial assumptions (e. g. the frequency of updating reported 
ERR assumptions). Ignoring such potential linkage can lead to biased parameter 
estimates in the empirical analysis. 
As opposed to estimating two separate probability equations, this study 
employs a bivariate probit model that explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of 
two potentially related corporate decisions (Greene, 2000). To capture finns' 
discretion over the frequency of adjustments made to their ERR assumptions, one 
categorical variable was constructed (1 is coded for discretionary behaviour of 
regularly updating reported ERR assumptions during the study period, and 0 
otherwise). Firms' propensity to terminate their sponsored DB plans is constructed 
as another categorical variable (1 is coded for the decision to terminate, and 0 
otherwise). The bivariate probit model can be written in terms of two probit 
equations of the sponsoring firms' termination decision (denoted by Tj=1 if 
terminate, 0 otherwise) and their discretion to adjust the ERR assumptions 
regularly (denoted by Sj=1 if update, 0 otherwise). The null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of the two discrete outcomes can be defined as the absence of 
correlation between the error terms across two probability equations and subject to 
a Wald test (Greene, 2000). 
This model allows for the explicit correlation between these two discrete 
outcomes and can be written as below: 
Ti * = 19xit + Cit 
(5.1) Ti=l if Tj* >07 0 otherwise 
Si* = fixi, + cis (5.2) Sj=l if Sj* A, 0 otherwise 
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where Eq. (5.1) represents the decision to terminate sponsored defted benefit 
pension plans or not; and Eq. (5.2) represents the discretion to update the ERR 
assumptions regularly or not. It is assumed that both ci, and . 6i, are normally 
distributed with means of 0 and standard deviation of 1, and the p is the 
correlation between these two disturbance terms. If a Wald test shows p is 
insignificant, then no endogeneity bias is present and the two models can be 
estimated separately as binomial probits. However, if p is significant and the log- 
likelihood of the bivariate estimate is significantly less than the joint binomial 
probit log-likelihoods, then indeed Ti and Si are endogenous processes (Greene 
2000, p. 849). Eq. (5.1) and Eq. (5.2) are simultaneously estimated using 
maximum likelihood, producing unbiased estimates of parameter coefficients# 
and p. 
Control Variables 
In testing the validity of the alternative integration, risk management and 
separation hypotheses, this study also controls for variables posited by prior 
literature in explaining pension terminations. The stock funding ratio measures the 
ratio of the pension plan's total assets to its total promised benefit obligations 
(SFUND). This measure, which represents that accumulation of both past funding 
practices and deviations in past investment performances, is required to be 
disclosed under SSAP 24 in terms of the relationship of the actuarial value of 
assets to liabilities. Under FRS 17, the stock funding ratio is expressed in terms of 
the relationship between assets to liabilities, calculated on a 'fair value' basis. 
Tbus the stock funding ratio reflects the accumulated effects of pension flows 
(contributions and benefit payouts) in the past and is sensitive to a range of 
reported actuarial assumptions. It is expected that firms with a lower stock funding 
ratio would exhibit higher propensity to terminate their pension plans. 
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The flow funding ratio measures whether an employer has set aside 
enough money each year to meet that year's requirement, where required 
contributions are determined by adding together that year's normal cost of benefit 
payments and the amount, if required, to amortize past unfunded liabilities. Flow 
funding ratio (FFUND), which utilizes pension flows (contributions and benefit 
payments) to assess the funded status of pension plans, is considered as an 
alternative proxy for the financial strength of pension fund. It is expected that 
firms with lower flow funding ratio would be more likely to terminate their 
pension plans. 
Pension plan maturity is the percentage of retired workers to current active 
members (PRET), which can be used to proxy for the current working capital 
needs of sponsored pension funds. Older funds with more retired workers are 
likely to demand non-trivial periodic contributions to meet the high level of 
anticipated fund outflows. They are likely to exhibit slower growth and slower 
profitability than other funds. By contrast, younger funds have implicitly higher 
proportion of younger workers and growth opportunities. It is expected that firms 
with higher percentage of retired workers to current active members will be more 
likely to terminate their pension plans because this will significantly reduce the 
volatility of required contributions. 
One explanation frequently offered in prior US-based literature on 
terminations is that firms build excess pension assets which accumulate at the pre- 
tax rate, and liquidate the 'financial slack' via terminations when firms require 
funds to finance positive NPV projects. This study argues that the existence of 
significant pension deficits, rather than surpluses, in the current UK economic 
environment imply a negative association between termination decision and firms' 
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investment opportunities. Following Ghicas, (1990), this alternative explanation is 
controlled for by developing an empirical proxy, the rate of undertaking new 
investments (RUNI). RUNI is expected to be negatively associated with firms' 
pension plan termination decision. 
5.5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Section 5.5.1 reports results from related independent sample t-tests and 
Mann-Whitney U tests for the sample. Section 5.5.2 reports the results from 
estimating a binary logistic model for the entire sample (hypothesis H5.1 and 
H5.2). Identical logistic regressions are performed for the 40 firms that elect to 
regularly update their ERR assumptions in comparison to the 40 industry-matched 
pairs that utilize 'sticky' assumptions (H5.3). Section 5.3 reports the corroborative 
results from the sensitivity tests. 
5.5.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics and related independent sample t- 
tests and Mann-Whitney U tests for terminating and non-terminating firms among 
the industry match-paired sample. All variables are reported in the last actuarial 
valuation year prior to terminations. Both parametric and non-parametric tests 
reveals that SFUND and PENIEV are systematically different (p-value<0.05) 
between terminating and non-terminating firms. The mean stock funding ratio as 
disclosed under SSAP 24 for the set of sample firms terminating their DB pension 
plans is 1.00, whereas the same figure for sample firms continuing their DB 
pension plans is 1.22. This evidence suggests that terminating firms appear to 
have less pension assets available to meet their defted benefit pension liabilities 
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than do non-termination firms. The 'pension adjusted leverage' of terminating 
firms is also statistically significant higher than non-terminating firms. The 
univariate test results indicate that the difference between terminating and non- 
terminating firms is statistically significant for their reported funding ratio and 
'pension adjusted leverage ratio'. 
TABLE 5.2 
Univariate Test Results for Explanatory Variables 
Vairiable Hypo- Termination Non-Termination 
thesis Sub-sample Sub-samples 
(n=33) (n=47) 
Matched Mann- 
pair Whitney 
Mean Median Mean Median t-test U-test 
PRET 
FFUND 
SFUND 
PENLEV 
RUNI 
(1)>(O) 0.480 0.470 0.422 0.330 0.279 0.025 
(1)<(O) 0.759 0.570 1.159 0.750 1.681 0.804 
(1)<(O) 1.001 1.100 1.213 1.090 1.691** 2.146** 
(1)>(O) 1.287 0.490 0.456 0.360 2.199** 1.674** 
(1)>(O) 0.029 0.115 0.059 0.013 0.851 0.230 
* Significant at the 0.0 1 level of significance (one-tailed) 
Significant at the 0.05 level of significance (one-tailed) 
Significant at the 0.1 level of significance (one-tailed) 
PRET= percentage of retired workers to current active members; 
FFUND= pension fund contributions / pension fund expenditures; 
SFUND= stock funding ratio disclosed under SSAP 24; 
PENLEV= long term debts adjusted for pension liabilities/total tangible assets; 
RUNI= (capital expenditures + acquisitions + R&D)/total assets. 
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Since multicollinearity inflates the standard errors and can lead to biased 
coefficient estimates in multivariate regression analysis, The Pearson product- 
moment correlations are reported in Table 5.3. 
5.5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5.4 presents results from estimating a bivariate probit model to test 
our competing integration, risk management and separation hypotheses. The first 
column displays estimates of the termination equation (5.1) and the second 
column displays estimates of the ERR updating equation (5.2). The dependent 
variable in Eq. (5.1) is the decision to terminate (1 is coded for termination and 0 
is coded for non-termination), while the discretion over regularly updating the 
ERR assumption is likewise identified as a dummy variable SWITCH (1 is coded 
for regular updating of ERR during the study period and 0 otherwise) in Eq. (5.2). 
Table 5.4 reveals that pension characteristic variables are generally poor 
predictors of propensity to terminate pensions. Neither PRET, measured by the 
ratio of pensioners to plan members, nor the flow funding ratio (FFUND) and 
stock funding ratio (SFUND) are statistically significant at conventional level. 
Therefore, empirical evidence is not supportive of the implications of labour 
economics perspective. By contrast, there is much stronger support for the 
implications of the integration hypothesis. The coefficient of PENLEV ('pension 
leverage ratio') is significant at less than 5 percent level. Consistent with the 
hypothesis H5.1, its positive sign means that firms with higher pension adjusted 
leverage exhibit higher propensity to terminate their DB pension plans. This 
evidence suggests that firms seek to mitigate the adverse effect of reporting 
unfunded pension liabilities through terminating their sponsored pension plans. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Bivariate Probit Model for Pension Terminations and ERR Updating 
Termination (Eq. 5.1) ERR-Updating (Eq. 5.2) 
(n=80) (n=80) 
Variable 
Exp. 
Signs Coef. 
Asymptotic 
t-stat 
Exp. 
Signs Coef. 
Asymptotic 
t-stat 
PENLEV + 0.025 2.35 + 0.652 2.87* 
SFUND 1.385 -1.26 + 1.692 1.78* 
FFUND 0.058 -0.43 0.212 -1.41 
PRET + 0.458 0.59 + 0.614 0.72 
RUNI 0.854 -0.71 0.554 -0.45 
CONSTANT + 1.847 1.36 + 0.701 0.48 
rhoa -0.405 ** 
Chi-square 28.91 P<0.01 
a rho is the disturbance correlation 
***Significant at the 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed) 
"Significant at the 0.05 level of significance (two-tailed) 
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance (two-tailed) 
Variable definitions: 
SWITCH= firms update their expected rate of return on pension assets assumptions were coded 
1; 0 otherwise; 
PRET= percentage of retired workers participating in the pension plan pension fund 
contributions/ (pension fund expenditures+ pension fund contributions); 
SFUND= pension funding ratio disclosed on footnotes; 
FFUND= pension fund contributions/ (pension fund expenditures+ pension fund 
contributions); 
PENLEV= long-term debts adjusted for pension liabilities / beginning year total tangible 
assets; 
RUNI= (capital expenditures + acquisitions + R&D)/ beginning year total assets; 
TERMIN= firms that have terminated their sponsored DB plans were coded as 1; 0 otherwise. 
The estimate of p, the correlation between the two probability equations, is 
-0.405, with a Wald statistic for the test of null hypothesis that p equals 0 is 4.088 
(p-value < 0.05). So the null hypothesis p equals to 0 can be rejected. Thus, this 
evidence is supportive of the risk management hypothesis H5.2. The termination 
behaviour appears not to be independent of managerial discretion over their ERR 
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assumptions. Specifically, sample firms updating their ERR assumption more 
regularly exhibit less propensity to terminate pensions than firms using 'sticky' 
ERR assumptions. 
Using a chi-square test, the overall model is significant at 1 percent level. 
Taken together, the results from estimating the bivariate probit model indicate that 
UK employer sponsors' decision to terminate their under-funded pension plans are 
related to the increased contracting costs caused by the potential adverse financial 
reporting effect of FRS 17. In addition, sponsoring firms' propensity to terminate 
their DB pension plans is inter-related with their pension reporting choices, i. e. 
discretion to regularly update reported ERR assumptions. 
5.5.3. Sensitivity Tests 
The evidence in Table 5.4 is based on pension fund and firm financial 
characteristics during the pre-FRS 17 period (i. e. 1998 to 1999). However, during 
the subsequent extended adoption period (i. e. when FRS 17 was in transitional 
implementation in 2001-2002), UK firms were also required to report by footnote 
their pension funding ratios calculated in accordance with FRS 17. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the reported stock funding ratio under SSAP 24 is calculated as the 
actuarial value of assets divided by the actuarial value of liabilities determined in 
accordance with 'best estimate' firm and fund-specific parameters. By contrast,, 
FRS 17 requires the application of mark-to-market valuation of assets and 
discounting of pension liabilities using standardised AA corporate bond rates. 
Sensitivity tests that examine whether mean changes between SSAP 24 and FRS 
17 stock funding ratios, vary systematically between terminating and non- 
terminating firms over the period 2001-2002, can be conducted to directly 
corroborate the major findings. 
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Table 5.5 reports, separately among matched ERR-updating and ERR- 
sticky firms, the mean SSAP 24 and FRS 17 stock funding ratios for terminators 
and non-terminators respectively, and their mean differences. For ERR-updating 
firms, where the adoption of market-based actuarial valuations will result in 
significant variations in reported funding ratios, statistically significant lower 
SSAP 24 pension funding ratios are expected for terminators relative to non- 
terminators. The risk management hypothesis H5.2 therefore implies that the 
mean change in differences between SSAP 24 funding ratios and FRS 17 funding 
ratios would be statistically significant lower for non-terminators than terminators. 
Results in Table 5.5 suggest that for ERR-updating firms, the mean 
A(SSAP 24-FRS 17) stock funding ratio for terminators is statistically significant 
higher than that of non-terminators. This evidence is consistent with H5.2. By 
contrast, for ERR-sticky firms significant variations in reported stock funding 
ratios between terminators and non-terminators will only occur upon adoption of 
FRS 17. Results in Table 5.5 show no systematic difference in mean A(SSAP 24- 
FRS 17) stock funding ratio between terminators and non-terminators found for 
ERR-sticky firms, consistent with this prediction. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Sensitivity Tests for Change in Funding Ratio 
Mean change 
in funding ratio 
Termination Mean SSAP 24 Mean FRS 17 A(SSAP 24 - 
status funding ratio funding ratio FRS 17) 
All firms NON- 1.132 1.059 0.048 
(n=80) TERMINAUNG 
TERMINA'nNG 1.047 0.958 0.069 
p-value for 0.019 
two sample 
tests of the null 
hypothesis that 
AFund,,.. t, > 
AFund,,,. 
ERR-updating NON- 1.127 1.052 0.071 
firms TERMINATING 
(n=40) TERMINATING 1.052 0.979 0.139 
p-value for 0.01 
two sample 
tests of the null 
hypothesis that 
AFund,, ontnn ý" 
AFundt,,. 
ERR-sticky NON- 1.139 1.064 0.062 
Firms TEFMINATTNG 
(n=40) TEFMNATTNG 1.024 
p-value for n. s. 
two sample 
tests of the null 
hypothesis that 
AFundnontrm > 
AFundt,,,,, 
0.941 0.082 
Mean SSAP 24 funding ratio is defined as the ratio of the actuarial value of pension assets to 
the actuarial value of pension liabilities, discounted at an equity-linked discount rate. 
Mean FRS 17 funding ratio is defined as the ratio of the market value of pension assets to the 
value of pension liabilities using an AA corporate bond discount rate. 
Mean change in funding ratio is the difference between the mean SSAP 24 funding ratio and 
the mean FRS 17 funding ratio. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed) 
"Significant at the 0.05 level of significance (two-tailed) 
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance (two-tailed) 
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Table 5.5 also shows that the mean stock funding ratios are also always 
higher for non-terminating firms relative to terminating firms. The mean reported 
SSAP 24 stock funding ratio is higher than the equivalent FRS 17 stock funding 
ratio for all firms, reflecting the impact of smoothing practices on actuarial-based 
valuations during a period of declining equity markets. 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter contributes to existing pension termination literature in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it examines whether economic decision concerning 
terminating defined benefit plans are primarily driven by financial conditions 
affecting the employer sponsor, or by fundamental characteristics of their 
sponsored pension fund, in an economic environment where the liquidation of 
financial slack explanation is generally not applicable. Secondly, it then explores 
whether such decision is inter-related with firms' pension accounting policy by 
estimating a bivariate probit model in which the corporate pension accounting 
discretion as a binary discrete outcome is allowed to be endogenously determined 
in the termination probability equation. This modelling approach represents an 
improvement on the existing binary logistic models in pension termination 
literature, relying only on single-equation estimation. Thirdly, it also corroborates 
main results through analysing pension funding ratios calculated under both new 
(FRS 17) and old UK pension GAAP (SSAP 24). 
By forcing UK employers to immediately recognize the impact of their 
pension funding decision on their balance sheet, FRS 17 challenged the traditional 
view that pension accounting is primarily intended to help employer sponsors 
spread their pension costs over time. This Chapter investigates the potential inter- 
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relationship between UK firms' pension accounting choices and pension 
termination decision during a period of regulatory uncertainty and changing 
accounting rules. Specifically this Chapter examines whether UK firms faced 
incentives to alter their chosen ERR assumptions to facilitate or mitigate their 
propensity to terminate their defined benefit pension plans. The rationales for 
exercising this discretion are characterized in terms of discriminating between 
competing separation, risk management and integration hypotheses of the 
termination decision and the inter-relationship between discretion over ERR 
assumptions and pension termination decision. 
Consistent with the risk management hypothesis, it is found that firms' 
termination decision are inter-related with their propensity to regularly update 
their ERR assumption. These main results hold even after controlling for other 
variables which prior researchers associate with pension plan termination 
decision. These results are also corroborated by further sensitivity tests based on 
differing UK GAAP funding ratios. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that 
firms' propensity to terminate their under-funded pension plans are associated 
with increased contracting costs caused by the anticipated adoption of FRS 17. 
However, pension accounting standards permit management to exercise 
considerable discretion over alternative pension accounting practices and actuarial 
funding choices, which may well be endogenous with their funding and 
investment policies (Klumpes, 2001, p. 31). The results in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 did not control for the possibility that management may seek to limit the impact 
of their pension exposure by exercising discretion over their pension funding and 
investment policy. In Chapter 6, the complicating effects of the endogenous 
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relation between the ERR assumptions, pension funding, and differences in 
pension investment policy will be explored further. 
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6. PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION DECISION 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The growing size of pension plans' assets and liabilities in relation to the 
market capitalisation of sponsoring companies raises the possibility that firms' 
overall financial position and prospects may not only influence its strategy for 
funding their pension liabilities, but also its allocation of pension assets among 
alternative investment categories. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine 
independently the potential linkages between corporate financial characteristics, 
the managerial propensity to exercise discretion over pension actuarial 
assumptions, and plan termination decision. Evidence is found that firms' 
decision to terminate sponsored defined benefit pension plans is inter-related 
with their related pension financial reporting choices. This finding implies an 
integration of pension and corporate financial decision and suggests a view of 
pension obligations consistent with the theoretical rationale endorsed in FRS 17, 
i. e. the pension liability of the firm sponsoring a defined benefit plan is part of 
the firm's financial liability. Similarly, within a corporate finance framework, 
companies may invest pension assets in a way so as to mitigate,, or to compound, 
the leverage and other risk-determining characteristics of their business. 
However, the firm's choice over altemative asset categories, such as 
equities versus bonds, is not well understood. Theoretical research prior to the 
1990s has developed competing hypotheses to explain pension asset allocation 
decision from a corporate financial perspective (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981; 
Treynor, 1977; Sharpe, 1976; Harrison and Sharpe, 1983). The tax-based Black- 
Tepper hypothesis implies that firms with over-funded pension plans should 
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invest in the most heavily taxed assets (such as bonds) to maximize their tax- 
savings because over-funded plans are less likely to default on their pension 
promises (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981). The 'pension put' hypothesis (Sharpe, 
1976; Treynor, 1977) implies that firms with under-funded pension plans should 
invest more in riskier assets (such as equities) to maximize the value of the 'put 
option' to default. 51 However, both hypotheses lack consistent empirical support 
from the scant volume of research on pension asset allocation (Friedman, 1983; 
Bodie et al., 1987; Peterson, 1996; Amir and Benartzi, 1999; Frank, 2002). 
Bodie et al. (1987) cautioned that further empirical research remains to be 
filled before a clear picture of these important corporate pension decisions can 
emerge. The objective of this Chapter thus is to seek empirical regularities in the 
UK firms' management of their pension fund asset allocation and its inter- 
relationship with their pension funding and pension-related accounting policy 
over the period 1998-2002, during which new pension accounting standard (FRS 
17) was issued and transitional compliance was in effect. It is important to 
undertake such an empirical investigation in the UK for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the UK pension fund investment strategy has evolved 
substantially over the past decades. With respect to asset allocation, it has moved 
through a period in which equities have been the predominant asset within the 
pension fund investment portfolio. Trustees and plan sponsors started to attach 
greater importance to the risk-taking part in their pension management. Changes 
in asset allocation strategy are taking place. Secondly, there is an accounting 
dimension to this topic. Pension earnings which hold a growing proportion of 
51 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insures US firms' pension liabilities in fuH in the event 
of default. The PBGC has a claim on 30 percent of the market value of the firms' assets. The 
PBGC's insurance of pension benefits provide the firm a 'put' option: it can shed its pension 
liabilities by giving the PBGC the assets in the scheme plus one-third of the firms' assets. 
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total reported corporate earnings are contended as being decoupled from pension 
risks under the traditional pension accounting framework (Gold, 2000). The 
'transparent fair-value' pension reporting standard FRS 17 issued in 2000 is 
likely to alter perception of risk in equity allocation strategy. Thirdly, a new body 
of theoretical research concerning pension asset allocation emerged in the late 
1990s (Sharpe, 1990; Leibowitz, et al., 1994; Blake, 2003). These studies 
developed asset/liability or surplus return models of portfolio diversification 
taking into account not only asset returns and variances but also changes in 
pension liabilities and their covariance with asset returns. Further empirical 
knowledge is also needed to test the validity of the above new theoretical 
insights. 
In contrast to the previous empirical research which has focused on 
testing either tax-based 'Black-Tepper' argument or 'pension put' effect on asset 
allocation, the study in this Chapter develops and tests the hypothesis that UK 
sponsors have managed their asset allocation with attempt to mitigate their 
pension exposure to potential volatility risk of the financial statements and/or 
cash flows during a period of accounting regulatory uncertainty. Using cross- 
sectional data on a panel of firms for the study period 1998-2002, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the relationships among asset allocation, pension funding 
and related pension reporting choices are, for most part, consistent with the 
corporate risk management objective of hedging the cash contribution risks that 
stem from measuring pension assets and liabilities at a 'fair value' basis. 
Controlling for the endogeneity among asset allocation, pension funding 
and the expected rate of return assumption choices, evidence is also found that 
the percentage of assets invested in equities is increasing with the pension 
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funding level, and decreasing at an increasing rate as the funding level reaches 
one specific point. In other words, the effect of pension funding on asset 
allocation exhibits a non-linear relationship. 
The rest of this Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 provides the 
institutional background required for the study and situates this study in the 
context of past research. Section 6.3 develops hypotheses. Section 6.4 describes 
the research methodology, variable specification, data and descriptive statistics. 
Results are presented in section 6.5, and concluding remarks in section 6.6. 
6.2. BACKGROUND 
The funding of a defined benefit pension plan, whether in response to the 
regulatory requirements or the dictates of sound financial management, leads to 
the accumulation of assets dedicated to the payment of plan benefits and 
administrative expenses. Pension plan assets and their capacity to generate future 
investment earnings are the primary source, at any given time, of benefit 
security, i. e. the assurance that accrued rights of the plan participants will 
ultimately be honoured. For example, if the assets of a fully funded defined- 
benefit plan are invested such that they earn a6 percent of return in a stable 
economic environment, on the average, about 70 percent of the plan's benefits 
will be paid out of investment earnings and only 30 percent will have to be 
contributed by sponsors (McGill and Grubbs, 1989). 
Productive deployment of pension plan assets directly reduces costs of 
funding a defined benefit pension plan. Prior empirical research also established 
that the asset allocation is the main determinant of the investment performance of 
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a pension fund (Blake et al., 1999; Brinson et al., 1991; Ibbotson and Kaplan, 
2000). Thus the decision to allocate plan assets among different investment 
52 vehicles has been a very important decision for employer sponsors. During the 
last four decades, UK employer sponsors have invested the majority of their 
assets in equities. Davis (1991) observes that the UK firms have maintained a 
substantially higher equity proportion than USA, Canada, Japan and Germany. 
Corporate strategic asset allocations in the UK have evolved since the 
1980s. Recent years have seen rapid changes occurring in both the legislative and 
accounting regulation for final salary pensions in the UK. 53 The case of Boots 
Group provides a perspective over the asset allocation decision undertaken by 
employer sponsors during a period of regulatory uncertainty. In November 2001, 
the Boots group announced that its f-2.3 billion pension fund, one of the UK's 50 
largest funds with 72,000 members, had switched 100 percent of its pension 
assets from equity into long-dated high-quality bonds. 54 Duration-matching by 
investing in fixed income investment products such as bonds can effectively 
reduce the likelihood of the accumulated assets falling short of the long-term 
pension liabilities (Blake, 2003). 
52 McGill and Grubbs (1989) identify four important objectives for investment policy of defined 
benefit pension plans. Firstly, rate of return objective: this can be qualitative or quantitative. 
Secondly, risk tolerance: this is the amount of portfolio risk that sponsoring firm is willing to 
take. Assuming that managers are rational and invest on the efficient frontier, increased portfolio 
risk implies greater expected return on asset. Thirdly, liquidity requirements: these depend on the 
specific needs of pension plans. Plans with more aged participants will need more cash for 
benefits payments and may choose to invest in short term instruments while plans with younger 
participants have a longer investment horizon and may choose to invest in long-term instruments. 
Fourth, diversification: this is to safeguard the interests of beneficiaries. 
53 Under 1995 Pension Act, pension trustees have a fiduciary duty to preserve the trust capital and 
to apply the capital and its income in order to protect plan beneficiaries. Pension plan members 
can sue for compensation if they suffer loss as a result of negligence by trustees. However, 
pension trust law is very flexible as well, which enables the trust deed to be drawn up in virtually 
any way that suits the sponsor (Blake, et al., 1999). This thesis therefore investigates the asset 
allocation from the corporate sponsor's perspective. 
54 The bonds are a close match for the maturity and indexation of UK pension liabilities, which 
has a weighted average maturity of 30 years and 25 percent are inflation-linked. 
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However, patterns of defined benefit pension plan asset allocation in the 
UK and USA have been relatively invariant over the last several years. The 
average equity allocation for a typical UK sponsor in 2002 was 73 percent 
(Urwin, 2002). US researchers contend that the actuarial smoothing in valuation 
of pension assets and liabilities has contributed to the high equity allocations by 
sponsors (e. g. Gold, 2000; Coronado and Sharpe, 2003). It is also claimed in the 
UK that the 'fair value' approach as espoused by FRS 17-style pension 
accounting standard would lead corporate sponsors to shift their asset allocation 
in favour of fixed income securities, in order to shield themselves against the 
potential volatility onto their financial statements (e. g. Financial Times, March 
20,2004). 
6.3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Recent years have seen changes in both economic and regulatory 
environments in the UK in which sponsoring firms are operating and managing 
their pension plans. Specifically, new pension accounting rule endorsed the 
corporate finance perspective that firms and their sponsored pension plans are in 
effect an integral economic entity. It is reasonable to assume that changes are 
likely to occur in the management of asset allocation by plan sponsors. 
Prior empirical research on corporate pension asset allocation has yielded 
rather mixed results. Inconsistence thus remains empirically on the extent 
pension funding, and other economic factors from prior research that appear to 
be important in explaining pension asset allocation decision. Chapter 3 suggests 
that further empirical research in a setting of changing UK pension accounting 
regulation can help to shed further insights into corporate pension asset 
131 
allocation decision. Consequently two hypotheses are introduced to test factors 
that are likely to affect asset allocation decision by UK sponsors during an 
extended FRS 17 adoption period, when the asset/liability framework has gained 
importance for corporate pension asset investment strategy. 
63.1. Financial Reporting Risk 
The release of new UK pension accounting rule (FRS 17) may alter the 
nature or perception of risks of employers' pension exposure. It was a common 
assumption that pending adoption of FRS 17 would expose UK sponsoring firms 
to significant balance sheet volatility (Veysey, 2004). Under FRS 17, the pension 
deficits or surpluses are required to be recognized on the corporate balance sheets 
once they arise. By contrast, SSAP 24 allows any surpluses or deficits to be 
spread over the employees' future working time, typically 15 years. 
If sponsoring firms were forced to recognize their past funding practices 
on a 'fair value' basis onto their financial statements, i. e. as required under FRS 
17-style pension accounting rules, then the desired positioning of the firm's 
consolidated pension balance sheet may not be attainable solely through actions 
executed to their long-term pension obligations, such as altering the level of 
reported ERR assumptions and/or plan terminations. Consequently plan sponsors 
are exposed to risks of having potentially volatile financial statements. However, 
managers can mitigate such financial reporting risk by choosing a different mix 
of equities and bonds. Investing in bonds has the advantage of obtaining a high 
correlation between assets and liabilities, which reduce the risk-adjusted pension 
surplus risk (e. g. Blake, 2003). 
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Following Bergstresser et al. (2003), a sensitivity measure (PENRISK) is 
constructed to capture variation in firms' pension exposure to the potential 
financial reporting risk. PENRISK is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of market value of pension assets to total net assets in a firm year. 55 
Hypothesis 6.1: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of assets invested in 
equities decreases as firms' exposure to the potential financial reporting risk 
increases. 
63.2. Contribution Risk 
Risky assets, such as equities, are characterized by their volatile returns. 
Finance theory suggests that higher risk of equity investment is awarded by the 
higher return it generates (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). However, if the 
volatile return on the pension assets translates into changes in the required cash 
contribution, then risky assets will translate into more risky required 
contributions to the pension plan (Blake, 2001). Culp (2001) suggests that the 
main concern of 'cash flow risk' managers is to minimize the volatility of 
changes in cash flows. With respect to the corporate pension management, one of 
the important factors that directly links the firm with its sponsored pension plans 
is the cash contribution (Peskin, 1997). Friedman (1983) finds some evidence 
that firms have incentives to time their pension contributions so as to smooth the 
reported earnings. It is indeed the sense of timing that makes the cash flow-based 
55 Bergstresser et al. (2003) suggest that such a sensitivity measure collapses the influence of 
outliers and brings the distribution of the ratio closer to that of a normally distributed random 
variable. 
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theories of value-enhancing risk management distinct from value based theories 
(Culp, 2001). 56 
UK firms face strong incentive to hedge the riskiness of their cash flow 
stream of pension contributions for two reasons: firstly, minimum funding 
requirements (MFR) subject plans with deep deficits (less than 90 percent) to 
accelerated cash contributions in order to make up the funding shortfall. 57 
Secondly, prospects of adopting the FRS 17-style pension accounting standard 
imply that sponsors are required to recognize their funding position using 'fair 
value' approach on an annual basis. Investors and other interested parties are 
becoming more aware of the relative magnitude and potential risks that the 
defined benefit pension sponsorship imposes on the overall financial condition of 
the firms on a timely basis. Thirdly, prior to FRS 17, firms' pension liabilities are 
not reported on financial statements. Shareholders and investors may judge the 
firm's performance by its reported earnings rather than by more comprehensive 
flow measures. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) find that market failed to 
distinguish between pension and operating earnings and capitalize them 
similarly. To certain extent, adoption of FRS 17 is similar in nature to a statutory 
increase in funding level for UK sponsors. 
By matching pension assets with liabilities, i. e. allocating plan assets into 
bonds, sponsoring firms can effectively reduce the volatility of their pension 
contributions, thus achieve to hedge their cash contribution risks. If the incentive 
is strong for sponsors to minimize the volatility of pension contributions, then it 
56 Culp (2001) argues that value risk managers are concerned about the value of the firm, either at 
a specific point in time (e. g. when debt must be retired) or over regular intervals (e. g. monthly 
changes in value). 
57 As noted in Chapter 2, effective in April 1997, legal restrictions were imposed on the ability of 
employer sponsors to under-fund UK pension funds through the introduction of a 'Minimum 
Funding Requirement' ('MFR'). UK firms with MFR funding ratios below 90 percent were 
required to make immediate cash contributions to their sponsored pension funds. 
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would be observed that firms with both extremely over-funded and under-funded 
plans invest in bonds because such extreme over-funding and under-funding 
afford less flexibility to adjust the timing of pension contributions than do firms 
with moderate funding levels. Pension plans with greater deficits are subject to 
the MFR requirement to make deficit-reduction contributions and those with 
greater surpluses have to conform to the tax regulations. 58 By contrast, pension 
contributions are fairly predictable for moderate funding levels, but less 
predictable when funding levels become more extreme. This discussion leads to 
the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6.2: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of assets invested in 
equities increases as the funding level increases up to a specific point, then 
decreases as the funding level increases beyond this point. 
The contribution risk hypothesis thus predicts a nonlinearity relationship 
between variations in funding level and pension asset allocation, thus provides an 
alternative explanation for the conflicting results from prior studies on the effect 
of pension funding on asset allocation. Amir and Benartzi (1999) find some 
empirical evidence on such a nonlinear relationship between pension funding and 
asset allocation. However, their study does not control for the potential 
endogeneity between pension funding and asset allocation. 
In Chapter 4, evidence is found that firms with higher leverage exhibit 
greater propensity to select relatively higher ERR assumptions during the period 
1998-2002. However, the research design does not provide a way to control for 
the possibility that the ERR assumptions can also be used by sponsors to manage 
58 UK corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans with a funded status in excess of 105 
percent were subject to taxation at a rate of 35 percent. 
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the level of pension funding, and subsequently their required cash contributions 
made to the plan. The former pension accounting standard SSAP 24 permitted 
UK sponsoring firms to discount pension liabilities at the same rate as the 
expected rate of return on pension assets (ERR) assumptions. This accounting 
flexibility thus provides incentives for UK firms to mitigate the contribution risk 
to fund the benefit obligations through exercising discretion to their ERR 
assumptions. This discussion leads to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6.3: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of assets invested in 
equities increases as the level of ERR assumption increases. 
6.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
6.4.1. Empirical Model 
Accounting researchers have recognized the importance of analyzing the 
potential endogeneity in the choices made by firms along different dimensions 
(e. g. Beatty et al., 1995; D'Souza, 1998). Treating endogenous variables as 
exogenous, or excluding relevant choice variables, leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates. Prior pension research has not taken into 
account of the simultaneity of pension asset allocation, funding and related 
financial reporting choices. 59 Causality is therefore unclear, and the same cross- 
sectional results can be rationalized by a variety of explanations. 
59 Mitchell and Smith (1994) employs simultaneous equations model approach to investigate 
pension funding in the US public sector. They attempt to control the simultaneity between the 
required per worker annual contribution (REQ), actual pension plan funding in the public sector 
(ACT) and average worker compensation package (AVEPAY). 
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It is possible that corporate pension asset allocation policy is conditional 
upon firms' long-term pension funding and their discretionary ERR choices. 
Corporate sponsors can exercise the discretion in the level of ERR assumptions 
to mitigate their contribution risk, and also increase the allocation of equities in 
their pension fund investment portfolio to justify the high level of the ERR 
assumptions. The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 provides evidence that 
corporate pension termination decision is indeed not independent of firms' 
pension reporting choices. Consequently, this study employs a simultaneous 
equations model to control for the simultaneity and accurately identify the impact 
of pension funding on the pension asset allocation decision. 
The hypotheses concerning corporate pension asset allocation decision 
are tested by employing a simultaneous model with three equations: asset 
allocation, funding and pension actuarial assumption choices. It is based on the 
assumption that sponsors can adjust their asset allocation, funding and related 
pension reporting choices simultaneously. Specifically, the system of 
simultaneous equations is specified as follows: 
%EQUIYX = ao + a,, FUND. +a FUNDSQ,, a PENRISK 
0'41 Ejzlýt 
19 21 + 3t 
ý+a 
(]>, 'X I lil + 79 + cig 
(6.1) 
FUNDit -= 80 + Plt %EQ UITYit + i82tE'? Rit 
+ Of2X2it + yt +62t 
(6.2) 
ERR 50 + 51t %EQUITYi, + i52tFUNDit + (D3X3it + 7t + 'c3t it 3 
(6.3) 
where % EQUITY is the percentage of equity invested by corporate sponsors, 
FUND is the reported stock funding level and ERR is the level of reported 
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expected rate of return on pension assets assumptions. 60 FUNDSO is the squared 
value of FUND. PENRISK is the sensitivity measure of firms' pension exposure 
to reporting risk. X, it, X2jt and X3jt are a vector of predetermined control variables 
in three respective equations; y, represents dummy variables for years 1998- 
2002. Eq. (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) model pension asset allocations, pension funding 
and ERR reporting choices respectively. c,, , . 61, and cl, are error terms. 
TABLE 6.1 
Variable Dermitions 
OloEQUI7Y= percentage of pension fund portfolio invested in equities; 
FUND= reported funding status under SSAP24; 
FUNDSQ= the squared value of FUND; 
ERR= expected rate of return on pension assets assumption; 
PENRISK= natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of pension assets to 
total net assets; 
LEV= firms' leverage ratio defined as total short-term plus long-term 
debt, scaled by shareholders' equity adjusted for pension 
expenses; 
PROF= mean of return on shareholders' equity over the preceding 10 
years; 
STDCF= standard deviation of operating cash flows (earnings before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation expenses) over the 
preceding 10 years deflated by the book value of equity; 
TAXST= total reported taxes minus the change in deferred taxes over the 
preceding year deflated by beginning year total assets; 
PRET= percentage of vested members over total number of vested and 
non-vested members, a proxy for the maturity of pension plans; 
LNSIZE= natural logarithm of market value of pension assets; 
ARR= contemporaneous actual rate of return on pension fund 
investment; 
SGR= salary growth rate assumption 
MKRTN= contemporaneous actual rate of return on a weighted market 
portfolio with an equivalent asset mix; 
RUNI= (capital expenditures+ acquisitions+ R&D)Aotal assets; 
JROA= changes in operating earnings deflated by beginning total assets 
adjusted for pension expenses. 
60 FUND is the same variable as SFUND variable used in Chapter 4, which measures the ratio of 
the pension plan's total assets to its total promised benefit obligations. 
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Table 6.1 summarizes the definitions of regression variables. The asset 
allocation regression (Eq. 6.1) is to provide empirical evidence on the hypothesis 
H6.1ý H6.2 and H6.3, while controlling for a range of economic determinants 
posited by prior research. The 'pension put' hypothesis (Sharpe, 1976; Treynor, 
1977) implies that firms for which the pension 'put' option is more valuable (that 
is, more in the money) will hold more of the most risky assets, presumably 
equities, and vice versa. The 'put' option is likely to be more valuable for under- 
funded plans, for unprofitable companies or firms with higher variability in their 
cash flows, or firms with more debt. The 'pension put' hypothesis is controlled 
for by using three proxies (LEV, PROF, and STDCF) consistent with prior 
literature (e. g. Friedman, 1983; Bodie et al., 1987; Frank, 2002). 
Firstly, LEV (long-term debt divided by total tangible assets) is a proxy 
for leverage. Higher leverage implies less debt covenant slack, higher probability 
of financial distress; and firms with higher leverage are likely to invest more in 
equities. Secondly, PROF (mean return on shareholders equity over the 
preceding ten years) is a proxy for long-term profitability. Less profitable firms 
are less likely to fulfil the fixed payments of retirees' benefits and thus more 
likely to invest more in equities to maximize the value of the option to default 
(Sharpe, 1976). Thirdly, STDCF (standard deviation of operating cash flows over 
the preceding 10 years deflated by the book value of equity) is a proxy for firm 
risk. Firms with higher variability in their cash flows are likely to invest more in 
equity to maximize the 'pension put'. Friedman (1983) finds a negative relation 
between firm risk, measured as income variability, and the percentage of assets 
invested in equities. He proposes a 'risk offsetting story9 to interpret his finding. 
The argument is that risky firms tend to offset the risks by investing in less risky 
assets in their pension plans, such as bonds. 
139 
To control for the tax-based 'Black-Tepper' hypothesis, TAXST (total 
reported taxes minus the change in deferred taxes over the preceding 10 years 
deflated by beginning year total assets) is included as a proxy for firm's average 
tax rate. Firms with higher tax rate would gain more by investing the assets in 
fixed income securities. In additional to the above control variables, the maturity 
of the pension liabilities may be an important determinant affecting the asset 
allocation decision by UK sponsors in the current economic environment when 
most of funds gradually mature and demand non-trivial fixed benefit payments. 
Firms with mature pensions may wish to invest more assets in bonds so as to 
achieve better asset/liability matching, thus reduce the likelihood of the assets 
falling short of obligations. 
Prior US-based studies find the plan demographics influences asset 
allocations (e. g. Amir and Benartzi, 1999; Friedman, 1983). PRET, measured as 
the percentage of vested member over total number of vested and non-vested 
members, is included to control for the maturity of pension plan. Finally, 
MKRTN (contemporaneous actual rate of return on a weighted market portfolio 
with an equivalent asset mix) is included to control for the argument that UK 
pension fund asset management is also partially driven by the herding behaviour, 
that is UK pension funds often benchmark their investment performance against 
other funds' performance and relevant market indices (Klumpes and Whittington, 
2003). 
The pension funding regression (Eq. 6.2) adopts the empirical framework 
employed by Francis and Reiter (1987) to explain corporate pension funding 
strategy, while controlling for the endogeneity among asset allocation 
(%EQUITY) and ERR assumption choices (ERR). The corporate finance 
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perspective holds the prediction that firms should over-fund their pensions 
because tax arbitrage enables firms to earn a tax-free rate of return on investment 
(Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981). Firms with a higher average tax rate are more likely 
to have a higher funded status. Thereby TAXST is included to control for the tax 
incentive for high level funding. 
The 'financial slack' effect has emphasized the pension fund's usefulness 
as a source of corporate liquidity or as a store of temporarily excess corporate 
funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Such slack could be kept in the form of either 
liquid assets, unused debt capacity or pension assets. Financial slack hypothesis 
predicts that the firms should over-fund its pensions to build excess assets which 
can accumulate at the pre-tax rate and be used when firms require funds to 
finance positive NPV projects. The proxy for the rate of undertaking new 
investments (RUNI), measured as the sum total of capital expenditure, 
acquisitions and R&D expenditure divided by total assets, controls for the 
'financial slack' hypothesis of high level funding. Sharpe (1976) argues that 
4pension put' is of greatest value to under-funded pension plans, therefore risky 
firms should under-fund their pensions to maximize the 'put option' value. 
Therefore, STDCF is included as a proxy to control for the firm risk to control 
for the 'pension put option' incentive of low level funding. 
The ERR regression (Eq. 6.3) replicates the empirical model developed in 
Chapter 4 to explain cross-sectional variations in reported ERR levels. In 
addition, Eq. (6.3) includes the level of funding as an additional endogenous 
variable. Finally, Bodie et al. (1987) find a negative association between the size 
of the pension plan and the percentage of bonds allocated in the pension 
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portfolio. So a general control variable is included, plan size (LNSIZE), in all 
three equations (Eq. 6.3, Eq. 6.2, Eq. 6.3). 
6.4.2. Estimation Methodology 
There are several different estimation methods available for 
simultaneous-equations systems (Greene, 2000, p. 652). In general, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method is not a desirable estimator if the equation to be estimated 
is one of a system of simultaneous structural equations. OIS would yield biased 
and inconsistent estimates of the system parameters because it ignores the 
distinction between explanatory endogenous and exogenous variables by 
ap lying least squares to each equation of the model separately (Greene, 2000). L- p 
Therefore a Hausman specification test is performed on the equation system 
specified in section 6.4.1 to check the existence of endogeneity (Hausman, 
1978). The result indicates that the exogeneity of asset allocation decision 
(%EQUITY) can be rejected at 5 percent level. 
Wooldridge (2002) suggests that extensions of the least squares 
technique, such as two-stage least squares (2SLS) or three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) method, can be used to simultaneous-equations estimation. 2SLS is an 
appropriate technique when some of the right hand side variables are correlated 
with error terms, and there is neither heteroskedasticity nor contemporaneous 
correlation in the residuals. 3SLS is appropriate when explanatory variables are 
correlated with the error terms, and there is both heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation in the residuals (Wooldridge, 2002). The F-test 
applied on the elements of the diagonal of the error covariance matrix of the 
simultaneous-equation system (specified in section 6.4.1) rejects the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity in the residuals at 1 percent level. A further 
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Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no cross-equation 
contemporaneous correlation between errors. As a result, 3SLS is applied as the 
appropriate estimator for this study. 
6.43. Sample and Data 
The main constraint on the sample size is the availability of detailed 
pension asset composition . 
61 The proprietary asset allocation data are hand- 
collected from the professional publication 'Pension Fund and Their Advisers' 
book ('PFrA'). The sample period consists of period over 1998-2002. During 
this period UK sponsors were subject to both legislative-imposed minimum 
funding solvency restrictions and differential pension accounting regulatory 
requirements. To be included in the sample, the sponsor firstly had to be a 
publicly listed FTSE 350 firm that sponsors at least one defined benefit pension 
scheme with complete pension asset allocation data available. Secondly, to 
increase the power of empirical tests, firms with more than 5 percent of their 
pension assets as 'unclassified' are deleted. 62 Finally, firms with missing data 
required for analysis are deleted. 
Following the above criteria, the complete asset allocation data can only 
be obtained between 60 to 70 firms per year. After eliminating outliers, the final 
sample comprises 279 firm-year observations. All the data used for this study is 
collected from the financial statements of the sample firms, Datastream and 
'PFrA'book. 
61 Frank (2002) also noted the obstacle to investigating DB investment policy is obtaining the 
asset allocation data necessary to compute percentage of bonds invested by pension funds. 
62 Amir and Benartzi (1999) and Frank (2002) deleted firms with 5 percent of the assets that are 
6unclassified' in their studies respectively. 
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6.4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
TABLE 6.2 
Distribution of Pension Asset Composition by Year 
Asset 
category 
1998 
(n=53) 
1999 
(n=56) 
2000 
(n=58) 
2001 
(n=55) 
2002 
(n=57) 
ALL 
(n=279) 
UK Equity 54.54% 54.27% 51.65% 50.64% 44.20% 51.06% 
OS Equity 18.19 18.26 18.36 22.77 20.60 19.64 
UK Fixed 7.95 8.37 8.64 8.02 12.48 9.09 
Interest 
OS Fixed 2.57 2.52 2.37 2.26 1.53 2.25 
Interest 
Index Bonds 4.60 4.57 5.55 5.52 5.00 5.05 
Property 3.23 3.03 3.07 2.01 3.04 2.88 
Cash 5.95 5.68 4.56 2.87 2.86 4.38 
Total Equity 72.73 72.53 70.01 71.21 64.80 70.26 
Total Bonds 15.12 15.46 16.56 15.80 19.01 16.39 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics on the distribution of pension 
asset composition in the sample. At the end of 1998, sponsoring firms allocate 
72.73 percent of their assets to equities and 15.12 percent to fixed income 
securities. On average, the sample UK firms invest significantly more in equities 
than in bonds. This evidence is consistent with the pension asset allocation of 
relevant population. UK firms on average invest about 49-59 percent of their 
total pension funds in domestic equities and an additional 16-22 percent in 
international equities (Urwin, 2002). The allocation to equities dropped nearly 8 
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percent in 2002 for the sample firms and an increase of nearly 4 percent allocated 
to bonds. Overall the sample pension asset allocation displays a slow trend 
toward a greater percentage of bonds among the overall pension asset 
composition during the study period (1998-2002). 
The dependent variable in the descriptive analysis is the percentage of 
pension assets allocated to equities (%EQUITY). Panel A of Table 6.3 presents 
the cross-sectional distribution of %EQUITY by year. %EQUITY varies 
significantly across the firms with a standard deviation of 13.66 for the pooled 
sample. To examine the frequency of asset allocation revisions, changes in 
%EQUITY are calculated over one, two and three years. Most firms maintain a 
constant allocation to equities (Table 6.3, panel B). Over a one-year period, more 
than 80 percent of the firms remained within 5 percentage points of their 
beginning allocation to equities. Over a three-year period, 80 percent of the firms 
decreased their allocation to equities by less than 12 percent, or increased it by 
less than 7 percent. Given the stability of equity allocation over the five year 
study period (1998-2002), this study focuses on cross-sectional differences in 
asset allocation rather than time-series changes. 
Table 6.4 provides means and standard deviations for the regression 
variables required for estimating Eq. (6.3) by year. The average SSAP 24 
funding ratio gradually declined from 1.144 in 1998 to 1.086 in 2002, reflecting 
the fall of the equity return since 2000. Over the same period, the maturity of 
pension plans increased by nearly 22 percent. The sensitivity measure of firms' 
exposure to financial reporting risk has increased gradually over the period 1998- 
2002 as expected. It is also observed that firms' profitability (PROF) exhibits a 
declining trend but the LNSIZE exhibits stability over the entire sample period. 
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TABLE 6.3 
The Distribution of Equity Investments ' 
Eq 
Panel A 
uity investments ranked by q uintiles ever y year 
Quintile 
of 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ALL 
Equity (n=53) (n=56) (n=58) (n=55) (n=57) (n=279) 
Investments 
1 (less 35.00 37.00 30.00 30.00 28.78 28.78 
equities) 
2 70.00 69.00 68.71 66.71 62.42 67.05 
3 75.00 72.62 75.00 74.40 69.25 73.00 
4 77.00 77.40 80.00 80.25 78.24 78.00 
5 (more 88.00 91.00 91.00 90.00 89.96 91.00 
equities) 
Mean 72.41 71.73 71.50 70.43 66.40 70.33 
STD 9.91 11.74 14.18 14.19 15.68 13.66 
t Test for 
Quintiles -5.85*** -11.96*** -14.36*** -8.93 -6.96*** -18.13*** 
5 versus 1 
Panel B 
The distribution of changes in equity investments 
Statistic 
(N) 
Annual Changes 
(120) 
2-Year Changes 
(80) 
3-Year Changes 
(51) 
Mean -1.36% -2.86% -4.70% 
Std. deviation 6.75 9.86 11.30 
Minimum -42.68 -42.66 -38.66 
loth percentile -6.00 -11.84 -11.68 
Median 0.00 -1.00 -3.09 
goth percentile 4.02 5.17 6.33 
Maximum 22.00 22.00 22.00 
'Equity investment is the percentage of the pension assets allocated to equities 
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TABLE 6.4 
Descriptive Statistics on the Regression Variables by Year 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ALL 
(N) Statistics (n=53) (n=56) (n=58) (n=55) (n=57) (n=279) 
FUND Mean 1.144 1.155 1.110 1.112 1.086 1.120 
STD 0.167 0.156 0.131 0.163 0.151 0.154 
FUNDSQ Mean 1.337 1.359 1.249 1.262 1.202 1.280 
STD 0.403 0.369 0.298 0.370 0.331 0.356 
ERR Mean 8.430 7.867 7.325 6.852 6.578 7.386 
STD 0.778 0.963 1.053 0.848 0.746 1.104 
PENRISK Mean -7.751 -7.561 -7.688 -7.723 -7.449 -7.624 
STD 1.055 1.074 1.644 1.688 1.340 1.367 
LEV Mean 0.183 0.188 0.205 0.221 0.269 0.215 
STD 0.136 0.128 0.129 0.146 0.284 0.182 
PROF Mean 13.518 12.502 13.728 9.498 7.820 11.296 
STD 13.488 14.105 11.528 10.307 10.677 12.226 
STDCF Mean 0.087 0.224 0.130 0.155 0.128 0.146 
STD 0.079 0.672 0.134 0.170 0.131 0.330 
TAXST Mean 0.032 0.027 0.032 0.025 0.065 0.024 
STD 0.227 0.029 0.042 0.021 0.038 0.033 
PRET Mean 0.426 0.421 0.445 0.490 0.517 0.462 
STD 0.226 0.217 0.241 0.263 0.237 0.237 
LNSIZE Mean 5.681 5.881 5.970 5.947 6.338 5.979 
STD 1.366 1.323 1.432 1.397 1.021 1.309 
ARR Mean 13.989 19.424 11.734 8.532 4.335 11.484 
STD 47.867 25.908 19.527 20.392 15.789 27.998 
MKRTN Mean 29.054 10.702 11.708 -6.526 -1.114 8.450 
STD 1.818 0.926 2.340 2.930 0.880 12.157 
RUNI Mean 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
STD 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
SGR Mean 6.12 5.58 5.14 4.65 4.33 5.15 
STD 0.82 0.89 0.87 0.71 0.65 1.01 
AROA Mean 0.26 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.13 
STD 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.06 
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TABLE 6.4 (Continued) 
Variable definitions: 
OloEQUI7Y= percentage of pension fund portfolio invested in equities; 
FUND= reported funding status under SSAP 24; 
FUNDSQ= the squared value of FUND; 
ERR= expected rate of return on pension assets assumption; 
PENRISK= natural logarithm of the ratio of market value of pension assets to total net assets; 
LEV= firms' leverage ratio defined as total short-term plus long-term debt, scaled by 
shareholders' equity adjusted for pension expenses; 
PROF= mean of return on shareholders' equity over the preceding 10 years; 
STDCF= standard deviation of operating cash flows (earnings before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation expense) over the preceding 10 years deflated by the book value 
of equity; 
TAXST= total reported taxes minus the change in deferred taxes over the preceding year 
deflated by beginning year total assets; 
PRET= percentage of vested members over total number of vested and non-vested 
members, a proxy for the maturity of pension plans; 
LNSIZE= natural logarithm of market value of pension assets; 
ARR= contemporaneous actual rate of return on pension fund investment; 
SGR= salary growth rate assumption ; 
MARTN= contemporaneous actual rate of return on a weighted market portfolio with an 
equivalent asset mix; 
RUNI= (capital expenditures + acquisitions + R&D)/total assets (rate of undertaking new 
investment); 
AROA= change in operating earnings deflated by beginning total assets adjusted for 
pension expenses. 
6.5. RESULTS 
0 6.5.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 6.5 examines the relation between each of the independent 
variables in Eq (6.1) and %EQUITY, using a nonparametric portfolio analysis. 
Each independent variable is divided into five equal-size portfolios, where 
portfolio 1(5) contains firms with the lowest (highest) values. The relation 
between the funding ratio of the pension plan (FUND) and equity allocation is 
consistent with the non-linear relationship as predicted in hypothesis H6.2. The 
allocation to equities increases from 67.43 percent for the first quintile to 71.79 
for the fourth quintile, and then it decreases to 68.24 for the fifth quintile. 
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Consistent with hypothesis H6.1, the measure of firms' sensitivity to financial 
reporting risk (PENRISK) is statistically significant in explaining the allocation 
to equities. Firms with highest exposure to financial reporting risk (fifth quintile) 
allocate 65.77 percent of pension assets to equities, whereas firms with the 
smallest exposure (first quintile) allocated 75.99 to equities. 
It is found that a negative association between the maturities of the 
pension plans and equity allocation. Firms with the more mature pension funds 
(fifth quintile) allocate 55.46 percent of pension assets to equities, whereas firms 
with younger funds (first quintile) allocate 75.71 percent. This evidence is 
consistent with prior findings in Amir and Benartzi (1999) and Peterson (1996) 
that firms with more mature age distribution of plan participants allocate more in 
bonds than equities. 
The effect of long-term profitability (PROF) and pension fund size 
(LNSIZE) are statistically significant in explaining the allocation to equities. 
More profitable firms (fifth quintile) allocate 76.93 percent to equities, whereas 
less profitable firms (first quintile) allocate 62.56 percent to equities. Finally, 
firms with smaller pension funds invest more in equities. The firms sponsoring 
smallest pension funds allocate 75.47 percent to equities, while the firms 
sponsoring largest pension funds allocate 67.75 percent to equities. 
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6.5.2. Results from Simultaneous-equation Estimation 
Table 6.6 presents results from three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimation of the simultaneous equation model of Eq. (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) for 
the pooled sample. Panel A, table 6.6 reports results from estimating Eq. (6.1), 
the asset allocation model of the primary interest. Consistent with hypothesis 
H6.2, the effect of funding level on asset allocation follows a non-linear 
relationship. The coefficient on FUNDSQ is negative and significant at 5 percent 
level. This finding suggests that the sample firms with extremely over-funded 
and under-funded pension plans allocated more pension assets into bonds than 
equities. This allocation strategy can minimize the cash flow risk caused by 
volatile pension contributions, as extreme under-funded plans have stronger 
incentive to avoid the accelerated funding requirements and over-funded plans 
have stronger incentive to avoid exceeding the full-funding limits. 
A second finding of most interest in the Eq. (6.1) is the significant 
positive relationship between firms' long-term profitability (PROF) and equity 
allocation. The 'pension put' hypothesis predicts that less profitable firms should 
be investing their pension portfolio in equities to maximize the value of the 'put' 
option. By contrast,, this finding suggests that sample firms with higher long-run 
profitability have allocated higher percentage of their pension assets in equities, 
consistent with the univariate analysis in section 6.5.1. 
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This result appears to provide some support for 'risk-offsetting' story 
advocated by Friedman (1983) that the less profitable firms face higher risk to 
default on fixed payments, thus prefer bonds to equities. Consistent with 
hypothesis H6.1, the coefficient on PENRISK is of negative sign as predicted, 
and significant at 10 percent level. 
Finally, the results in panel A, Table 6.6 suggest that the maturity of 
sponsored pension fund is statistically significant in explaining pension asset 
allocation decision. Other things being equal, the percentage of pension assets 
allocated to equities decreases as the pension fund maturity increases. However, 
the evidence is not supportive of hypothesis H6.3 (Panel A, Table 6.6). The 
coefficient of the ERR assumption is not statistically significant at conventional 
level. This finding suggests that managers' reporting discretion over ERR 
assumption is mitigated by factors uncorrelated with the underlying incentive to 
allocation of pension assets between equities and bonds. 
6.53. Robustness Tests 
The pooled time-series, cross-sectional regression assumes the 
coefficients are consistent across time and firms and the residuals are 
independent. To assess the sensitivity of the results to data choices and model 
specification, the asset allocation model is re-estimated using fixed effects panel 
regression to control for firm-specific factors that may affect pension asset 
allocation decision. The results from fixed-effects regression as presented in 
Table 6.7 are consistent with the 3SLS estimates as far as the main variables on 
pension funding (FUND) and the sensitivity measure on firms' financial report 
risk (PENRISK) are concerned. The coefficient on PENRISK remains negative 
and significant at 5 percent level, and the coefficient for FUND is positive and 
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significant. The coefficient for FUNDSQ is negative and significant at 5 percent 
level. In summary, the sensitivity test indicates that the findings are not driven by 
dependence among observations or the set of control variables included. 
TABLE 6.7 
Sensitivity Tests of Asset Allocation Eq. (6.1) 
(Fixed Effect Estimators) 
Variable Pred. Coeff. t-stat 
Sign 
FUND + 8.549 2.34* 
ERR ? 0.007 -0.41 
FUNDSQ 3.501 -2.25 
PENRISK -0.031 -2.18** 
LEV + 0.115 1.14 
PROF + 0.007 0.09 
STDCF + 0.051 0.17 
TAXST - 0.456 -1.62 
PRET - 0.275 -2.04* 
MKRTN - 0.002 -0.63 
LNSIZE - 0.019 1.44 
Adj-R2 0.179 
* significant at 10% significant at 5% significant at 1% for one-tail test 
Variable definitions see Table 6.1 
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6.6. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter contributes to the prior empirical literature on pension asset 
allocation in three ways. First, it takes theoretical insights from asset/liability or 
surplus return models of optimal asset allocation in hypothesis development. 
Second, it analyzes the effect of cross-sectional variations in funding level on 
pension asset allocation from alternative corporate risk management perspective. 
Third, it expands prior research by controlling for simultaneity among asset 
allocation, pension funding and related pension reporting choices. 
This Chapter examines the UK firms' management of their pension fund 
asset allocation and its inter-relationship with their pension funding and pension- 
related accounting policy over an extended period (1998-2002), during which 
new pension accounting standard (FRS 17) was debated, promoted and the 
transitional compliance was in effect. Controlling for the endogeneity among 
asset allocation, pension funding and expected rate of return assumption, the 
empirical evidence suggests that managerial discretion over asset allocation is 
consistent with a risk management explanation (i. e. firms seek to minimize cash 
contribution risks associated with adopting 'fair value' based pension accounting 
rules). In addition, it is found that the percentage of assets invested in equities is 
increasing with the pension funding level, and decreasing at an increasing rate as 
the funding level increases. In other words, the effect of pension funding on asset 
allocation exhibits a non-linear relationship. Contrary to prior research, the 
results in their entirety support the view that UK sponsors have incorporated their 
corporate risk management practices into the allocation of their pension assets. 
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7. SUMNLARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. SUNMMY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis investigates whether the observed economic consequences of 
the change of pension accounting regulation from SSAP 24 to FRS 17 are 
consistent with hypotheses predicted by alternative theoretical perspectives on 
employers' pension accounting. Specifically, the impact of pension accounting 
rule change is being investigated empirically on pension termination and asset 
allocation decision by UK corporate sponsors, and its linkages with pension- 
related accounting choices. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis examines whether UK managers exercise the 
discretion over actuarial valuation assumptions to manage the contents of 
financial statements during the study period 1998-2002, a time frame covering 
both pre- and post- FRS 17 period. Evidence is found that the level of the 
expected rate of return on pension assets assumption (ERR) chosen by UK 
sponsoring firms is driven by the financial statement concern over the balance 
sheet leverage. This factor is consistently significant over the entire study period, 
consistent with the corporate finance view's prediction that the pension-related 
accounting choices made by a firm are systematically related to managerial 
short-term financial reporting incentives. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis corroborates findings in Chapter 4 in the study on 
corporate decision to terminate their defined benefit pension plans. This study 
contributes new evidence to the pension termination literature that decisions 
made on these long-term pension promises are not independent of corporate 
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pension reporting choices. In addition, the results in Chapter 5 suggest that firms 
which terminated their under-funded defined benefit pension plan did so in part 
due to the potential adverse impact of FRS 17 on the balance sheet because 
contractual obligations are specified in terms of book leverage. 
Drawing upon findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, Chapter 6 of the 
thesis presents a related study investigating whether sponsoring firms may 
manage their pension asset allocation in a way so as to mitigate the leverage 
and/or other risk-determining characteristics in response to changing pension 
accounting regulation. Controlling for the endogeneity among asset allocation, 
pension funding and expected rate of return assumption, Chapter 6 documents 
evidence that the relationships among asset allocation, pension funding and 
related pension reporting choices are, for most part, consistent with the corporate 
risk management objective of hedging the cash contribution risk that stems from 
their long-term pension obligations. 
7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis has provided some unique insights into the change of UK 
pension accounting rule that has been debated and promoted in the context of 
competing theoretical perspectives concerning employers' pension liabilities. 
The pension accounting rule change from SSAP 24 to FRS 17 in the UK reflects 
some long-standing controversies in professional accounting and actuarial 
literature since the 1980s: (i) pension actuarial discounting assumptions; (ii) the 
necessity of pension asset/liability recognition; (iii) cost-based versus market- 
based valuation methodology. FRS 17 has substantially changed the valuation 
basis of employers' pension assets and liabilities, annual pension costs, liability 
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recognition and pension footnote disclosures. Both the concepts and the pension- 
related disclosures resulting from the new UK pension accounting rule (FRS 17) 
have promoted a more integrative view of the corporate pension sponsorship. 
Most importantly, the accounting standard setting bodies across OECD 
countries are increasingly adopting a 'fair value' pension accounting model as 
espoused under FRS 17. The pension accounting rule change in the UK has 
altered perceptions on the nature of the corporate pension sponsorship and risks 
inherent in providing long-term pension promises. Findings of this thesis in its 
entirety suggests that the corporate finance perspective of employers and their 
sponsored pension funds comprising a single economic entity promoted by FRS- 
17 style pension accounting rule has important financial consequences for UK 
corporate managements. 
Z-10 Ao such, it can be concluded that the role of 'fair value' based pension 
accounting can be: 
(i) a 'saviour': both the conceptual changes and transparency of 
information resulting from the change in pension accounting standard have 
promoted a more integrative view of the relationship between pension funds and 
their employer sponsors. 
(ii) a 'destabiliser': the volatility inherent in 'fair value' reporting and 
short-termist management of corporate financial policy might conflict with long- 
term funding adequacy and security of defined benefit pension plans. 
During the changing regulation period (1998-2002) investigated in this 
thesis, the contracting cost incentives underlying UK managers' actuarial 
assumption choices appear to be stronger since when new pension accounting 
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standard (FRS 17) was issued. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests a linkage 
between firms' pension termination decision and managers' discretion over their 
actuarial assumptions. These findings have implications to pension accounting 
standard setters in that the 'fair value' model in pension accounting appears to be 
susceptible to reliability problems arising from managers' short-term reporting 
incentives. 
73. LIMITATIONS 
It is noted that the findings in this thesis are subject to certain limitations. 
The generalisation of its findings is reduced by the use of a relatively small 
sample size in empirical studies presented in this thesis. The small sample size is 
partially caused by the limited data availability on pension actuarial assumptions 
disclosed on the pension footnote, termination and asset allocation information of 
UK sponsors. In particular, in the study on firms' decision to terminate their 
defined benefit pension plan (Chapter 5), the use of small dataset is limiting the 
finding on a statistically significant relationship between termination decision 
and firm leverage. 
Furthermore, the research design employed in the asset allocation study 
(Chapter 6) has not provided a way to control for the possibility that firms can 
choose to terminate their sponsored pension plans in order to mitigate the 
potential financial reporting risk as postulated due to the adoption of FRS 17- 
style pension accounting rule. Finally, due to the lack of pension liability data on 
UK sponsoring firms, the measure of long-term funding ratio that is used in this 
thesis is the one that is disclosed in the footnote of sponsoring firm's financial 
statement. This measure is likely to be a noisy measure because managers use 
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differing actuarial concepts in estimating pension liabilities, or even exercise 
discretion to pension discount rate for opportunistic objectives. 
7.4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Changing perspectives about defining the nature and scope of employers' 
pension commitments have influenced recent UK pension accounting standard 
setting activities, and these developments have implications for evaluating the 
existing strand of empirical research concerning the value relevance of pension 
disclosures. 
One interesting and potentially fertile area of research that pertains to this 
thesis is whether firms electing to disclose their pension exposures based on 
market (rather than actuarial cost-based) valuation principles provide potentially 
value relevant information to the investors. As suggested in Chapter 5, at least 
some UK firms updated their ERR assumptions as reported under requirements 
of SSAP 24, while others followed SSAP 24 literally by reporting 'sticky' ERR 
assumptions that are not adjusted in accordance to current market conditions. If 
interest rates change rapidly and market conditions are volatile, the sensitivity of 
reported pension assets and/or liabilities will be potentially value relevant to 
capital market participants. The empirical implications of such questions still 
await confirmation from future research. 
Another fertile area of future research in pension accounting is to 
examine the empirical implications of insurance perspective concerning pension 
contractual arrangement. Neither of the polemic views of corporate finance 
perspective and labour economics perspective about the economic relationship 
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between pension plans and employer sponsors appears to accord entirely with 
either pension law or economic reality (Bodie, 1990; Klumpes, 2001). Instead the 
insurance perspective makes an economically more plausible assumption that 
shareholders and employees both have complex contingent claims over pension 
surpluses and deficits. However, the empirical implications of insurance 
perspective for corporate funding and investment decisions have to date received 
scant attention from accounting researchers. The insurance perspective may 
provide further insights into understanding long-term pension commitments as a 
retirement income insurance provided by employers to employees. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: TYPES OF EMPLOYER SPONSORED PENSIONS IN 
THE UK 
The pension promise is inherently a long-term compensation 
arrangement. Under this agreement, a worker earns (46accrues") a right to an 
eventual pension benefit, payable after the employee attains certain eligibility 
criteria, with benefits frequently commencing at retirement and continuing until 
death. Two types of occupational pension schemes are commonly used by UK 
employers to provide retirement benefits to their employees: defined benefit 
pension schemes and defined contribution pension schemes. 
Under a final salary scheme the benefits to be provided are defined in 
advance based on earnings and years of service, and the contributions are 
calculated to secure these benefits. The key type of defined benefit pension 
schemes is the final salary scheme. Over 90 percent of active members of 
occupational pension schemes belong to final salary schemes. Under such 
schemes retirement benefits are expressed as a fraction (frequently 1/60th or 
1/80th) of the scheme member's final pensionable salary at retirement age 
multiplied by the member's year of pensionable service. Employers' 
contributions to a defined benefit scheme depend on actuarial calculations that 
project the likely cost of the promised benefits when workers retire, taking 
account of such factors as life expectancy, likely work force turnover, future 
pensionable earnings, and assumed investment returns. The annual pension 
benefit paid, however, does not depend on actual pension fund returns, since 
when actual returns are lower than expected; the employer is ultimately 
responsible for covering the shortWl. 
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In contrast, a defined contribution scheme defines the contribution to be 
paid to the scheme in advance and the retirement benefits payable depend only 
upon the cumulated value of contribution amounts, as well as related investment 
earnings. Money purchase scheme is the main type of defined contribution 
scheme in the UK. Under money purchase schemes contributions are attributed 
to the benefit of individual members, earning either a fixed or variable rate of 
return. The actual benefit at retirement, on leaving service or at death, is a 
function of the rate of return and the duration of the investment. The total amount 
of pension benefits payable depend on market rates for annuities at the date of 
retirement and not on the individual's final salary. Therefore investment risks are 
borne by employees under a defined contribution pension scheme. 
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APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT OF UK AND 
INTERNATIONAL PENSION ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
Date Event Pension Accounting Rule Development 
Panel A: UK Pension GAAP 
1983 Exposure Draft ASC proposes UK firms to disclose pension cost 
32 information by way of footnote 
1986 Exposure Draft ASC proposes UK firms footnote funding ratio and 
39 discount assumption 
1988 SSAP 24 ASC implements ED39; SSAP 24 effective 1990 
1995 Discussion Paper ASB discusses deficiencies related to SSAP 24; 
1998 Discussion Paper ASB restates intention to require UK firms to 
recognize pension assets and liabilities on balance 
sheets; in favour of market-based valuation 
methodology 
1999 FRED 20 ASB proposes UK firms to recognise pension assets 
and liabilities using market-based assumptions 
2000 FRS 17 ASB implements FRED 20; FRS 17 effective 2003 
2002 FRS 17 ASB postpones implementing FRS 17 until 2005 for 
re-issue of 1AS 19 
Panel B: International Pension GAAP 
1983 1AS 19 1ASC requires firms to disclose pension information 
by way of footnote 
1996 Exposure Draft IASC proposes valuation of pension assets/liabilities 
54 using market-based assumptions 
1998 Revised IAS 19 IASC implements ED 54 
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APPENDIX C: ACCOUNTING DEFINITION OF ALTERNATIVE 
NWASURES OF REPORTED PENSION LIABILITIES 
Pesando and Clarke (1983) examine accounting implications of pensions 
as labour markets institutions. In their exploratory study, Pesando and Clarke 
(1983) delineate two competing economic models of the labour market, the 
'implicit lifetime contract' and the 'spot contract' model, each of which they 
conclude bearing important implications on employers' pension accounting. 
Under the 'implicit lifetime contract' model, firms are a long-term 
4going-concern' and employees' total compensation is not necessarily equal to 
the value of their labour services performed on a periodic basis (Pesando and 
Clarke, 1983). An 'implicit lifetime contract' assumes a strong moral 
commitment between the firm and its employees, extending beyond the legal 
binding labour contract. Firms are therefore confronted with the ongoing need to 
recognize the accrued liability for the funding of future service costs. The 
projected benefit obligation (PBO) is the actuarial present value, on a specified 
date, of benefits attributed by the pension plan's benefit formula to employee 
services rendered prior to that date, assuming the plan continues in operation and 
that service and earnings of active participants increase at projected rates. 
According to Pesando and Clarke (1983), the PBO simply represents one 
component of the employer's long-term compensation obligation, and is the most 
consistent with 'implicit lifetime contract' model. 
Pesando and Clarke (1983) also argue that those who analyze the tax and 
related pension issues from the perspective of corporate finance perspective tend 
to adopt an 'explicit spot contract model', that assumes nothing but a legal 
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relationship exists between the employer and employee and employers thus can 
easily terminate pension plans. The accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) is the 
actuarial present value of benefits attributed by the pension plan's benefit 
formula to employee service rendered before a specified valuation date, based 
upon employee service and compensation prior to that date. This measure of 
pension liabilities is also a 'wind-up' measure since it identifies the precise 
amount that the firm would be required to discharge its 'explicit' legal obligation 
if the pension plan were terminated. 
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